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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters based on three applied theory papers, which
all use microfoundations to study mechanisms behind asset prices in the context of monetary
policy and Önancial stability.
Market Fragility and the Paradox of the Recent Stock-Bond Dissonance. The
objective of this study is to jointly explain stock prices and bond prices. After the Lehman-
Brothers collapse, the stock index has exceeded its pre-Lehman-Brothers peak by 36% in
real terms. Seemingly, markets have been demanding more stocks instead of bonds. Yet,
instead of observing higher bond rates, paradoxically, bond rates have been persistently
negative after the Lehman-Brothers collapse. To explain this paradox, we suggest that, in
the post-Lehman-Brothers period, investors changed their perceptions on disasters, thinking
that disasters occur once every 30 years on average, instead of disasters occurring once every
60 years. In our asset-pricing calibration exercise, this rise in perceived market fragility
alone can explain the drop in both bond rates and price-dividend ratios observed after the
Lehman-Brothers collapse, which indicates that markets mostly demanded bonds instead of
stocks.
Time-Consistent Welfare-Maximizing Monetary Rules. The objective of this
study is to jointly explain capital prices, bond prices and money supply/demand. We an-
alyze monetary policy from the perspective that a Central Bank conducts monetary policy
serving the ultimate goal of maximizing social welfare, as dictated by a countryís constitu-
tion. Given recent empirical Öndings that many households are hand-to-mouth, we study
time-consistent welfare-maximizing monetary-policy rules within a neoclassical framework
of a cash-in-advance economy with a liquidity-constrained good. The Central Bank per-
forms open-market operations buying government bonds in order to respond to Öscal shocks
i
and to productivity shocks. We formulate the optimal policy as a dynamic Stackelberg
game between the Central Bank and private markets. A key goal of optimal monetary pol-
icy is to improve the mixture between liquidity constrained and non-liquidity constrained
goods. Optimal monetary responses to Öscal shocks aim at stabilizing aggregate consump-
tion áuctuations, while optimal monetary responses to productivity shocks allow aggregate
consumption áuctuations to be more volatile.
Jump Shocks, Endogenous Investment Leverage and Asset Prices: Analytical
Results. The objective of this study is to jointly model leveraging and stock prices in an
environment with rare stock-market disaster shocks. Financial intermediaries invest in the
stock market using household savings. This investment leveraging, and its extent, a§ects
stock price movements and, in turn, stock-price movements a§ect investment leveraging. If
the price mechanism is unable to absorb a rare stock-market disaster, then with leverage
ratios of 20 or more, Önancial intermediaries can go bankrupt. We model the interplay be-
tween leverage ratios and stock prices in an environment with rare stock-market disaster
shocks. First we introduce dividend shocks that follow a Poisson jump process to an endow-
ment economy with pure exchange between two types of agents: (i) shareholders of Önancial
intermediaries that invest in the stock market (ìexpertsî), and (ii) savers, who deposit their
savings to Önancial intermediaries (households). Under the assumption that the households
and the so called "experts" both have logarithmic utility, we obtain a closed-form solution
for the endowment economy. This closed-form solution serves as a guide for numerically
solving the model with recursive Epstein-Zin preferences in continuous-time settings. In
our extension we introduce production based on capital investments, but with adjustment
costs for investment changes. Jump shocks directly hit the productive capital stock, but the
way they ináuence stock returns of productive Örms passes through the leveraging channel,
ii
which is endogenous. The production economy also has endogenous growth, and investment
adjustment costs partly ináuence the modelís stability properties. Importantly, risk has an
endogenous component due to leveraging, and this endogenous-risk component ináuences
growth opportunities, bridging endogenous cycles with endogenous growth. This chapter is
part of a broader project on Önancial stability. Future extensions will include an evaluation
of the Basel II-III regulatory framework in order to assess their e§ectiveness and their impact
on growth performance.
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation consists of three chapters based on three applied theory papers, which all
use microfoundations to study mechanisms behind asset prices in the context of monetary
policy and Önancial stability. For the design of optimal monetary policy and macroprudential
policy, it is essential to understand the mechanisms behind investment decisions in all asset
markets. The following three chapters intend to shed light on the underlying mechanisms.
The Örst chapter is titled ìMarket fragility and the paradox of the recent stock-bond
dissonanceî. It is joint work with Christos Koulovatianos and Jian Li. It appeared as a
Center for Financial Studies (CFS) Working Paper, No. 589 in 2017 and a shorter version
of this chapter has been published in Economics Letters, Volume 162, in January 2018. We
ask whether, based on current market observations, stock and bond markets are dissonant.
Asset pricing theory teaches us that when markets demand more stocks, asset prices increase
and bond prices decrease (bond rate increases) and vice versa, when markets demand more
bonds, bond prices increase (bond rate decreases) and asset prices decrease. Currently, we
observe that in the post-Lehman-Brothers period, the real US stock market index has grown
above and beyond its pre-Lehman-Brothers peak at an annual rate exceeding real-GDP
growth. On the other hand, in the same period, we observe that the real 6-month bond
rate has decreased signiÖcantly. These two observations seem as a stock-bond dissonance
according to standard asset pricing theory. To explain this paradox of the persistent growth
of stock prices and the persistent drop in bond rates, we use the Lucas (1978) asset pricing
model with rare disasters, as in Barro (2006). The seeming stock-bond dissonance can
be explained by a post-crisis shift in investorsí expectations. SpeciÖcally, an increase in
investorsí perceived frequency of a rare-disaster shock can explain the paradox. Because
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shifts in expectations are unobservable, we have employed a calibrated asset-pricing model
that addresses the impact of expectations on observed asset prices. Our research urges to
not misinterpret seemingly good market trends as market robustness at times of underlying
market fragility.
The second chapter is titled ìTime-consistent welfare-maximizing monetary rulesî and
is joint work with Christos Koulovatianos. We are interested in how a Central Bank should
optimally respond to Öscal and productivity shocks, taking into account that households
face liquidity constraints. Empirical research shows that large fractions of households are
hand-to-mouth, hence they face liquidity constrains. As consumption choices are ináuenced
by bond markets and Central Banks do open-market operations, how should the presence of
liquidity-constrained households a§ect monetary policy? In order to answer this question, we
employ a cash-in-advance model with two types of consumption goods: a credit-constrained
and a non-credit constrained good. The Central Bank performs open-market operations in
order to manage money supply. Its objective is to maximize social welfare. To derive the
optimal time-consistent monetary policy, we use concepts and algorithms from the literature
on optimal time-consistent Öscal policy. We Önd that optimal time-consistent monetary
policy has real e§ects along the transition to the steady state from a shock. Along the
transition, monetary policy improves the distorted ratio between the two consumption-good
types. Fiscal shocks are o§set and productivity shocks are accommodated by optimal time-
consistent monetary policy.
The third chapter is titled ìJump shocks, endogenous investment leveraging and asset
prices: analytical resultsî and is part of a bigger project with Christos Koulovatianos and
Jian Li. The question of the broader project is, how capital requirements can ináuence
balance sheets of banks and asset prices in general? One could also rephrase the question to,
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how does leverage impact investments into the real economy and what is the optimal level
of leverage for Önancial intermediaries? An answer to this could shed light on the mechanics
of Önancial stability and the design of optimal macroprudential policy. Insights about the
optimal leverage ratio provided by a model can guide the design of capital requirements. A
key question is whether Önancial intermediaries stay too close to the boundary of optimal
capital requirements. For example, banks may stay above that boundary foreseeing future
requirements in order to avoid future pressures to rebalance.
This bigger project is motivated by the 2008 Önancial crisis, which revealed the need to
better understand the source of Önancial instability. Reinhart and Rogo§ (2009) documented
that ìwe have been there beforeî. Similar persistent declines and long-lasting changes in
asset prices, output or investment were observed after Önancial crisis, which motivates the
need to make the Önancial system more resilient.
In order to achieve this, one needs to develop analytical results, that can serve as guides
for calibration and computation. The third chapter takes this step, focusing on theory and
o§ering some key analytical results on this class of models of Önancial stability with disaster
risk. A crucial gap in the literature is the understanding of asset allocation in a world of
rare disaster shocks. The goal is to jointly analyze both the leverage ratio of intermediaries
and asset prices, in a micro-founded continuous-time framework with endogenous growth
and exogenous jump shocks, in order to study how the anticipation of rare disasters a§ects
the mechanism behind Önancial stability.
In all three chapters we use microfoundations and focus on asset pricing. The optimal
design of monetary and macroprudential policy relies on understanding the mechanisms
behind asset pricing, behind investments in all asset markets. The driver of asset pricing is
utility maximization of all agents. Endogenous asset pricing makes allocations of wealth in
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the economy sensitive to future-earnings expectations. In the Örst chapter we jointly explain
stock prices and bond prices. We show how in an extended Lucasí asset pricing tree model
(Lucas (1978)) small changes in expectations, triggered by extreme-tail events, impact asset
allocations of economic agents and therefore asset pricing. In the second chapter we model
the Central Bank as a benevolent social planner, who maximizes social welfare by recognizing
the ultimate means through which households achieve utility (consumption and leisure). The
Central Bank makes open market operations, which has an impact on money, capital price
and bond price in our model economy. In the third chapter, asset prices are driven through
utility maximization of unproductive households and intermediaries which help channelling
resources from unproductive households to productive investments. Those intermediaries
use household savings to invest in the stock market. We model leveraging and stock prices
in an environment with rare stock-market disaster shocks, both in an endowment economy
and a production economy with logarithmic utility and Epstein-Zin preferences.
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1. CHAPTER
Market Fragility and the Paradox of the Recent Stock-Bond
Dissonance
1.1 Introduction
Since the Örst oil crisis of 1973, the US stock exchange has been marked by two major setback
episodes of its aggregate dividend index : the dot-com bust and the Lehman-Brothers collapse
(see Figure 1.1). These two disaster episodes mark two subperiods, as depicted by Figure
1.1: the pre- and post-Lehman-Brothers regimes.
In the post-Lehman-Brothers period (subperiod 2), by the end of July 2017, the stock
market has grown above and beyond its pre-Lehman-Brothers peak by more than 36% in
real terms (58% in nominal terms). On the other hand, we see that the real 6-month bond
rate has decreased signiÖcantly from a mean bond rate of 0.33% in subperiod 1 to -1.29% in
subperiod 2. This high increase in stock prices together with persistently negative bond rates
after the Lehman-Brothers collapse, looks like a stock-bond dissonance according to standard
asset pricing theory. We further observe that the price-dividend ratio has signiÖcantly fallen
from subperiod 1 to subperiod 2 from 60.24 to 49.26 as depicted in Table 1.1. These two
empirical observations are essential for explaining the current stock-bond dissonance. Later
in the subsection 1.4.1 these are our four targets which we want to match.
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Figure 1.1 - US Data. Flat lines are statistics reported in Table 1.1. Sources: Datastream
(TOTMKUS) and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), 6-Month
Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate (TB6MS).
According to standard asset-pricing theory, it is reasonable to think that investors have
rebalanced their portfolios, demanding more stocks instead of bonds. If this was true, then
the bond price would have fallen, leading to an increase in the bond rate. However, in
the post-Lehman-Brothers period, the bond rate has signiÖcantly decreased and persistently
stayed in a negative regime. This stock-bond dissonance, (a) the persistent drop in bond
rates, and (b) the persistent growth of stock prices, is a paradox.
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subperiods 1 2
2000/7ñ2008/1 2008/2ñ2017/7
mean real interest rate 0:33% (1:32%) !1:29% (1:12%) b
median P-D ratio a 60:24 (3:05) 49:26 (2:31) c
Table 1.1 - Descriptive statistics. Bond rate, and P-D-ratio statistics that appear in Figure 1.1.
a Medians are reported when normality tests fail. Standard errors are reported in parentheses for
means and median absolute deviations for medians.
b Di§erence-of-means t-test for di§erence from previous subperiodís statistic is 9.53 (p-value is 0).
c Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for di§erence from previous subperiodís median is 12.13 (p-value is
0).
To explain this stock-bond dissonance we use the Lucas (1978) asset pricing model with
rare disasters as in Barro (2006). We focus on two key observations in the data, which are the
signiÖcant drop in the bond rate and the signiÖcant drop in the price-dividend ratio, which
we try to match with the model. We show that a change in investorsí expectations about
the frequency of rare disasters can explain the observed dissonance. More precisely, after
the Lehman-Brothers collapse, the investors have the perception of higher market fragility,
i.e. higher disaster risk hitting the real economy, such as a sudden drop in dividends. In our
calibration exercise we show that without changing the investorsí preference parameters, nor
market fundamentals, in both subperiods, the model can match the data only by allowing
for an increase in investorsí perceived frequency of a rare disaster.
Our model builds upon investorsí increasing fear for more frequent market disruptions.
As in Barro (2006) a rare disaster can be any low-probability event that triggers a sharp
drop in per capita GDP or consumption. An economic disaster can be triggered by economic
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events that a§ect the business sector and speciÖcally the aggregate dividend index (Great
Depression in 1929, the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis), by natural disasters, or by
wartime destruction (World War I, World War II, nuclear conáicts). As in the asset-pricing
literature with rare disaster risks, e.g., Barro (2006, 2009), Gabaix (2012), Gourio (2012),
and Wachter (2013), we assume that rare disasters are exogenous events. Although bonds
are not a perfect hedge against disaster risks, investors substitute bonds for stocks in case
of higher market fragility.
According to our model, an explanation to the paradox is based on investorsí perceptions
about disaster risk: investors think that disasters occur once every 30 years on average
compared to once every 60 years on average before the Lehman-Brothers collapse. Our
argument is based on the fact that there is no decrease in the dividend growth rate nor
an increase in the dividend volatility (outside crashes) observed after the Lehman-Brothers
collapse. So, without changing perceptions about disaster risk (market fragility), the drop
in the price-dividend ratio or the drop in the bond rate cannot be explained.
Our sensitivity analysis supports our market-fragility explanation. Being aware that
disaster risk is considered to be ìdark matterî, in our sensitivity analysis, we use a range of
initial disaster probabilities from 1.7% to 2.5% in subperiod 1 and doubling the frequency
for subperiod 2. Our model still performs relatively well which reconÖrms our working
hypothesis of an increase in market fragility.
We also calibrate our model allowing for the possibility of a partial default in government
bonds, making them not completely risk-free. We show that the sovereign-default risk is less
important quantitatively to explain the observed stock-bond dissonance. Indeed sovereign-
default risk raises the government bond rate as markets require a default premium. Hence,
it is market fragility alone that can explain the persistently negative government bond rates.
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Our market-fragility explanation is in line with a number of studies focusing on rare
disaster risks in asset pricing. First, an ináuential body of literature suggests that disaster
risk is variable. More speciÖcally we refer to Gabaix (2012), Gourio (2012), and Wachter
(2013), who demonstrate that this variability can explain many asset-pricing puzzles. In
addition, Marfe and Penasse (2017) Önd empirical evidence for disaster-risk variability. An-
other body of literature assumes imperfect information about rare disaster risk and argues
that parameter learning implies more pessimistic disaster-risk beliefs after a rare disaster
(Collin-Dufresne et al., 2016, Koulovatianos and Wieland, 2017, and Kozlowski et al., 2017).
All these studies agree that after the Lehman-Brothers collapse, beliefs about rare disaster
risk should be more pessimistic, backing up the working hypothesis examined in this paper.
Yet, for the sake of simplicity, here we employ only rational expectations and an unexpected
post-disaster structural break.
Due to challenges in observing disaster risk, John Campbell in his 2008 Princeton Finance
lectures called disaster risk the ìdark matter for economistsî. But ever since much progress
has been made regarding disaster-risk estimation and its role in calibration. Chen, Joslin and
Tran (2012) demonstrate that small changes in the distribution of heterogeneous beliefs can
have substantial impact on the aggregate-market implications of disaster risk. Chen, Dou
and Kogan (2017) also stress that disaster risk is di¢cult to infer, and o§er a comprehensive
robustness measure for estimating asset-pricing models with disaster risk.
1.2 More empirical details on the paradox
To describe the aggregate dividend process, depicted in Figure 1.1, we assume that, as in
Barro (2006, 2009), dividends, Dt, follow the process,
ln (Dt+1) = #! $
2
2
+ ln (Dt) + $"t+1 + &t+1 ln
!
1! 't+1
"
, (1.1)
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in which the random term "t+1 " N(0; 1), is i.i.d. normal with mean 0 and variance 1. The
random term, &t+1,
&t+1 =
8><>: 10
,
,
with Prob. *
with Prob. 1! *
, (1.2)
introduced low-probability, rare disasters to the dividend process, i.e., with probability *
2 (0; 1) dividends are hit by a negative rare disaster shock of size 't+1. Variable 't+1 2 (0; 1)
is a random variable with given time-invariant distribution and compact support, Z % (0; 1).
An interesting feature of the post-Lehman-Brothers stock prices is that the P-D ratio
has fallen signiÖcantly (see Figure 1.1 and Table 1.1). For explaining the persistent drop
in the P-D ratio, it would be reasonable to focus on changes in fundamentals. The three
parameters involved in equations (1.1) and (1.2) are #, $, and *. We Örst examine whether
the transition from subperiod 1 to subperiod 2 has been marked by any changes in the trend,
#, and in the component of volatility that is not related to disasters, namely parameter $.
Interestingly, neither #, nor $ have changed across subperiods 1 and 2.
1.2.1 What remained constant across subperiods 1 and 2: the
dividend trend and the non-crash dividend volatility
In order to see that neither #, nor $ changed across subperiods 1 and 2, we Örst need to
obtain an estimate for $, the non-disaster-shock dividend volatility, by excluding crash-
episode periods. The criterion for determining non-crash periods is explained by Figure
1.2.
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Figure 1.2 - Three-month LIBOR-OIS Spread (US daily data). Source for London
Interbank O§ered Rate (LIBOR): Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Research
Division. Source for Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS): Datastream.
Figure 1.2 depicts the spread between the 3-month London Interbank O§ered Rate (LI-
BOR) and the 3-month Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS). According to Thornton (2009, p.
1), the LIBOR-OIS spread is ìa measure of the health of banks because it reáects what banks
believe is the risk of default associated with lending to other banks.î This interpretation of
the LIBOR-OIS spread, and the overall pattern revealed by Figure 1.2, motivate that a sys-
tematic rise of the LIBOR-OIS spread above 50 basis points indicates times of problems in
the banking sector. The Örst green vertical line indicates the date at which the LIBOR-OIS
spread suddenly increased beyond the 50-basis-points threshold. That date was August 9,
2007, when BNP Paribas, Franceís largest bank, announced that it would halt redemptions
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on three investment funds (see St. Louis Fed, 2007). Certainly, this date marked the start of
a broader period of uneasiness regarding the solvency of the banking sector. Nevertheless, the
50-basis-points threshold of the LIBOR-OIS spread has been exceeded systematically only
since February 2008. Therefore, February 2008, marked by the red vertical line in Figure 1.2,
is the cuto§ month separating subperiod 1 (the pre-subprime-crisis phase / Lehman-Brothers
collapse) and subperiod 2 (the post-subprime-crisis phase / Lehman-Brothers collapse) in
our sample.
Table 1.2 presents statistics regarding the average dividend growth rate (means and
medians), and also a measure of variability of the dividend growth rate, but focusing on the
non-disaster-shock dividend volatility across subperiods 1 and 2.
subperiods 1 2
2000/7ñ2008/1 2008/2ñ2017/7
mean dividend growth rate 5:59 a
(12:02)
4:89
(17:27)
b
median dividend growth rate 4:88
(6:23)
6:66
(5:67)
standard deviation of dividend growth rate
(excluding crash period)
12:22 11:57
Table 1.2 - Descriptive statistics of dividends in real terms appearing in Figure 1.1. All
numbers are percentages. Standard errors are reported in parentheses for means, and median
absolute deviations are reported for medians.
a Normality test does not fail (Jarque-Bera test statistic is 3.19 with p-value 20.3%).
b Normality test fails (Jarque-Bera test statistic is 564.43 with p-value 0%).
Regarding measures of the average dividend growth rate, in Table 1.2 Jarque-Bera test
statistics are reported, testing normality of distributions. While the dividend growth rate
does not fail a normality test in subperiod 1, normality is rejected in subperiod 2. For this
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reason, a test of equality of means across subperiods 1 and 2 is not appropriate. Instead, in
Table 1.3 we report a number of equality tests for the medians of the dividend growth rate
across subperiods 1 and 2.
Method df Value Probability
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney 0.849519 0.3956
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney (tie-adj.) 0.849519 0.3956
Med. Chi-square 1 1.446670 0.2291
Adj. Med. Chi-square 1 1.128270 0.2881
Kruskal-Wallis 1 0.723697 0.3949
Kruskal-Wallis (tie-adj.) 1 0.723697 0.3949
van der Waerden 1 0.293416 0.5880
Category Statistics
Variable Count Median
>Overall
Median
Mean
Rank
Mean
Score
GR_D_1 91 4.881276 41 99.05495 -0.041503
GR_D_2 114 6.663943 61 106.1491 0.033129
All 205 6.315151 102 103.0000 1.13E-16
Table 1.3 - Tests of equality of medians of dividend growth across subperiods 1 and 2. Variable
"GR_D_1" is the dividend growth rate in subperiod 1 and Variable "GR_D_2" is the dividend
growth rate in subperiod 2.
Since according to all median tests reported in Table 1.3 the null hypothesis of equality
between the two medians cannot be rejected, in our calibration of the model below, we use
the total-sample median spanning the two subperiods, from July 2000 until July 2017 (205
months in total) which is equal to 6.32% (see also the last line in Table 1.3).
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Regarding the measure of non-disaster dividend volatility (volatility of dividend growth
excluding crash periods), for subperiod 1 we include the months from 2000/7 until 2007/7
and for subperiod 2 we include the months from 2009/6 until 2017/7.
Method df Value Probability
F-test (97; 84) 1.117252 0.6040
Siegel-Tukey 1.282917 0.1995
Bartlett 1 0.275745 0.5995
Levene (1; 181) 0.971887 0.3255
Brown-Forsythe (1; 181) 0.954303 0.3299
Category Statistics
Variable Count Std. Dev.
Mean Abs.
Mean Di§.
Mean Abs.
Median Di§.
Mean Tukey-
Siegel Rank
GRD1_NO 85 12.22474 8.994378 8.981747 86.60000
GRD2_NO 98 11.56549 7.768607 7.765153 96.68367
All 183 11.90850 8.337954 8.330238 92.00000
Bartlett weighted standard deviation: 11.87599
Table 1.4 - Tests of equality of variances of dividend growth across subperiods 1 and 2,
excluding crash periods. Variable "GRD1_NO" is the dividend growth rate in subperiod 1 for
which crash periods are excluded, and variable "GRD2_NO" is the dividend growth rate in
subperiod 2, for which crash periods are excluded as well.
Based on Table 1.4, the standard deviations for these no-disaster subperiods are 12.22%
and 11.57%, but all tests cannot reject the null hypothesis that these two standard deviations
are equal. So, throughout the rest of the paper, in the calibration below, we use the total-
sample standard deviation, spanning the two subperiods, from July 2000 until July 2017
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(183 months in total, after excluding the period from August 2007 until May 2009), which
is equal to 11.91% (see also the penultimate line in Table 1.4).
1.2.2 What changed across subperiods 1 and 2: perceptions about
disaster risk
While neither #, nor $ changed across subperiods 1 and 2, parameter *, seems to have
changed. Our working hypothesis is that there has been a pessimistic shift in rare-disaster
beliefs about parameter * after the Lehman-Brothers collapse, i.e. * has increased. This
working hypothesis is corroborated by an increase in the ìSKEWî index, depicted by Figure
1.3.
Figure 1.3 - The SKEW index, US monthly data. Source: Chicago Board Options
Exchange.
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The SKEW index partially reveals the investorsí beliefs on market fragility, despite that
it is not a perfect proxy for the rare disaster risk hitting the dividend index. Figure 1.3 plots
the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Skew index, commonly known as ìSKEWî.
According to Chicago Board Options Exchange CBOE (2010), the SKEW is an indicator
based on options, measuring the perceived tail risk of the distribution of Standard and Poorís
(S&P) 500 log returns at a 30-day horizon. The SKEW measures tail risk, and speciÖcally
the risk related to an increase in the probability of extreme negative outlier returns, two or
more standard deviations below the mean. Details on the formal deÖnition of SKEW are
provided by the Chicago Board Options Exchange CBOE (2010, p. 5).
The main point made by Figure 1.3 is that the mean level of the SKEW index has
increased in subperiod 2. Interestingly, the SKEW index is well approximated by a normal
distribution in both subperiods (the Jarque-Bera statistic is 3.71, implying a p-value of 0.16
in subperiod 1, while for subperiod 2 the Jarque-Bera statistic is 2.51, implying a p-value of
0.29).
subperiods 1 2
2000/7ñ2008/1 2008/2ñ2017/7
mean SKEW 117:0 (4:99) 122:1 (6:28)a
Table 1.5 - Descriptive statistics of the SKEW index appearing in Figure 1.3.
Standard errors in parentheses.
a Di§erence-of-means t-test for di§erence from previous subperiodís statistic is -6.37 (p-value is 0).
Table 1.5 presents a formal statistical test revealing that the mean SKEW has increased
signiÖcantly in subperiod 2. This evidence supports our working hypothesis that, after the
Lehman-Brothers collapse, beliefs about rare disasters have become more pessimistic. The
risk interpretation of the changes reported by Figure 1.3 and Table 1.5 is given by the Chicago
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Board Options Exchange CBOE (2010, p. 8). SpeciÖcally, the estimated risk-adjusted
probability that the S&P 500 may experience a sudden drop of two standard deviations
in the next 30 days has increased from 6.89% in subperiod 1 to 8.27% in subperiod 2
on average. Similarly, the estimated risk-adjusted probability of a sudden drop of three
standard deviations has increased from 1.16% in subperiod 1 to 1.46% in subperiod 2 on
average. Although these estimates are not a perfect proxy of the risk of a rare disaster
hitting the dividend index, they reveal that beliefs about tail risks and market fragility have
been elevated after the Lehman-Brothers collapse. In the rest of the paper we use an asset-
pricing model in order to investigate whether a change in * alone across subperiods 1 and 2
is capable of replicating key asset-pricing features summarized by Table 1.1, and we obtain a
model-based sense of the increase in parameter *.
1.3 Model
In this section we present our model with disaster risk. We follow the classic Lucas-tree setup
(Lucas, 1978). There is a risky asset, the stock composite index (the market portfolio), and
a one-year zero-coupon bond. Our stylized asset-pricing model that uses i.i.d. disaster
shocks hitting the dividend process, and summarized by equations (1.1) and (1.2), implies
a áat term structure on bond rates in equilibrium, so there is no need to introduce bonds
with di§erent maturity. The one-year zero-coupon bond is not entirely risk-free. In the
case of a rare disaster hitting the dividend process, the probability of a partial default on
government bonds exists. So we do not only have market fragility in our model but also a
sovereign-default risk.
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The budget constraint of an investor is,
St!1Dt| {z }
q
Incom e
= Pt (St ! St!1)| {z }
q
Investm ent in Sto cks
+ QtBt ! (1! /)&t&
B
t Bt!1| {z }
q
Investm ent in Bonds
+ Ct|{z}
q
Consumption
, (1.3)
in which St!1 and Bt!1 is the number of stocks and bonds held by the investor in the
beginning of period t, while Pt and Qt are the stock and bond prices in period t. The term
(1! /)&t&Bt multiplying Bt!1 in (1.3) states that if there is no dividend disaster (vt = 0), then
the zero-coupon bond pays 1 unit of the consumable good at the maturity date; in periods
that a dividend disaster occurs (vt = 1), then a probabilistic sovereign-default process is
triggered, governed by &Bt ,
&Bt =
8><>: 10
,
,
with Prob. 3
with Prob. 1! 3
, (1.4)
with 3 2 [0; 1). If both a dividend-disaster and a default occur (&t = &Bt = 1), then the
zero-coupon bond pays 1 ! / units of the consumable good, i.e., it defaults by the fraction
/ 2 [0; 1].1 Variables "t+1, &t+1, &Bt+1, and 't+1 are independent among each other and also
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time.
Preferences are recursive, of the form of Epstein-Zin-Weil (EZW), with utility in period
t, denoted by Jt, given by the recursion,
Jt =
(
(1! 5)C1!
1
#
t + 5
,
Et
!
J1!(t+1
"- 1! 1#
1!$
) 1
1! 1#
, (1.5)
in which 7 > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), 9 > 0 is the coe¢cient
of relative risk aversion, and 5 2 (0; 1) is the utility discount factor that is inversely related
to the rate of time preference, : = (1! 5) =5.
1 The concept of sovereign default follows Barro (2006, p. 836) who observes that in periods of rare market
disasters the probability of a sovereign default increases. We thank an anonymous referee for raising this
point.
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1.3.1 Asset prices
Equation (1.1) implies that dividend growth is random, following i.i.d. shocks over time. In
Appendices 1.6.A through 1.6.C we prove that these i.i.d. shocks imply a constant price-
dividend (P-D) ratio over time, denoted by x,
Pt
Dt
= x =
!
1! ! with ! = 5e
(1! 1# )
!
)!( %2
2
"
(1! *?)
1! 1#
1!$ , t = 0; 1; :::, (1.6)
in which ? = 1 ! E*
,
(1! ')1!(-, with E* (&) denoting expectation with respect to variable
' only. The expected bond rate, denoted by rB, is
E
!
rB
"
=
1
5
e
1
#
)!((1+ 1# )%
2
2
(1! *?)
1
#!$
1!$ (1! *3/)
1! */1! E* ,(1! ')!(- (1! 3/)0 ! 1 , t = 0; 1; :::. (1.7)
1.3.2 Empirical implications and tests of the model
The áat P-D ratio implied by equation (1.6) is not a bad approximation of the P-D ratio
dynamics in both subperiods 1 and 2. As Figure 1.1 indicates, after the P-D ratio overreac-
tions to the disaster episodes calmed down, P-D ratios remained almost constant throughout
subperiods 1 and 2, but at di§erent levels.
subperiods 1 2
2000/7ñ2008/1 2008/2ñ2017/7
estimator A1 in equation (1.9) 1:05 (0:37)
a 0:88 (0:07) a
ADF statistic for unit root of ln (Pt) !2:09 b !0:52 b
ADF statistic for unit root of ln (Dt) 1:69 b 1:39 b
Table 1.6 - Cointegration coe¢cients (standard errors in parentheses) and ADF unit-root tests.
a Max eigenvalue test indicates one cointegrating equation at the 5% level. b ADF test cannot
reject a unit root (1% critical value is -3.50, 5% critical value is -2.89).
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For empirical evidence on the validity of (1.6), notice that another way of writing (1.6)
is,
ln (Pt) = ln (x) + ln (Dt) . (1.8)
In Table 1.6 we report estimates of A1 in the cointegrating equation,
ln (Pt) = A0 + A1 ln (Dt) + ut , (1.9)
whenever cointegration is applicable, based on Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit-root
tests.
Table 1.6 provides evidence that, in subperiods 1 and 2, ln (Pt) and ln (Dt) are both
integrated of order 1, and that the estimates of A1 do not di§er much from 1.2 In subperiod
1, coe¢cient A1 is not signiÖcantly di§erent from 1. Although in subperiod 2 coe¢cient
A1 di§ers from 1, the value of 0:88 supports that equation (1.8) is not a bad big-picture
approximation of Önancial markets in the US after the Lehman-Brothers collapse. This
evidence validates using the Barro (2006, 2009) model for asset-pricing purposes during
subperiods 1 and 2, despite that these subperiods have relatively short length of about 8
years each.
1.4 Calibration
1.4.1 Benchmark calibration and key targets
We summarize our calibrating parameter values in Table 1.7, focusing on the benchmark
case of no sovereign fragility (3 = / = 0).
2 ADF tests showing that ln (Pt) and ln (Dt) are not integrated of order 2 or above can be provided by the
authors upon request.
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subperiods 1 2
2000/7ñ2008/1 2008/2ñ2017/7
! 1:85 same
" 2:91% same
# 3:92 same
$ 6:32% (data) same
% 11:91% (data) same
& 7:08 (data) same
' 1:7% (benchmark) 3:5%
Table 1.7 - Calibrating parameter values. E*(') = 23:28%.
Parameter A is a newly introduced parameter. It is based on the Önding by Barro and Jin
(2011) that, after transforming disaster sizes using the formula z = 1= (1! '), empirically,
variable z is Pareto distributed with density f (z) = Az+0 =z
++1, in which z0 is the minimum
value of z. Our chosen value for '0 (obeying z0 = 1= (1! '0), the minimum cuto§ disaster
size) is 12.5%. We independently estimate A, and choose calibrating values of A from the
95% conÖdence interval of its estimated value.3 For estimating A, we use the database by
Barro and Jin (2011) that refers to GDP disasters, which is downloadable from,
https://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/publications/size-distribution-macroeconomic-disasters-data
Barro and Jin (2011) present a sensitivity analysis of all their results considering that the
lower bound for the disasters, '0, ranges from 9.5% to 14.5%, while Barro (2006, 2009)
3 We use this estimated Pareto distribution in order to compute all expressions involving the expectation
E" (&). Barro and Jin (2011) demonstrate that the goodness of Öt to disaster-size data increases if one uses
two Pareto distributions, each being e§ective for a di§erent interval of the support of z. Yet, a single Pareto
distribution also gives a good approximation, so we use this for simplicity.
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also work with '0 = 15%. We pick a value somewhere in the middle of this range, setting
'0 = 12:5%, which leaves 110 disasters out of 157 in the Barro and Jin (2011) sample. Using
the maximum-likelihood estimation of the ìshapeî parameter A in the Pareto distribution,
we obtain an estimate for A equal to 5:986 (standard error 0.57), and a 95% conÖdence
interval implying that A^ 2 [4:87; 7:11].4
Figure 1.4 - Goodness of Öt of transformed disaster-size data above the 12.5% threshold.
Source: Barro and Jin (2011).
In our calibration exercise we compute all expectations involving ', using E* (&) based on
a Pareto distribution for the transformed variable z = 1= (1! ') with a calibrating parameter
4 SpeciÖcally, we use the package ëPARETOFITí, a module to Öt a Type 1 Pareto distribution by Stephen
P. Jenkins, which is implementable using Stata and downloadable from,
http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/bocode/p
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A", taken from this 95% conÖdence interval, i.e., A" 2 [4:87; 7:11]. As Figure 1.4 reveals, our
calibrating value, A" = 7:081 Öts the disaster data very well, doing approximately the same
good job in Ötting the disaster distribution as the point estimate A^ = 5:986.
We have four targets: rB1 , r
B
2 , (P=D)1, and (P=D)2, denoting the bond rate and the
P-D ratio in the two subperiods. Parameter values #, $, and A are directly inferred from
data. We use parameter *1 = 1:7% as a benchmark value. Then our calibration exercise
is to match the four targets using four parameter values, the three preference parameters,
7, :, and 9, which are constant across the two subperiods, and also *2, which is the fourth
parameter value.
rB rB P-D ratio P-D ratio
subperiods Model Data Model Data
2000/7ñ2008/1 0:33% 0:33% 60:61 60:24
2008/2ñ2017/7 !1:29% !1:29% 48:34 49:26
Table 1.8 - Model vs. data. Case with no sovereign fragility: 3 = / = 0.
The key element of our calibration exercise is that, in subperiod 2, after the Lehman-
Brothers collapse, the disaster-risk parameter, *, has more than doubled, reáecting that
disasters occur in slightly less than 30 years (1=3:5% ' 29) on average.5 In Table 1.8 we
can see that this simple modiÖcation in perceived market fragility is capable of replicating the
persistent changes in the bond rate and the P-D ratio that occurred after the Lehman-Brothers
collapse.
5 Barroís (2009) benchmark suggests disasters occurring once every 60 years (1/1.7% = 59). This change is
consistent with models of rational learning about disaster risk implying that perceived disaster risk increases
after a disaster episode and then remains high for a long period afterwards (see Koulovatianos and Wieland,
2017).
23
1.4.2 Sensitivity analysis: varying the disaster probability in the
Örst subperiod
In this subsubsection we provide a sensitivity analysis using a di§erent benchmark for *1:
instead of Öxing *1 to 1:7%. We vary its values in a range from 1:5% to 2:5%, doubling *2
in each calibration exercise. The key message here is that none of the matching preference
parameters 7, :, and 9, change drastically.
Table 1.9 - Sensitivity analysis examining the impact of changing *1.
We perform a sensitivity analysis focusing on changing the disaster probability parameter
*. Compared to the benchmark value of *1 at 1:7%, we expand the parameter space ranging
from *1 = 1:5% to *1 = 2:5%. Keeping all parameters inferred from data constant, namely
#, $, and A, in each calibration exercise we gradually increase *1 by 0.1% percentage points,
doubling *2 at the same time.
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Figure 1.5 - Sensitivity analysis examining the impact of changing *1 (and setting
*2 = 2*1) on preference parameters, 9, 7, and : that provide the best Öt to the four data
targets, keeping #, $, and A constant.
Fitting the four targets of Table 1.8 through a minimum-distance approach, Figure 1.5
and Table 1.9 report how the three preference parameters, 7, :, and 9, change as we vary
the anchor value of *1 each time. In Table 1.9, we provide the re-calibrated parameters and
the corresponding matched values. Under this sensitivity analysis, our model still performs
relatively well. The model simulated values do not vary much compared to the benchmark
results, and the results are quite close to the actual data targets. Regarding the preference
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parameters 7, :, and 9, Figure 1.5 plots the corresponding variations, and none of the
matching preference parameters change drastically. Importantly, according to Chen, Dou,
and Kogan (2017, Figure 1, p. 23), we are conÖdent that our calibration parameters are in
the ìacceptable calibrationî area for models like ours.
1.4.3 Sensitivity analysis: sovereign-default risk
We also introduce sovereign-default risk, setting / = E* (') = 23:28%, and 3 = 40%, as in
Barro (2006). As it is obvious from formulas (1.6) and (1.7), sovereign-default risk leaves P-D
ratios unaltered, but raises rB, as markets require a default premium. Using our calibrating
values from Table 1.7, the resulting interest rates are rB1 = 0:75% and r
B
2 = !0:50%. In
light of our sensitivity analysis, it seems that even if sovereign-default risk is present, it is,
instead market fragility that is most likely to explain recent asset-price trends. Especially
if we think that higher sovereign-default risk emerged after the Lehman-Brothers collapse,
this risk element would push bond rates upward instead of downward.
1.5 Conclusion: market fragility can resolve the paradox
The Örst part of the stock-bond-dissonance paradox refers to why bond rates have been
so persistently low. Since the Lehman-Brothers collapse, the rise in stock prices creates
the plausible impression that markets have increased their demand for stocks, lowering the
demand for bonds. However, if fewer bonds had been demanded in the post-Lehman-Brothers
era, then bond rates should have increased. Our approach to this part of the paradox has
been to focus on explaining the simultaneous drop in the P-D ratio through increased market
fragility, captured by the size of parameter * in our model. Our theory says that there is no
paradox: the drop in the P-D ratio implies that this substitution between stocks and bonds
did not necessarily happen; instead markets must have increased the demand for bonds, while
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decreasing the demand for stocks in a subtle manner.
The other part of the paradox, referring to why stock prices have grown so much and so
fast, can be explained by the fact that no disasters have occurred after 2008. To an extent, the
dividend trend, captured by parameter # in the model, reáects the incremental productivity
growth of Örms in the stock exchange. Disasters a§ect the perceived e§ective growth of
dividends, so di§erent perceptions of disaster risk before and after the Önancial crisis a§ect
only the perceived but not the actual growth of dividends and prices. Therefore, the fast
rise of stock prices can be explained by the coincidence, that no disasters have occurred after
2008.
For explaining the persistently negative bond returns, we do not rule out that the Fed
policy contributed to the high demand for bonds. Yet, according to our approach, it is
market fragility (perhaps bank fragility that followed the 2008 Önancial crisis, consistent
with a rise in * in our model), that led the Fed to its aggressive quantitative easing policy.
Our suggested market fragility explanation for resolving the paradox, points at a Örst
message: it is crucial to avoid misinterpreting seemingly good market trends as market
robustness at times of underlying market fragility. Market fragility always implies weaker
investment in the real economy. This weakness alters the e§ects of planned Öscal and mon-
etary policies. Our arguments in this study may serve as a starting point for new research
on better identifying underlying market fragility and its sources.
1.6 Appendix
1.6.A Proof of equations (1.6) and (1.7)
Using the transformation,
Wt = St!1 (Dt + Pt) + (1! /)&t&
B
t Bt!1 , (A.1.1)
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the budget constraint (1.3) becomes,
Wt+1 = R
P
t+1 (Wt ! Ct) , (A.1.2)
in which RPt is the gross portfolio return deÖned as,
RPt = G
S
t!1R
S
t + G
B
t!1R
B
t , (A.1.3)
with
RSt =
Dt + Pt
Pt!1
and RBt =
(1! /)&t&Bt
Qt!1
(A.1.4)
being the gross returns of stocks and bonds, and with GSt = PtSt= (PtSt +QtBt) and G
B
t =
QtBt= (PtSt +QtBt) being the portfolio weights.
Using (A.1.2) the Bellman equation is,
Vt (Wt) = max
ct#0;/St ;/Bt
8<:(1! 5)C1! 1#t + 5 nEt hVt+1 !RPt+1 (Wt ! Ct)"1!(io
1! 1#
1!$
9=;
1
1! 1#
, (A.1.5)
subject to (A.1.3) and subject to the stochastic structure given by (1.1) and (1.2). Under a
general stochastic structure, the value function, Vt (&), is of the form,6
V (Wt) =  tWt , t = 0; 1; ::: . (A.1.6)
A useful implication of (A.1.6) is,7
Ct
Wt
= (1! 5)0  1!0t , t = 0; 1; ::: . (A.1.7)
In addition, (A.1.6) implies the key asset pricing equation of this model, which is,8
Et
"
5
1!$
1! 1#
9
Ct+1
Ct
: 1!$
1!# !
RPt+1
" 1#!$
1! 1# Rit+1
#
= 1 , i 2 fS;Bg . (A.1.8)
6 Equation (A.1.6) corresponds to Epstein and Zin (1991, p. 267, eq. 9).
7 Equation (A.1.7) should correspond to Epstein and Zin (1991, p. 268, eq. 12), but equations (A.1.7) and
Epstein and Zin (1991, p. 268, eq. 12) are di§erent. See Appendix 1.6.B for a proof of equation (A.1.7).
8 See Epstein and Zin (1991, p. 268, eq. 16).
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In the standard textbook Lucas (1978) asset-pricing model the key simplifying assumption is
that all investors are identical, all having the same amount of S!1 stocks in period 0, and all
having Bt!1 = 0 for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g, i.e., bonds in zero net supply in all periods. Identical
investors do not trade stocks in equilibrium. Combining these simplifying assumptions of no
trade in equilibrium with the budget constraint, and also with equations (1.3) and (A.1.1),
we obtain,
St = S!1 , Ct = S!1Dt , Wt = S!1 (Dt + Pt) , G
S
t = 1 , and G
B
t = 0 , t = 0; 1; ::: .
(A.1.9)
Combining (A.1.3) with (A.1.9) gives,
RPt = R
S
t , (A.1.10)
while equation (A.1.4) implies,
RSt+1 =
1 + xt+1
xt
Dt+1
Dt
, with xt * Pt
Dt
. (A.1.11)
In addition, equation (A.1.9) implies that Ct+1=Ct = Dt+1=Dt, so substituting this result
into (A.1.8) for i = S, together with (A.1.10), (A.1.11), and (1.1), equation (A.1.8) becomes,
Et
(9
5
1 + xt+1
xt
: 1!$
1! 1#
h
e)!
%2
2
+2"t+1
!
1! 't+1
"&t+1i1!() = 1 . (A.1.12)
In Appendix 1.6.C we prove that, as a consequence of our assumption that variables "t+1,
&t+1, and 't+1 are i.i.d. over time, the P-D ratio is also constant over time, i.e.,
xt = x , t = 0; 1; ::: . (A.1.13)
Substituting (A.1.13) into (A.1.12), proves the formula given by (1.6).
For proving equation (1.7) we substitute (A.1.4), (A.1.10), (A.1.11), and (A.1.13) into
(A.1.8), for i = B, to obtain,
5
1!$
1! 1#
9
1 + x
x
: 1#!$
1! 1#
Et
<h
e)!
%2
2
+2"t+1
!
1! 't+1
"&t+1i!( (1! /)&t+1&Bt+1 1
Qt
=
= 1 . (A.1.14)
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Equation (A.1.14) implies a constant value for Qt over time, Qt = Q for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g.
The bond price, Q, is set a priori to the realization of disasters and defaults. This is
the reason why Q is constant over time. Yet, because of the sovereign default risk, the
ex-post bond return is variable over time. SpeciÖcally, with probability *3, the ex-post
(post-default) maturity price of the bond is 1! /, making the ex-post bond return equal to
rB = (1! /) =Q! 1. So,
rBt =
8><>: r
B = 1
Q
! 1
rB = 1!5
Q
! 1
,
,
with Prob. 1! *3
with Prob. *3
. (A.1.15)
In equation (1.7) we refer to the expected return implied by equation (A.1.15), which is
given by E
!
rB
"
= (1! *3/) =Q!1. !
1.6.B Proof of equation (A.1.7)
Take equation (A.1.6) as an initial guess for the functional form of the value function,
considering that  t is an unknown stochastic process. Substituting (A.1.6) into equation
(A.1.5) we obtain,
 tWt = max
ct#0;/St ;/Bt
>
(1! 5)C1!
1
#
t + 5!t & (Wt ! Ct)1!
1
#
? 1
1! 1#
, (A.1.16)
in which, !t *
n
Et
h
 1!(t+1
!
RPt+1
"1!(io 1! 1#1!$
. Taking Örst-order conditions on equation (A.1.5)
with respect to Ct gives,
Ct =
9
5
1! 5!t
:!0
(Wt ! Ct) . (A.1.17)
Equation (A.1.17) implies,
C
1! 1
#
t =
9
5
1! 5!t
:1!0
(Wt ! Ct)1!
1
# . (A.1.18)
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Substituting (A.1.18) into (A.1.16), imposes optimality conditions on (A.1.16). So, the max
operator in (A.1.16) can be eliminated after substituting (A.1.18) into (A.1.16), which gives,
 
1! 1
#
t W
1! 1
#
t = 5!t
"9
5
1! 5!t
:!0
+ 1
#
(Wt ! Ct)1!
1
# . (A.1.19)
Using (A.1.18) and substituting it into (A.1.19) results in,
 
1! 1
#
t
9
Ct
Wt
: 1
#
!1
= (1! 5)
>
1 +
9
5
1! 5!t
:0?
. (A.1.20)
Equation (A.1.17) implies,
Ct
Wt
=
>
1 +
9
5
1! 5!t
:0?!1
. (A.1.21)
Substituting (A.1.21) into (A.1.20) gives,
 
1! 1
#
t = (1! 5)
>
1 +
9
5
1! 5!t
:0? 1#
. (A.1.22)
Equation (A.1.22) reconÖrms that the guess given by equation (A.1.6) is valid. Combining
(A.1.21) with (A.1.22) leads to equation (A.1.7). !
1.6.C Proof that the price-dividend ratio is constant
Since variables "t+1, &t+1, and 't+1 are i.i.d. over time, through integral-variable transfor-
mation, equation (A.1.12) implies that,
Et
9
1 + xt+1
xt
:
= Et+1
9
1 + xt+2
xt+1
:
= K , t = 0; 1; ::: . (A.1.23)
To see that xt+1 = xt = x for t = 0; 1; :::, Öx some xt = 8xt > 0, assuming that 8xt is a solution
to the asset-pricing model. Consider conditional expectations for (A.1.23), namely,
Et
9
1 + xt+1
xt
j xt = 8xt
:
= K . (A.1.24)
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Equation (A.1.24) implies a unique solution for Et (xt+1). Let that unique solution be
8xt+1 = Et (xt+1). Using 8xt+1, consider equation (A.1.24) one period ahead to obtain 8xt+2 *
Et+1 (xt+2). Notice that, due to additive separability, and since the choice of t 2 f0; 1; :::g
was arbitrary, equation (A.1.24) implies,
1 + 8xt+1
8xt
=
1 + 8xt+2
8xt+1
, t = 0; 1; ::: . (A.1.25)
Using gt+1 * 8xt+1=8xt equation (A.1.25) implies,
gt+2 ! gt+1 = 1
8xt
9
1! 1
gt+1
:
, t = 0; 1; ::: . (A.1.26)
If gt+1 6= 1, since 8xt > 0, we can easily verify that equation (A.1.26) implies unstable
dynamics for xt. If gt+1 > 1 for some t, then (A.1.26) implies gt+s > 1 for all s 2 f0; 1; :::g,
and xt !1. If gt+1 < 1 for some t, then eventually gt^ < 0 for some t^ > t, leading to xt^ < 0.
For 7 6= 1 (which is of interest for matching the data), both of these possibilities lead to a
non-well-deÖned value function. To see this, use equations (A.1.7), (A.1.11), (A.1.9), and
(A.1.6) to obtain,
Vt (Wt) =  tWt = (1! 5)
#
#!1 (1 + xt)
#
#!1 S!1Dt . (A.1.27)
For xt !1, either Vt (Wt)!1 (if 7 > 1), or Vt (Wt)! 0, (if 7 < 1), even if 0 < Dt <1.
None of these possibilities implies a well-deÖned value function or a maximum value, given
that the EZW utility function represents a cardinal certainty-equivalent time aggregator
measured in consumption units (in addition, the solution gt = 1 for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g, gives
Vt (Wt) > 0 bounded away from 0 for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g). Since from equation (A.1.9) Ct=Wt =
1= (1 + xt), having xt^ < 0 for some t^ > t, implies Ct^ > Wt^, and equation (A.1.2) then gives
Wt^+1 < 0 if R
P
t^+1
> 0, i.e. Vt^ (Wt^) < 0, which is unacceptable, given the consumption-unit
cardinality of EZW preferences. But even if RP
t^+1
< 0, having negative stock prices in an
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exchange economy of identical agents is impossible in equilibrium. So, the only acceptable
equilibrium solution for (A.1.26) is gt = 1 for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g, which leads to equation
(A.1.13), proving the result. !
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2. CHAPTER
Time-Consistent Welfare-Maximizing Monetary Rules
2.1 Introduction
How should a Central Bank optimally respond to Öscal and productivity shocks, taking
into account that households face liquidity constraints? Liquidity constraints have gained
new attention recently, as more detailed consumption and wealth data have been available.
Recent research emphasizes that large fractions of households, including wealthy ones, are
hand-to-mouth, hence liquidity constrained (see Kaplan et al., 2014). It is reasonable to think
that bond markets and overall-economy liquidity (money supply) ináuence the consumption
choices of liquidity-constrained households. Does this interplay between bond markets and
consumption choices of the liquidity constrained a§ect monetary policy, i.e., open-market
operations by Central Banks?
To capture the role of liquidity constraints, we employ a cash-in-advance (CIA) model
with two types of consumption goods: a credit-constrained and a non-credit-constrained
good. More speciÖcally in our model setup, we follow Cooley and Hansen (1989) and (1992),
which build on the originally developed by Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and
Plosser (1983) real business cycle (RBC) model. They introduce a monetary sector in the
standard RBC model, while keeping the RBC modelís main features: perfect competition
and perfect price áexibility. Money is introduced via a cash-in-advance constraint, being used
to facilitate transactions. As in Lucas and Stokey (1983, 1987), only a subset of consumption
goods is CIA constraint, the so called ìcash goodî, liquidity constraint good. We allow the
Central Bank to perform open-market operations, buying government bonds in order to re-
spond to Öscal shocks and to productivity shocks. We take the approach that Central Banks
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conduct monetary policy serving the ultimate goal of maximizing social welfare, as dictated
by a countryís constitution. In order to achieve this goal, we use concepts and algorithms
from the literature on optimal time-consistent Öscal policy. More speciÖcally, we formulate
the optimal policy as a dynamic Stackelberg game between the Central Bank and private
markets. In this game-theoretic formulation of the Central Bankís welfare maximization
problem, we follow the literature on optimal Öscal policy and voting, which includes Krusell
et al. (1997), Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999), Klein and Rios-Rull (2003), Klein et al. (2008)
and Bachmann and Bai (2013).9 In our case, our focus is on the optimal money supply
growth rate. The endogenously derived optimal money supply growth rate is a function of
the modelís aggregate state variables. More speciÖcally, we use a linear-quadratic approxi-
mation method, as in Cooley and Hansen (1989) for computing the equilibrium process for
our model, more speciÖcally the linear equilibrium decision rules.
We Önd that optimal time-consistent monetary policy has real e§ects along the tran-
sition to the steady state from a shock. It focuses on improving upon the ratio between
the two consumption-good types that is distorted due to the presence of the liquidity con-
straint. Optimal time-consistent monetary policy o§sets Öscal (demand) shocks, smoothing
out aggregate consumption áuctuations. Finally, we Önd that optimal time-consistent mon-
etary policy accommodates productivity (supply) shocks, amplifying aggregate consumption
áuctuations.
The reason we focus on time-consistent monetary policy is that time-consistency estab-
lishes the credibility of monetary policy. This idea is in line with current forward-guidance
monetary policy practices of Central Banks. Private marketsí decision making depends on
current policy and the expected course of monetary policy. Establishing credibility comes
9 The only exception of this optimal-policy approach on monetary policy that we are aware of is the paper
by Cooley and Quadrini (2004).
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at the cost that time-consistent policies are not Örst-best policies, as Örst pointed out by
Kydland and Prescott (1977).
Our approach di§ers from the conventional literature on monetary policy rules (new
Keynesian models), where monetary policy rules are assumed based on empirical Öndings.
Instead, through welfare maximization, we derive the Central Bankís optimal money supply
rule endogenously. After calibrating our model to di§erent targets than the steady-state
ináation rate, the optimal steady state money supply growth rate that we Önd in our model
economy is equal to 2.03%. This Ögure is consistent with the major Central Bankís price
stability objective and with past empirical observations.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we describe our model economy and market
clearing conditions. Then we set up the recursive formulation of the policy-setting equi-
librium, before describing the game-theoretical formulation employed to derive the welfare-
maximizing monetary policy rule. We calibrate the model parameters and key steady-state
features of the model to US data covering the years from 1947 to 2018. We describe the cycli-
cal behavior of our model economy. We simulate the model with the optimal endogenous
money supply rule (benchmark model) and the model with a constant exogenous money
supply rate (set equal to the optimal steady state money supply rate). We compare the
simulations with the cyclical behavior of the US time-series.
The Öscal authority levies constant tax rates and does not adjust to exogenous shocks.
We are in a monetary-Öscal policy regime of Öscal dominance. The monetary authority,
the Central Bank reacts to both shocks, the productivity shock and the Öscal shock via
the endogenously derived, time-consistent optimal money supply rule as depicted in the
computed impulse responses. In case of a productivity shock, the endogenous monetary
policy makes the economy more volatile and ampliÖes the cycle. This is consistent with
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the idea that monetary policy should accommodate supply shocks. Also, monetary policy
improves the mixture between the cash good and the credit good. Therefore, monetary policy
has real e§ects along the transition. We also observe that monetary policy has no e§ect on the
real interest rate. In case of a Öscal shock, monetary policy tries to counteract the crowding
out e§ect on investment and consumption and the increase in Öscal deÖcit. This is consistent
with the idea that monetary policy should o§set demand shocks. Monetary policy smooths
consumption and corrects the distortion between the cash and the credit good. Also here,
we can see that monetary policy has real e§ects. The role of the cash-in-advance constraint
in monetary policy transmission is identiÖed.
We conclude with the limitations of the model and possible directions for future work.
2.2 Model
The model is a modiÖed stochastic version of the Cooley-Hansen (1992) economy. The
key feature of our model is that a Central Bank performs open-market operations with the
potential of absorbing repercussions of Öscal shocks and of productivity shocks. The central
reason we use a neoclassical model without price frictions or other similar elements of post-
Keynesian models is that we need to keep a clear view on the welfare-maximizing criterion of
the Central Bank. A frictionless neoclassical or real-business-cycle (RBC) framework (see,
e.g., Cooley and Prescott, 1995), is perhaps the ideal vehicle for numerically investigating
the core question of our paper: are welfare-maximizing monetary policies stabilizing as an
exogenous Taylor rule would dictate? Throughout the paper we denote variables in nominal
terms by a bar. For aggregates we use uppercase letters and for micro-level variables we
use lowercase letters. Therefore variable x is 8X if nominal and aggregate, X if real and
aggregate, 8x if nominal and at the micro-level, and x if real and at the micro-level.
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2.2.1 Government
The government Önances government spending using taxes and government debt. The gov-
ernment issues zero-coupon bonds every period, rolling over outstanding debt from the pre-
vious period. The government budget constraint, in nominal terms, is given by,
8Gt = 8Tt + 8B
T
t ! (1 + it!1) 8BTt!1 +RCBt , (2.1)
where 8BTt!1 is the nominal value of total debt issued in period t! 1, accounted for in prices
of period t! 1, and maturing in period t, it!1 is the nominal bond rate in period t on debt
issued in t ! 1, 8Gt and 8Tt are nominal government spending and government revenues in
prices of period t, and RCBt are the nominal direct receipts from the Central Bank in period
t, in current prices as well. Fiscal and monetary policy are linked through the government
budget constraint, consistent with Walsh (2010).
Government revenues, 8Tt, come from three sources, taxes on consumption, on labor
income and on capital income. Therefore, government revenues in real terms, Tt, are,
Tt = R cCt + RhwtHt + R krtKt , (2.2)
where Ct, Ht, and Kt are real aggregate consumption, hours worked and capital, wt and
rt are the real wage and the real capital return, while R c, Rh, and R k are the marginal tax
rates on consumption, labor income, and capital income. We assume that all tax rates are
constant over time, which is the reason they do not carry the subscript ìtî.10
Real government spending, Gt, is an exogenous random process given by,
Gt = ~ge
utYt , (2.3)
10This assumption is based on early work by Barro (1979) and on results provided later on by Chari et al.
(1994) for economies in the class within which our model falls.
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in which Yt is real output, ~g 2 (0; 1) is a constant parameter and ut is an AR(1) Öscal shock
with,
ut = :uut!1 + "u;t , (2.4)
in which :u 2 (0; 1) and "u;t " i:i:d:N (0; $2u). Equations (2.3) and (2.4) fully describe the
exogenous Öscal shocks that monetary policymaker wish to smooth out.
Dividing both sides of equation (2.1) by the price index, Pt, gives, the government budget
constraint in real terms,
Gt = Tt +B
T
t !
1 + it!1
1 + 3t
BTt!1 +RCBt , (2.5)
in which,
3t =
Pt
Pt!1
! 1 . (2.6)
is the ináation rate.
2.2.2 Central Bank and bonds market
The Central Bank (CB) issues Öat money (currency), 8M st , which is guaranteed through
purchases of government bonds. We denote nominal holdings of Öscal debt by the CB by
8BCBt . Taking into account interest earned by the CB, the evolution of the CBís balance
sheet is given by,
8BCBt ! 8BCBt!1 +RCBt = it!1 8BCBt!1 + 8M st ! 8M st!1 . (2.7)
Denoting the growth rate of nominal money supply by #t,
8M st = (1 + #t) 8M
s
t!1 . (2.8)
The main objective of this paper is to determine how the CB decides upon the optimal level
of #t through a time-consistent welfare-maximizing monetary policy rule.
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Bonds are held by the CB and the public, which is only households in our model. There-
fore, the market-clearing condition for the bonds market is,
8BTt = 8B
H
t + 8B
CB
t , (2.9)
where nominal bond holdings by households is denoted by 8BHt . Substituting equations (2.7),
(2.8) and (2.9) into (2.1) we obtain,
8Gt = 8Tt + 8B
H
t ! (1 + it!1) 8BHt!1 + #t 8M st!1 . (2.10)
Equation (2.10) reveals the relationship between monetary policy, dictated by #t, and the
bonds market. The interplay between the two is crucial in our analysis.
The balance sheet of the Central Bank is given by Table 2.1, in which 8BCBt is the nominal
money demand of government bonds by the Central Bank, and 8MSt is the nominal money
supply in period t.
Assets Liabilities
8BCBt
8MSt * currency
Table 2.1 - Balance sheet of the Central Bank
Table 2.1 can be summarized through,
8BCBt = 8M
S
t . (2.11)
The Central Bank exercises monetary policy through open-market operations. Purchases
of government bonds lead to an expansion of the money supply. Monetary expansions and
contractions can function as responses to economy-wide Öscal and productivity shocks. We
describe the way that the Central Bank forms its monetary-policy objectives incorporating
these considerations in a later subsection.
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2.2.3 Production and representative Örm
Production technology is Cobb-Douglas with,
Yt = F (Kt; Ht) = e
ztK+t H
1!+
t , (2.12)
in which Yt is a composite consumable good, Kt is the accumulated aggregate stock of capital
in period t, Ht is aggregate labor hours, and zt is a productivity shock that follows an AR(1)
process with,
zt = :zzt!1 + "z;t , (2.13)
in which :z 2 (0; 1) and "z;t " i:i:d:N (0; $2z). We assume that "z;t and "u;t have a correlation
coe¢cient :zu 2 (!1; 1).
Firms maximize proÖts operating in a perfectly-competitive Önal-goods market, hiring
inputs in perfectly-competitive markets. Competitive pricing implies,11
Rt = Ae
zt
t
9
Kt
Ht
:+!1
, (2.14)
and
wt = (1! A) ezt
9
Kt
Ht
:+
. (2.15)
2.2.4 Households
There is a large number of identical inÖnitely-lived households that supply labor endoge-
nously (a source of disutility), and derive utility from two types of consumption goods, c1
and c2. Consumption good c1 is a ìcash goodî, and good c2 is a ìcredit goodî.12 SpeciÖcally,
c1 requires cash in advance, being restricted by the constraint,
(1 + R c)c1;t / 8m
H
t!1
Pt
+
(1 + it!1)8bHt!1
Pt
!
8bHt
Pt
, (2.16)
11Variable Rt denotes the rental cost of capital. The relationship between Rt and the capital return, rt, is
given by rt = Rt ! (, where ( is the (tax-exempt) depreciation rate (see equation (2.2) above).
12This distinction follows closely Cooley and Hansen (1992).
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where 8mHt!1 is the individual nominal money holdings carried over from period t ! 1 to
period t, and (1 + it!1)8bHt!1 is the nominal cash amount obtained by individual household
bond holdings (principal plus nominal interest), while 8bHt is the cash amount paid in period
t, in order to buy newly issued bonds.
The constraint given by (2.16), shows that households allocate their resources into con-
sumption c1 and bond investment, 8bHt =Pt. Nevertheless, as in Cooley and Hansen (1992),
the bond and money trades (nominal demand of household bonds and money balances) take
place in the beginning of period t, before the shocks (zt; ut) are revealed, and before the
goods market opens. The goods market in period t, opens later within period t, after the
realization of shocks (zt; ut). This means that while goods c1 and 8bHt =Pt are both traded
in period t, they are not traded simultaneously. Market clearing in the goods market and
the asset markets later in period t determine price level Pt and ináation. The Central Bank
announces its monetary policy for period t earlier than households declare their bond and
money demand.
The overall budget constraint of the household is,
(1 + R c)(c1;t + c2;t) + kt+1 ! (1! /)kt + 8m
H
t
Pt
+
8bHt
Pt
= (1! Rh)wtht + (1! R k)Rtkt + R k/kt + 8m
H
t!1
Pt
+
(1 + it!1)8bHt!1
Pt
, (2.17)
where kt is the individual real capital claims to productive assets.
Households maximize their expected utility given by,
max
f(c1;t;c2;t;ht; ,mHt ;,bHt ;kt+1)g1t=0
E0
( 1X
t=0
5tu (c1;t; c2;t; ht)
)
, (2.18)
with 0 < 5 < 1, and,
u (c1;t; c2;t; ht) = a log c1;t + (1! a) log c2;t !Bht . (2.19)
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with 0 < a < 1, making investments in three assets: (i) productive-capital asset holdings,
kt+1, (ii) government bonds 8bHt , and (iii) money balances ( 8m
H
t ).
The speciÖcation in (2.19) follows the concept of ìindivisible laborî suggested by Hansen
(1985), Rogerson (1988), and followed by Cooley and Hansen (1989). SpeciÖcally, the utility
function is initially given as a function of consumption and leisure. The original version of
(2.19) is,
~u (c1;t; c2;t; ht) = a log c1;t + (1! a) log c2;t + A log lt , (2.20)
where lt is leisure in period t. With households having one unit of time, lt + ht = 1. It is
assumed that labor is indivisible, with households having to work either ho 2 (0; 1) hours,
or 0 hours, with probability 3t. Therefore, the utility function (2.20) becomes,
~u (c1;t; c2;t; ht) = a log c1;t + (1! a) log c2;t + A [3t log (1! ho) + (1! 3t) log (1)] ,
or,
~u (c1;t; c2;t; ht) = a log c1;t + (1! a) log c2;t + A3t log (1! ho) . (2.21)
Setting ht = 3tho, and B = !A log (1! ho) =ho makes (2.21) equivalent to (2.19). We
emphasize that the choice of ht is endogenous in the model. The choice of ht represents
how the e§ort for Önding or for maintaining a job a§ects the probability of Önding or of
maintaining a job, 3t. Since this individual e§ort is proportional to individual productivity,
labor earnings in the budget constraint given by (2.17) are wtht.
2.2.5 Market clearing
We express all market-clearing conditions in terms of real variables.
Money market The only holders of money are the households, implying,
MHt =M
S
t . (2.22)
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Government-bond market Bonds are held by both households and the central bank,
implying,
BSt = B
CB
t +B
H
t , (2.23)
with bHt = B
H
t due to the representative-agent assumption.
Productive-capital market Household investment in productive-asset claims equals pro-
ductive capital in each period. Since households are identical,
kt = Kt . (2.24)
An implication of perfect competition in both the productive-capital market and the bonds
market is the arbitrage condition,
1 + (1! R k) rt = 1 + it
1 + 3t
. (2.25)
Final goods market In equilibrium, aggregating the budget constraint given by (2.17)
leads to
Yt = Ct +Xt +Gt , (2.26)
where
Xt = Kt+1 ! (1! /)Kt (2.27)
is aggregate investment, with xt = Xt (xt = kt+1!(1! /) kt), Ct = C1;t+C2;t, with c1;t = C1;t
and c2;t = C2;t.
Labor market In equilibrium,
ht = Ht . (2.28)
44
2.3 Recursive formulation of policy-setting equilibrium
As in Cooley and Hansen (1989, 1992), we detrend all nominal variables by dividing them by
the nominal money supply. Therefore, a nominal variable, aggregate or individual, 8Xt or 8xt,
is detrended after being transformed into X^t * 8Xt= 8M st and x^t * 8xt= 8M st . In order to deÖne
equilibrium in this optimal policy-setting environment recursively, we need to organize the
variables in two groups, state variables, s, and action variables, a.
The aggregate state variables are deÖned as,
St =
A
zt; ut; #t; Kt; B^
T
t!1
B
, (2.29)
while the individual state variables are deÖned as,
st =
A
kt; m^
H
t!1; b^
H
t!1
B
. (2.30)
Although the two vectors given by (2.29) and (2.30) are neither of the same size nor their
variables are the same kind, we will conventionally use the notation ìst = Stî in order to
capture the notion of market clearing in state variables in the recursive formulations that
follow. SpeciÖcally, ìst = Stî refers to the set of equations,8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
kt = Kt
m^Ht!1 = 1
b^Ht!1 = B^
H
t!1
B^Tt!1 = 1 + B^
H
t!1
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
, st = St (2.31)
The four equations given by (2.31) describe equilibrium in the capital market, the money
market (m^Ht!1 = 8m
H
t!1= 8M
S
t!1 = 8M
H
t!1= 8M
S
t!1 = 1), the bonds market (recall that B^
CB
t!1 =
8BCBt!1= 8M
S
t!1 = 1), and it is conÖrmed that individual household bond demand, b^
H
t!1, equals its
aggregate counterpart. The four equations given by (2.31) refer to market clearing regarding
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four state variables, Kt, 8MHt!1, B^
H
t!1 and B^
T
t!1, while the rest of the variables in (2.29), zt, ut,
and #t, refer to the two exogenous aggregate shocks and to money growth, with the latter
being dictated by Central Bankís monetary policy and not through market forces.
The aggregate action variables are deÖned as,
At =
A
Ht; Xt; P^t; B^
T
t
B
, (2.32)
and the individual action variables are,
at =
A
ht; xt; m^
H
t ; b^
H
t
B
. (2.33)
Again not all variables of two vectors given by (2.32) and (2.33) are of the same kind.
Nevertheless, again, we will conventionally use the notation ìat = Atî in order to capture
the notion of market clearing in action variables as,8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
ht = Ht
xt = Xt
m^Ht = 1
b^Ht = B^
H
t
B^Tt = 1 + B^
H
t
9>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>;
, at = At (2.34)
The Öve equations given by (2.34) refer to market clearing regarding Öve action variables,
Ht, Xt, 8MHt , B^
H
t and B^
T
t , while the remaining variable in (2.32), P^t = Pt= 8M
S
t is a variable
that will be determined endogenously in competitive equilibrium.13
2.3.1 The welfare-maximizing monetary policy rule
We employ the game-theoretic formulation suggested by literature on optimal Öscal policy
and voting. This literature includes Krusell et al. (1997), Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999),
13This formulation of vectors at and At imitates the deÖnitions of vectors ut and Ut in Cooley and Hansen
(1989, p. 739). This formulation facilitates the recursive computation of equilibrium P^t.
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Klein and Rios-Rull (2003), Klein et al. (2008), and Bachmann and Bai (2013). In that
optimal-Öscal policy literature the goal of the government is predominantly to determine the
size of the government or its Öscal transfers. In our monetary-policy analysis the goal is to
analyze optimal money supply growth rate, #t+1. SpeciÖcally, the Central Bank seeks to set
an optimal time-consistent rule, <, in each period, as a function of the modelís aggregate
state variables. SpeciÖcally,
#t+1 = <
A
zt; ut; #t; Kt; B^
T
t!1
B
= <(St) . (2.35)
One of our targets is to imitate the way Central Banks pre-announce monetary-policy
strategies and then try to show commitment to the pre-announced strategies. To achieve
this, we assume that monetary-policy setting takes place at the beginning of every period,
i.e. before households and producers make their economic decisions. After policy is set, the
Central Bank commits to it for one period and then revises the policy. Since, however, the
revision process is history-independent, the result is a time-invariant monetary-policy rule
<, of the form given by (2.35). This is the setup of a dynamic-Stackelberg-game formu-
lation with closed-loop strategies and feedback information pattern (see Basar and Olsder,
1999, DeÖnition 5.2, p. 221), also Ötting the speciÖcation of Cohen and Michel (1988) in a
continuous-time setting (instantaneous precommitment at each time instant).
If < has been selected by the Central Bank, then real economic activity of households
depends on rule <. At the same time the Central Bank needs to understand the optimal
decisions of households subject to its rule <, in order to calculate household utility and
social welfare.
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2.3.1.1 Competitive equilibrium (CE) The economyís CE is described by the following
Öxed-point relations. The Bellman equation of an individual household is given by,14
V (S; s j <) = max
a
fu (S; s; A; a) + 5E [V (S 0; s0 j <)]g (2.36)
subject to,
s0 = ' (S; s; A; a j <) ,
S 0 = Z (S j <) ,
A = = (S j <) ,
#0 = <(S) ,
(z0; u0) " d> ( (z0; u0) j (z; u)) ,
where primes denote variables one period ahead, > ( (z0; u0) j (z; u)) is the distribution func-
tion describing the Markov chain governing the shocks (z; u). After solving (2.36), the
resulting optimal individual actions,
a" = ? (S; s; A j <) * argmax
a
fu (S; s; A; a) + 5E [V (S 0; s0 j <)]g
are consistent with the aggregate actions rule A = = (S j <), and the aggregate law of motion
of the state variables, S 0 = Z (S j <), after imposing market clearing, s = S and a = A as
deÖned by (2.31) and (2.34). SpeciÖcally, A = = (S j <) is the implicit function solving A =
? (S; S;A j <) and S 0 = Z (S j <) is consistent with S 0 = ' (S ; S ; = (S j <) ; = (S j <) j <).
For determining the policy rule #0 = <(S) we need to deÖne an ìintermediate equilib-
riumî that focuses on calculating the economyís (welfare) response to a one-time deviation
in next-periodís money growth policy #t+1, in period t, under the provision that all future
policies
/
#t+j
01
j=2
, comply with < afterwards.
14The exact form of the utility function, u (S; s;A; a), in (2.36) is given in the Appendix.
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2.3.1.2 Intermediate equilibrium (IE) The economyís IE is described by the following
Öxed-point relations. First, we formulate the non-Bellman equation,
~V (S; s; #0 j <) = max
a
fu (S; s; A; a) + 5E [V (S 0; s0 j <)]g (2.37)
subject to,
s0 = ' (S; s; A; a j <) ,
S 0 = ~Z (S; #0 j <) ,
A = ~= (S; #0 j <) ,
(z0; u0) " d> ( (z0; u0) j (z; u)) ,
where ~V (S; s; #0 j <) is the value function that computes individual utility in equilibrium
given a one-period deviation in policy #0, while S 0 = ~Z (S; #0 j <) and A = ~= (S; #0 j <)
describe the responsiveness of next periodís state variables and aggregate actions to a one-
period deviation in policy #0. The value function on the right-hand side of equation (2.37)
is the Öxed point of the competitive-equilibrium Bellman equation given by (2.36). In this
way, IE secures that the continuation stream of future policies complies with policy rule
<(S) and that all decisions dictated by CE conditions are respected in the future. What IE
does, is to compute the response in the evolution of the aggregate state variables one period
ahead through computing S 0 = ~Z (S; #0 j <). This deviation in the economyís state variables
a§ects continuation expected utility E [V (S 0; s0 j <)] accordingly. In turn, this impact on
continuation utility is reáected in the value function ~V (S; s; #0 j <) on the left-hand side
of equation (2.37). Importantly, as in CE above, A = ~= (S; #0 j <) is the implicit function
solving A = ~? (S; S;A; #0 j <), with
~a" = ~? (S; S;A; #0 j <) * argmax
a
fu (S; s; A; a) + 5E [V (S 0; s0 j <)]g
CCCC
)0 is free, not equal to .(S)
and S 0 = ~Z (S; #0 j <) is consistent with S 0 = '
A
S ; S ; ~= (S; #0 j <) ; ~= (S; #0 j <) j <
B
.
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2.3.1.3 Setting the policy rule Once the Öxed point of IE is obtained and ~V (S; s; #0 j <),
is computed, we impose market-clearing conditions on the state variables to compute,
~W (S; #0 j <) = ~V (S; S; #0 j <) , (2.38)
which is the welfare function of the economy as a function of a one-time deviation in next-
periodís money growth policy, #0, and subject to the policy rule < for setting policy in future
periods thereafter. Given ~W (S; #0 j <), the policy rule < is computed as,
#0 = <(S) = argmax
)0
~W (S; #0 j <) . (2.39)
Function < on the left-hand side of (2.39) must be the same as function < on the right-hand
side of (2.39).
2.4 Calibration and computation
The calibration process targets matching key steady state values and real business cycles
features.
2.4.1 Data
We use quarterly data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Research
Division, covering years from Q1:1947-Q4:2018. We focus on four (real) time series, GDP ,
non-durable consumption, investment, and labor hours. The share of non-durable consump-
tion to GDP has been 55:55% on average. We have also added durable consumption to the
investment series, which brings the share of investment to GDP to 22% in our data. Nev-
ertheless, we calibrate our model so that government spending is about 1=3 of GDP in the
steady state. This strategy makes the private-investment share of GDP be plausibly smaller
in our model.
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2.4.2 Calibrating parameters and key steady-state features of the
model
Since the data frequency is quarterly, our benchmark calibration uses 5 = 0:99, that reáects
an annual rate of time preference equal to 4:1%. The tax rate on capital gains is R k = 50%, a
value that, combined with the calibrated value of 5 gives a steady-state real interest rate of
2:02%. The value of B, set to 2:6 (following Cooley and Hansen, 1992), together with a labor-
income tax rate set to Rh = 23%, lead to a steady-state labor supply of 29%, which is well
within the ballpark of the average employment data over time. The annual depreciation rate
is set to 4:8%, leading to a steady-state investment share of GDP equal to 16%. The tax rate
on consumption is set to R c = 8%, while we set the benchmark debt-to-GDP ratio to 110%.
We balance the tax rates and the parameter of exogenous government spending, ~g, so as to
achieve a steady-state government share of GDP equal to 32:86% ' 1=3.15 The value of A is
set to 43%, slightly higher than the value of 36% used by Cooley and Hansen (1992). This
value of A is consistent with a notion of capital that is augmented by improved human capital
in recent years. Preference parameter a, capturing the relative preference between goods c1
and c2, is set to a = 0:84, following Cooley and Hansen (1992). With these parameter values,
our model has a steady-state consumption share of GDP (Css1 + C
ss
2 ) =Y = 52:82%, which
is not far from the average 55:55% in the data (the mismatching deviation is !4:91%).
2.4.3 Business-cycle features of the model
The key business-cycle features we aim at capturing are GDP, consumption and investment
volatility. The volatilities of the two shocks, are $z = $u = 0:37%, for both the productivity
and the Öscal shock. Given that the Öscal shock, ut, hits the ratio Gt=Yt, we assume that
15In the calibration, the value ~g is derived endogenously, because it must be ensured that the debt-to-GDP
ratio neither increases in the steady state nor it decreases, so as to avoid that the transversality condition of
the household problem fails. We provide details on the derivation of ~g with these properties in the Appendix.
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the innovations to shocks ut and zt, "z;t and "u;t, have a correlation coe¢cient :zu = !4%
which reáects the correlation observed in our database.
It is known that labor-hours volatility is di¢cult to be captured by a real-business cycle
model, even with the labor-hoarding setup of Cooley and Hansen (1989, 1992) that we
employ. Nevertheless, we report these volatilities in Table 2.2. Another set of calibration
targets consists of the correlations of these macro variables (consumption, investment and
labor) with output.
Volatility Correlation with GDP
Data Model (End.) Model (Ex.) Data Model (End.) Model (Ex.)
GDP 1.60 1.61 1.56 ñ ñ ñ
Consumption 0.83 0.79 0.69 0.78 0.59 0.61
Investment 5.79 5.86 5.64 0.82 0.92 0.94
Labor Hours 1.87 1.31 1.26 0.87 0.93 0.91
Table 2.2 - Business-cycle features of the model and comparison with data. ìModel (End.)î
stands for the version of the benchmark model with endogenous policy while ìModel (Ex.)î
stands for the version of the model with exogenous, constant growth rate of money supply.
Table 2.2 shows the main calibration moments.16 Volatility (standard deviation of log
values of detrended variables, using the Hodrick-Prescott Ölter) of GDP is matched almost
exactly by our model. Our benchmark model with endogenous monetary policy matches
investment well, deviating only by 1:2% from the corresponding data moment. Nondurable
consumption is slightly less successfully matched, deviating by 5:4% from the corresponding
data moment.
16We have run 500 Monte-Carlo experiments of series of 1000 periods (quarters).
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Simulated moments of correlation with output show that our model implied excess con-
sumption smoothing and too high volatility of investment. The simulated correlation of labor
with output does not deviate much from the data, deviating by 6:6% from the corresponding
data moment.
The version of the model with exogenous monetary policy uses the steady-state value
of the money growth rate found by the benchmark endogenous-policy model. This value is
#ss = 2:03%, very close to the ináation target of the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the European
Central Bank. We emphasize that #ss is endogenous in the benchmark endogenous-policy
model, so #ss is the model-implied average ináation in the stationary equilibrium.
In order to compare the business-cycle features of the exogenous-monetary-policy model,
we set the growth rate of money to the constant value #ss = 2:03%, taking it from the
endogenous-monetary-policy model calculation.
The moment comparisons between the two versions of the model reveal that the model
with an exogenous constant money-growth rate leads to lower Örst moments for all variables,
GDP, consumption, investment and labor hours. Regarding the correlation of variables
with GDP, the comparison between the two models gives mixed results. The model with
constant exogenous money-growth rate implies weaker consumption smoothing. In addition,
the model with constant exogenous money-growth rate implies more reactive investment
to booms and busts. Yet, the model with constant exogenous money-growth rate implies
slightly smoother reactions of employment to booms and busts.
To compare the propagation mechanisms of the two versions of the model, we plot impulse
responses to the productivity and supply-side shocks.
53
2.4.4 Impulse responses
We compute impulse responses of the two shocks, the productivity shock, zt, and the Öscal
shock, ut. Figures 2.1 through 2.6 below summarize the impact of these shocks on real
output, Yt, real investment, Xt, capital, Kt, hours worked, Ht, real consumption, Ct, and
consumption components, C1;t and C2;t, the nominal interest rate, it, ináation, 3t, real in-
terest rate, rt, the wage rate, wt, the detrended total nominal bonds, B^Tt (after dividing
by the nominal money supply), the growth rate of the nominal money supply, #t, the in-
verse of real money supply, P^t = Pt= 8M st , real government spending, Gt, real tax revenues,
Tt = R krtKt+ RhwtHt+ R cCt, the detrended household-bond holdings, B^Ht (after dividing by
the nominal money supply), the real total supply of bonds BTt , real central bank demand for
bonds BCBt and real household demand for bonds B
H
t . All plotted impulse responses in Fig-
ures 1 through 6 depict percentage deviations from the modelís corresponding deterministic
steady-state values.
One of our goals is to detect the nature and the e§ects of endogenizing monetary policy,
as implied by the policy rule #t+1 = <
A
zt; ut; #t; Kt; B^
T
t!1
B
. To this end, in every plot that
depicts the endogenous-policy impulse responses, we also include the impulse responses of
an exogenous policy rule. This exogenous policy rule uses a constant growth rate of the
nominal money supply, #, set to the implied optimal steady-state level of the endogenous
model, #ss.
2.4.4.1 Productivity shock Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, summarize the e§ects of a 1%
increase in the productivity shock, zt, on all variables of interest of the model economy. In
the panel of Figure 2.1, named ì#tî, we can see that endogenous optimal monetary policy
implies a nominal growth rate of money, #t, that is steadily lower than its steady-state
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value after some periods (blue line). This means that optimal time-consistent policy targets
a path of decelerating prices. Indeed, the panel of Figure 2.2 named ì3tî reveals that
endogenous monetary policy achieves this price deceleration, because ináation drops below
its steady-state value throughout transition to the steady state (blue line). The e§ect of
this endogenous policy on price deceleration is particularly strong, as revealed by the panel
of Figure 2.2 named ìP^tî. Because P^t = Pt= 8M st , the drop in the impulse response of P^t
reveals that prices decelerate more than nominal money supply, 8M st , i.e., 3t < #t along the
transition.
The Öne tuning of endogenous monetary policy implied by 3t < #t is reáected in the
panel of Figure 2.3 named ìBCBt î.
17 SpeciÖcally, the Central Bank intends to achieve an
intervention in the bonds market that discourages bondholding by households, an e§ect re-
vealed by the panel of Figure 2.3 named ìBHt î. Equation (2.16) shows that when households
buy fewer bonds and when this is combined with decelerating prices, the consumption of
the liquidity constrained good, C1;t, will increase. This increase is profound in the panel
of Figure 2.1 named ìC1;tî. The impulse response of C1;t reveals the strongest e§ect that
endogenous monetary policy has on real variables, after comparing the blue and the red
impulse-response lines of all real-variable panels of Figure 2.1.
To understand why endogenous monetary policy aims at having a sizable impact on the
consumption of the liquidity constrained good, C1;t, we must examine the key mechanics of
the model. The key feature of this model is that money ináuences real variables because of
the binding constraint of the liquidity-constrained good, C1;t (see equation (2.16)). If one
removes the liquidity constraint given by equation (2.16), that leads to a corner solution,
then money would not have any e§ects on real variables.
17As BCBt = (B
CB
t =Pt and equation (2.11) implies (B
CB
t =
(Mst , B
CB
t = 1=P^t. Therefore, the impulse response
of BCBt is the áipped version of the impulse response of P^t:
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Figure 2.1 - Impulse responses of growth rate of the nominal money supply, #t, real
output, Yt, real investment, Xt, capital, Kt, hours worked, Ht, real consumption, Ct, and
consumption components, C1;t and C2;t to a 1% increase in productivity shock zt (with
endogenous and exogenous monetary policy).
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Figure 2.2 - Impulse responses of nominal interest rate, it, ináation, 3t, real interest rate,
rt, the wage rate, wt, the detrended total nominal bonds, B^Tt , the detrended
household-bond holdings, B^Ht , the inverse of real money supply, P^t, real government
spending, Gt and real tax revenues, Tt to a 1% increase in productivity shock zt (with
endogenous and exogenous monetary policy).
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Figure 2.3 - Impulse responses of household real bond holdings BHt , central bank real
bond holdings BCBt and total real bonds B
T
t to a 1% increase in productivity shock zt
(with endogenous and exogenous monetary policy).
Endogenous time-consistent monetary policy tries to relax the e§ects of the binding
liquidity constraint given by equation (2.16), in order to make the corner solution more
tolerable for households during transitions from shocks. Endogenous policy achieves this
goal by reducing the growth rate of nominal money supply (see Figure 2.1). This policy will,
eventually, reduce the ináation rate (see Figure 2.2). Given that the real interest rate under
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exogenous monetary policy is similar to the real interest rate under endogenous monetary
policy, through the Fisher equation given by (2.25), a drop in the ináation rate implies
a drop in the nominal interest rate. This drop in the nominal interest rate makes bonds
less attractive for households. Through equation (2.16), buying fewer bonds and having real
incomes increased by decelerating prices increases C1;t relative to C2;t. In addition, aggregate
consumption, Ct = C1;t+C2;t, is higher under endogenous monetary policy, revealing a source
of welfare gains.
2.4.4.2 Fiscal shock Figures 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6, summarize the e§ects of a 1% increase in
the Öscal shock, ut, on all variables. Focusing on the exogenous-monetary policy version of
the model is informative about the transmission mechanism of Öscal shocks to the private
economy in the absence of Central-Bank reactions (regime of constant money-supply growth
rate, all magenta lines in the Ögures). The crucial feature of a Öscal shock is that it increases
deÖcits and creates a need for collecting more taxes in the future. This immediate impact of
a Öscal shock creates a foreseen welfare loss. This welfare loss is internalized by households.
Observing that leisure is the linear component of a quasilinear utility function, these welfare
losses are reáected in a decrease in leisure.18 This decrease in leisure is reáected in the panel
of Figure 2.4 named ìHtî which depicts a substantial increase in labor supply, Ht. This
increase in labor supply increases output. In turn, this increase in output pushes the price
index, Pt, drastically down. This decrease in the price index is reáected by the reaction of
ináation, 3t, appearing in the panel of Figure 2.5 named ì3tî.
The drop in ináation upon the impact of the Öscal shock is substantial. For the economy
with exogenous Öscal policy ináation drops by 25% of its steady-state value, i.e., it falls
18Notice that u (c1;t; c2;t; ht) = 7 log c1;t + (1! 7) log c2;t !Bht = 7 log c1;t + (1! 7) log c2;t +B (1! ht)!B,
i.e., leisure is the numeraire, the linear component of this quasilinear utility function.
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to 2:03% & (1! 25%) = 1:52%. This price deceleration immediately mitigates the negative
impact of the Öscal shock (the foreseen welfare loss), providing both Öscal space to the gov-
ernment to avoid running deÖcits and the ability to Önancial markets to adjust. SpeciÖcally,
in the panel of Figure 2.5 named ìitî we can see that the initial drop in 3t causes a sharp
drop in the nominal interest rate, it. This drop is implied by Fisherís equation, despite the
increase in the real interest rate, seen in the panel of Figure 2.5 named ìrtî (this increase in
rt stems from the drop in the capital-labor ratio, Kt=Ht). This sharp drop in the nominal
interest rate allows the government to avoid increasing the debt sharply. Instead, the panel
of Figure 2.6 named ìBTt î reveals that the sharp drop in the nominal interest rate allows
for total real debt to decrease.
The immediate market reactions to a Öscal shock, the internalization of the welfare loss
by households that leads to higher labor supply, to higher output and to lower nominal in-
terest rates, give the opportunity for smoother transition paths. SpeciÖcally, the transition
paths are characterized by higher nominal rates and higher ináation than their correspond-
ing steady-state levels. Yet, this adjustment speeds up the recovery of the crowded-out
investment, Xt, and the reduction in consumption.
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Figure 2.4 - Impulse responses of growth rate of the nominal money supply, #t, real
output, Yt, real investment, Xt, capital, Kt, hours worked, Ht, real consumption, Ct, and
consumption components, C1;t and C2;t to a 1% increase in Öscal shock ut (with
endogenous and exogenous monetary policy).
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Figure 2.5 - Impulse responses of nominal interest rate, it, ináation, 3t, real interest rate,
rt, the wage rate, wt, the detrended total nominal bonds, B^Tt , the detrended
household-bond holdings, B^Ht , the inverse of real money supply, P^t, real government
spending, Gt and real tax revenues, Tt to a 1% increase in Öscal shock ut (with endogenous
and exogenous monetary policy).
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Figure 2.6 - Impulse responses of household real bond holdings BHt , central bank real
bond holdings BCBt and total real bonds B
T
t to a 1% increase in Öscal shock ut (with
endogenous and exogenous monetary policy).
The modelís mechanics of adjustment to Öscal shocks reáected by the exogenous-Öscal-policy
impulse responses (magenta lines) are utilized by the Central Bank in the case of endogenous
monetary policy (green lines). SpeciÖcally, the Central Bank decreases money-supply growth
(see the panel of Figure 2.4 named ì#tî) and causes even sharper drops in ináation and in
nominal interest rate in the period of the Öscal shockís impact (see the panels of Figure
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2.5 named ì3tî and ìitî). In this way, the Central Bank achieves a speeding up of the
adjustment, characterized by two features. First, by Öne-tuning money-supply growth, #t, it
achieves ináation rates and nominal interest rates below their steady-state levels throughout
the transition. This achieves a consumption-smoothing e§ect that increases welfare (see the
panel of Figure 2.4 named ìCtî). Second, it achieves a more balanced mixture between the
liquidity-constrained good, C1;t, and the other good, C2;t. Since households prefer mixtures
of these two goods, monetary policy provides welfare gains through this channel as well.
2.5 Conclusion
We have studied a cash-in-advance model with two consumption goods, in which one type of
consumption is liquidity-constrained. In equilibrium, the liquidity-constrained good always
hits the liquidity constraint. As preferences over these two goods are strictly quasi-concave,
if the liquidity constraint was absent, households would prefer a speciÖc optimal mixture of
these two goods. This optimal mixture is distorted by the presence of the liquidity constraint
and the corner solution, causing a welfare loss. Due to this welfare loss, a Central Bank has
the opportunity to improve welfare by improving this mixture through monetary policy. This
cash-in-advance idea, without price rigidities, is one of the classic attempts to micro-found
money demand and potential beneÖts of monetary policy. Nevertheless, little has been done
to identify the optimal monetary policy. This paper has focused on this research question.
Because optimal policies face a credibility challenge by the presence of time inconsistency,
we have focused on credible, time-consistent monetary policy rules. SpeciÖcally, among
monetary-policy rules that respond to changes in the state of the economy, we have focused
on forward-looking monetary-policy rules that are consistent with the forward-guidance prac-
tices of Central Banks. This forward-guidance practice encouraged us to formulate the opti-
mal policy as a dynamic Stackelberg Markovian game between the Central Bank and private
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markets. Therefore, the recursive formulation for computing these optimal monetary policies
tracked the optimal time-consistent Öscal-policy literature.
We focused on how optimal time-consistent rules of increasing the money supply through
open-market operations respond to two types of shocks: (a) a total-factor productivity shock,
and (b) a Öscal shock to government spending. An unsurprising part of our Öndings is
that, for both types of shocks, the Central Bank tries to improve the mixture of the two
consumption goods that is distorted by the presence of the liquidity constraint. Among all
real variables, monetary policy mostly a§ects the dynamics of the two consumption goods.
Yet, some di§erences in Central-Bank policy in dealing with the two types of shocks are
informative.
A productivity shock o§ers production opportunities that eventually lead to a demand
expansion, after some periods in which households have worked more and have saved more.
Under a constant money-supply growth regime, this demand expansion leads to some above-
steady-state ináation, that tightens the constraint on the liquidity-constrained good. In
order to relax this constraint tightness, optimal policy achieves a low-ináation path that helps
aggregate-consumption demand to expand even further. Therefore, optimal monetary policy
improves the mixture of the two goods, but it increases consumption volatility. Apparently,
the welfare gains of improving the mixture of the two goods exceed the welfare losses of
higher consumption volatility.
A Öscal shock to government spending implies higher taxes for the future. Under a regime
of constant money-supply growth, government spending eventually crowds out investment
and leads to increased nominal interest rates and higher ináation. These Öscal-shock ef-
fects make the liquidity constraint relatively tighter and also cause substantial consumption
áuctuations. The Central Bank tries to mitigate these e§ects by decreasing money growth
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supply initially and Öne-tuning interest rates in order to both improve the mixture between
the two types of goods and to smooth consumption.
A key feature in our model is the absence of price rigidities. This absence facilitates a
clearer understanding of the role that cash-in-advance constraints play in the transmission
of monetary policy. In this paper we have seen the role that cash-in-advance constraints
play in the making of optimal time-consistent monetary policy. Nevertheless, the absence of
price rigidities, combined with rational expectations, allows for some vivid market reactions
in the Örst few periods that a shock occurs. These vivid market reactions are the outcome
of internalized calculations of future impulse responses to shocks that are foreseen, in an
environment that price adjustments are free of cost. The impulse responses to both shocks
imply an over-reaction in the Örst periods that the shock hits the economy: some variables
move toward the opposite direction in the beginning and soon rebound to the intuitive side
of the shock response. These over-reactions, that the Central Bank internalizes in the model,
are a feature of the model that may be inconsistent with data observations. Therefore, one
direction for future research would be to introduce micro-founded price rigidities, e.g., by
having menu costs as in Golosov and Lucas (2007).
Finally, a key direction for future work would be to introduce Önancial intermediaries,
such as a banking sector, in order to partially disconnect prices of Önancial assets from the
real economy. Such an extension should shed light on the way monetary-policy transmission
reaches the real economy. In addition, introducing banks to a model with cash-in-advance
constraints would help us understand whether Central Banks can internalize the interplay
between the e§ects of their monetary-policy instruments and the real shocks to the economy.
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2.6 Appendix
Before describing the algorithm, we formulate the modelís constraints in a way that can
accommodate the Bellman-equation formulation presented in the main body of the paper.
From (2.7) and (2.11) we obtain RCBt = it!1 8BCBt!1, which can be introduced into (2.1) in
order to obtain,
8Gt = 8Tt + 8B
T
t ! (1 + it!1) 8BTt!1 + it!1 8BCBt!1 . (A.2.1)
Equation (2.23) implies,
8BTt!1 = 8B
H
t!1 + 8B
CB
t!1 . (A.2.2)
Combining (A.2.1) with (A.2.2) we obtain,
8Gt = 8Tt + 8B
T
t ! (1 + it!1) 8BHt!1 ! 8BCBt!1 . (A.2.3)
After rewriting equation (A.2.3) in real terms, by dividing both sides of (A.2.3) by Pt, we
use the transformation x^t = 8xt= 8MSt , in order to obtain,
Gt = Tt +
B^Tt
P^t
! (1 + it!1) B^
H
t!1
(1 + #t)P^t
! B^
CB
t!1
(1 + #t)P^t
. (A.2.4)
Using condition (2.11), equation (A.2.2) becomes B^Tt!1 = B^
H
t!1 + 1 and therefore equation
(A.2.4) becomes,
Gt = Tt +
B^Tt
P^t
!
(1 + it!1)
A
B^Tt!1 ! 1
B
(1 + #t)P^t
! 1
(1 + #t)P^t
. (A.2.5)
Using (A.2.5) together with (2.2), (2.3), (2.12), (2.14), (2.15) and (2.26), equation (A.2.5)
becomes,
1 + it!1
1 + #t
=
(
[R c(1! A) + R kA + R c ! ~geut(1 + R c)] eztK+t H1!+t
!R k/Kt ! R cXt + B^
T
t
P^t
! 1
(1 + #t)P^t
)
P^tA
B^Tt!1 ! 1
B . (A.2.6)
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Transforming the cash in advance constraint (2.16) we obtain,
(1 + R c)c1;t =
m^Ht!1
(1 + #t)P^t
+
1 + it!1
1 + #t
b^Ht!1
P^t
! b^
H
t
P^t
. (A.2.7)
Combining (A.2.7) with (A.2.6) gives us an expression for c1;t,
c1;t =
1
(1 + R c)
8<: m^Ht!1P^t(1 + #t) + b^
H
t!1A
B^Tt!1 ! 1
B ("R c(1! A) + R kA + R c ! ~g eut(1 + R c)#
eztK+t H
1!+
t ! R k/Kt ! R cXt +
B^Tt
P^t
! 1
P^t(1 + #t)
)
! b^
H
t
P^t
)
, (A.2.8)
which is convenient for formulating momentary utility as a function of all state and control
variables in the Bellman equation.
The reduced form of the householdís budget constraint is obtained by combining (2.16)
and (2.17). Expressed in real terms and detrended using the x^t = 8xt= 8MSt transformation, it
is given by,
(1 + R c)c2;t + xt +
m^Ht
P^t
= (1! Rh)wtht + (1! R k)Rtkt + R k/kt. (A.2.9)
Using (A.2.9) together with (2.14), (2.15), gives us a convenient expression for c2;t,
c2;t =
1
(1 + R c)
(
(1! Rh)(1! A)ezt
9
Kt
Ht
:+
ht + (1! R k)Aezt
9
Kt
Ht
:+!1
kt+
+R k/kt ! xt ! m^
H
t
P^t
=
, (A.2.10)
facilitating the implementation of our numerical technique through the use of the Bellman
equation given by (2.36).
Householdsí utility maximization and deterministic steady-state
For the quadratic approximation (QA) in the algorithm we need the steady state values
of the state and action variables, that is why we solve the householdsí maximization problem
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using equations in real terms and apply the transformation x^t = 8xt= 8MSt . More speciÖcally,
(2.18) corresponds to,
max
f(c1;t;c2;t;ht;m^Ht ;b^Ht ;kt+1)g1t=0
E0
( 1X
t=0
5tu (c1;t; c2;t; ht)
)
with 0 < 5 < 1. Preferences are given by the following utility function,
u (c1;t; c2;t; ht) = a log c1;t + (1! a) log c2;t !Bht
with 0 < a < 1.
Households maximize their expected utility subject to (2.16) and (2.17), expressed in
real terms and detrended using the x^t = 8xt= 8MSt transformation.
We formulate the householdsí Lagrangian to solve the maximization problem:
L = E0
"( 1X
t=0
5t (a log c1;t + (1! a) log c2;t !Bht)
)
+
+
1X
t=0
*t
 
(1! Rh)wtht + (1! R k)Rtkt + R k/kt + m^
H
t!1
P^t(1 + #t)
+
(1 + it!1)b^Ht!1
P^t(1 + #t)
! (1 + R c)(c1;t + c2;t)! kt+1 + (1! /)kt ! m^
H
t
P^t
! b^
H
t
P^t
!
+
1X
t=0
9t
 
m^Ht!1
P^t(1 + #t)
+
(1 + it!1)b^Ht!1
P^t(1 + #t)
! b^
H
t
P^t
! (1 + R c)c1;t
!#
First order conditions
FOC. w.r.t. c1;t:
5ta
c1;t
= (*t + 9t)(1 + R c)
9t =
5ta
c1;t(1 + R c)
! *t (A.2.11)
FOC. w.r.t. c2;t:
5t(1! a)
c2;t
= *t(1 + R c)
*t =
5t(1! a)
c2;t(1 + R c)
(A.2.12)
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FOC. w.r.t. ht:
5tB = *t(1! Rh)wt
*t =
5tB
(1! Rh)wt (A.2.13)
Using (A.2.12) and (A.2.13), we get,
c2;t =
(1! a)(1! Rh)wt
B(1 + R c)
(A.2.14)
FOC. w.r.t. m^Ht :
*t
P^t
=
*t+1 + 9t+1
P^t+1(1 + #t+1)
,
using (A.2.11) and (A.2.13),
5tB
P^t(1! Rh)wt
=
5t+1a
c1;t+1(1 + R c)P^t+1(1 + #t+1)
c1;t+1 =
5aP^t(1! Rh)wt
B(1 + R c)P^t+1(1 + #t+1)
(A.2.15)
Note that,
1 + 3t =
Pt
Pt!1
() 1 + 3t = P^t(1 + #t)
P^t!1
(A.2.16)
c1;t+1 can be rewritten using (A.2.16),
c1;t+1 =
5a(1! Rh)wt
B(1 + R c)(1 + 3t+1)
(A.2.17)
or c1;t+1 can be rewritten using (A.2.14),
c1;t+1 =
5ac2;t
(1! a)(1 + 3t+1) . (A.2.18)
FOC. w.r.t. b^Ht :
*t + 9t
P^t
=
(*t+1 + 9t+1)(1 + it)
P^t+1(1 + #t+1)
,
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using (A.2.11),
c1;t+1 =
5(1 + it)c1;tP^t
P^t+1(1 + #t+1)
. (A.2.19)
c1;t+1 can be rewritten using (A.2.16),
c1;t+1 =
5(1 + it)c1;t
(1 + 3t+1)
(A.2.20)
Using (A.2.18) and (A.2.20), we get,
c1;t =
ac2;t
(1! a)(1 + it) (A.2.21)
Using (A.2.17) and (A.2.20), we get,
c1;t =
awt(1! Rh)
B(1 + R c)(1 + it)
(A.2.22)
(A.2.22) period ahead,
c1;t+1 =
awt+1(1! Rh)
B(1 + R c)(1 + it+1)
together with (A.2.17), is equal to,
wt+1
5wt
=
1 + it+1
1 + 3t+1
(A.2.23)
Total household consumption is equal to,
ct = c1;t + c2;t (A.2.24)
FOC. w.r.t. kt+1:
*t = *t+1((1! R k)Rt+1 + R k/ + (1! /)) ,
using (A.2.13),
wt+1
5wt
= 1 + (1! R k)(Rt+1 ! /) (A.2.25)
Combining (A.2.23) and (A.2.25), gives us the Fisher equation (approx. it 3 (1!R k)rt+3t),
1 + it
1 + 3t
= (1 + (1! R k)rt) (A.2.26)
71
(A.2.26) is reasonable. The nominal government bond return in t + 1, it is determined in
t, the moment the government bond is bought. The real return of this government bond is
known in t+ 1.
The nominal bond rate, it is equal to,
it = (1 + (1! R k)rt)(1 + 3t)! 1
and the real capital return, rt is equal to,
rt =
1
1! R k
9
1 + it
1 + 3t
! 1
:
.
Note that the net real capital return is equal to (1! R k)rt.
Deterministic steady state
In the deterministic steady state all real variables are constant and markets clear. For
real money balances to be constant in the deterministic steady state, the growth rate of
money supply, #t needs to be equal to the ináation rate, 3t. (2.8) in real terms, is given by,
MSt =
(1 + #t)
(1 + 3t)
MSt!1 ,
and shows that for
MSt =M
S
t!1 =) #t = 3t .
So in the deterministic steady-state,
#ss = 3ss (A.2.27)
Also if (A.2.27) holds, then
P^t = P^t!1 = P^ ss
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This can be shown by,
P^t = P^t!1
Pt
8MSt
=
Pt!1
8MSt!1
(1 + 3t)Pt!1
(1 + #t) 8M
S
t!1
=
Pt!1
8MSt!1
1 + 3t = 1 + #t
Also, under market clearing of the money market,(2.22),
m^Ht = m^
H
t!1 =
!
m^H
"ss
= 1 .
Using (A.2.25),
1
5
= 1 + (1! R k)(Rss ! /)
Steady-state marginal product of capital, Rss,
Rss =
1! 5
5(1! R k) + / . (A.2.28)
Steady-state real capital return, rss = Rss ! /,
rss =
1! 5
5(1! R k) . (A.2.29)
Using (2.14) and (A.2.28),
Kss
Hss
=
<
1
Aezss
9
1! 5
5(1! R k) + /
:= 1
*!1
. (A.2.30)
Steady-state wage, wss, using (2.15), is equal to,
wss = (1! A)ezss
9
Kss
Hss
:+
(A.2.31)
Using (A.2.14), steady-state consumption of "credit good", Css2 , is equal to,
Css2 =
(1! a)(1! Rh)wss
B(1 + R c)
(A.2.32)
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Using (A.2.17) and (A.2.27), steady-state consumption of "cash good", Css1 , is equal to,
Css1 =
5a(1! Rh)wss
B(1 + R c)(1 + #ss)
(A.2.33)
Using (A.2.32) and (A.2.33), steady-state total consumption, Css, is equal to,
Css = Css1 + C
ss
2 (A.2.34)
Using (A.2.26), (A.2.27) and (A.2.29), steady-state nominal bond rate, iss is equal to,
iss =
1 + #ss
5
! 1 (A.2.35)
Using (2.27), steady-state investment is equal to,
Xss = /Kss (A.2.36)
To derive steady-state productive capital stock, use (2.3), (2.12) and (A.2.36) in (2.26),
Y ss = Css +Xss +Gss
ez
ss
(Kss)+ (Hss)1!+ ! /Kss ! ~geussezss (Kss)+ (Hss)1!+ = Css
Kss
(
ez
9
Kss
Hss
:+!1
! / ! ~geussezss
9
Kss
Hss
:+!1)
= Css
Kss = Css
(
ez
ss
9
Kss
Hss
:+!1
! / ! ~geussezss
9
Kss
Hss
:+!1)!1
Kss = Css
(
ez
ss
9
Kss
Hss
:+!1
(1! ~geuss)! /
)!1
(A.2.37)
Using (A.2.30) and (A.2.37), steady-state hours worked are equal to,
Hss =
9
Kss
Hss
:!1
Kss (A.2.38)
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Using (A.2.9), we derive steady-state P^ ss,
(1 + R c)C
ss
2 = (1! Rh)wssHss + (1! R k)RssKss + R k/Kss !Xss !
1
P^ ss
P^ ss = f(1! Rh)wssHss + (1! R k)RssKss + R k/Kss !Xss ! (1 + R c)Css2 g!1
(A.2.39)
Steady-state real money balances is equal to,
!
MS
"ss
=
A
P^ ss
B!1
Using the cash-in-advance constraint, (A.2.7) in the steady state, we derive the steady-stateA
B^H
Bss
,
(1 + R c)C
ss
1 =
1
P^ ss (1 + #ss)
A
1 + (1 + iss)
A
B^H
Bss
! (1 + #ss)
A
B^H
BssB
A
B^H
Bss
=
(1 + R c)C
ss
1 P^
ss (1 + #ss)! 1
i! #ss . (A.2.40)
Using (2.11),we derive the steady-state
A
B^CB
Bss
,
A
B^CB
Bss
= 1 . (A.2.41)
The sum of (A.2.40) and (A.2.41), gives us the steady-state
A
B^T
Bss
,
A
B^T
Bss
=
A
B^H
Bss
+
A
B^CB
Bss
(A.2.42)
Endogenizing ~g
Use (A.2.36) and (A.2.39), such that,
1
P^ ss
= !(1 + R c)Css2| {z }
 1
+
"
(1! Rh)wss
9
Kss
Hss
:!1
+ (1! R k)Rss ! (1! R k)/
#
| {z }
 2
Kss . (A.2.43)
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From Y ss = Css +Xss +Gss, we derive,
Kss =
Css
ez
ss
9
Kss
Hss
:+!1
! /| {z }
 3
! euss+zss
9
Kss
Hss
:+!1
| {z }
 4
~g
. (A.2.44)
Using (A.2.43) and (A.2.44), gives us,
1
P^ ss
=  1 +
 2C
ss
 3 !  4~g
. (A.2.45)
We know that nominal direct receipts from the Central Bank in period t are equal to,
RCBt = it!1M t!1S . (A.2.46)
In real terms, (A.2.46), is equal to,
RCBt =
it!1MSt!1
1 + 3t
=
it!1
(1 + 3t) P^t!1
,
and in the steady state,
RCBss =
i
(1 + #ss) P^ ss
(A.2.47)
(A.2.45) together with (A.2.47), is equal to,
RCBss =
iss
1 + #ss
9
 1 +
 2C
ss
 3 !  4~g
:
. (A.2.48)
We use (2.5) in the steady state,
~geu
ss
Y ss = T ss +
!
BT
"ss9
1! 1 + i
ss
1 + 3ss
:
+RCBss ,
together with (2.2) in the steady state and (A.2.35), gives
~geu
ss
Y ss = R cC
ss + Rhw
ssHss + R k (R
ss ! /)Kss + !BT "ss91! 1
5
:
+RCBss . (A.2.49)
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We rewrite (A.2.49) using (2.12), (2.14), (2.15), (2.26) and (2.27) in the steady state,
~g =
1
(1 + R c) eu
ss| {z }
C1
RCBss
Y ss
+
+
1
(1 + R c) eu
ss
 
R c ! R c/
ezss
9
Kss
Hss
:1!+
+ Rh (1! A) + R kA! R k/
ezss
9
Kss
Hss
:1!+
+
!
BT
"ss
Y ss
9
1! 1
5
:!
| {z }
C2
~g = ?1
RCBss
Y ss
+ ?2 (A.2.50)
Using (2.14) in the steady state,
Y ss =
1
A
RssKss ,
together with (A.2.44), is equal to,
Y ss =
1
A
Rss
Css
 3 !  4~g
. (A.2.51)
Use (A.2.48) and (A.2.51) in (A.2.50),
~g = ?1
A
iss
1+)ss
A
 1 +
 2C
ss
 3! 4~g
BB
A
1
+
Rss C
ss
 3! 4~g
B + ?2
~g = ?1
Aiss
(1 + #ss)Rss
>
 2 +
 1
Css
( 3 !  4~g)
?
+ ?2
~g = ?1
Aiss
(1 + #ss)Rss
9
 2 +
 1 3
Css
:
+ ?2| {z }
01
! ?1
Aiss
(1 + #)Rss
 1 4
Css| {z }
02
~g
~g =
71
1 + 72
Algorithm
Step 1 The outer loop, called the ì#ss loopî is a loop that guarantees accuracy of
quadratic approximations. SpeciÖcally, in the process of calculating the optimal money
supply rule, <, given by,
#t+1 = <
A
zt; ut; #t; Kt; B^
T
t!1
B
= <(St) ,
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we approximate all functions around the steady-state values of state variables and action
variables. In order to ensure that the implied steady-state variable for the optimal money-
supply growth rate, #ss, is accurately computed, we check if
#ss = <
A
zss; uss; #ss; Kss;
A
B^T
BssB
= <(Sss) ,
holds, where the superscript ìssî denotes steady-state values. Before entering the #ss loop,
we take a guess on #ss.
Step 2 The next loop, called the ì< loopî, iterates on the optimal money supply rule,
<. We start with an initial guess for the policy rule <. We denote the initial guess as
<(0), while the iteration index is n . Therefore, the symbol <(
n ) stands for the policy-rule
update. The form of the policy rule <(n ) (#0 = <(n )
A
z; u; #;K; B^T
B
) is given by,
#0 = &'(n ) &
26666666666666664
1
z
u
#
K
B^T
37777777777777775
=
>
 
(n )
cst:  
(n )
z  
(n )
u  
(n )
)  
(n )
K  
(n )
B^T
?
| {z }
q
!"
(n )
&
26666666666666664
1
z
u
#
K
B^T
37777777777777775
,
(A.2.52)
Step 3
In this step we enter a new loop, the competitive-equilibrium loop, or the ìCE loopî,
iterating on the value function of the representative household, imposing market-clearing
conditions in order to ensure that aggregate variables and prices are consistent with indi-
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vidual decision rules. The Bellman equation of the representative household in competitive
equilibrium is given by,
V
A
z; u; #;K; k; m^H ; B^T ; b^H j <(n )
B
=
= max
h;x;m^H 0 ;b^H 0
(
u
A
z; u; #;K; k; m^H ; B^T ; b^H ; h; x; m^H
0
; b^H
0
; H;X; P^ ; B^T
0
B
+
+5Et
h
V
A
z0; u0; #0; K 0; k0; m^H
0
; B^T
0
; b^H
0 j <(n )
Bi)
, (A.2.53)
in which,
u
A
z; u; #;K; k; m^H ; B^T ; b^H ; h; x; m^H
0
; b^H
0
; H;X; P^ ; B^T
0
B
= a log c1 + (1! a) log c2 !Bh ,
(A.2.54)
with c1 given by equation (A.2.8) and c2 given by equation (A.2.10). Bellman equation
(A.2.53) represents equation (2.36) in the main body of the paper. Equation (A.2.54) com-
bined with (A.2.8) and (A.2.10), give the functional form of the momentary utility function
in equation (2.36) in the main body of the paper.
The Öxed point of (A.2.53) is calculated using quadratic approximation around the
steady-state values of action and state variables calculated above. Some of these steady-
state values depend on the (guessed) value #ss of the outer loop introduced by Step 1 above.
We take a guess on the value functionís quadratic form, denoted by Q(0)
V j.(n )
, and use
the right-hand-side (RHS) of the above Bellman equation as a mapping. A good guess on
the quadratic form is a negative-deÖnite matrix, namely Q(0)
V j.(n )
= !I9, in which I9 is a
94 9 identity matrix. This guess implies that the RHS of the Bellman equation corresponds
to a strictly concave objective with respect to maximizers, enabling the existence of a global
maximum. In brief, the Bellman equation acts as a contraction mapping, which, for the
nCE-th step of the updating process, can be written as,
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26666666666664
1
z
u
8
K
k
m^H
B^T
b^H
37777777777775
T
Q
(nCE+1)
V j&(n )
26666666666664
1
z
u
8
K
k
m^H
B^T
b^H
37777777777775
= max
h;x;m^H 0 ;b^H 0
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
2666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
1
z
u
8
K
k
m^H
B^T
b^H
h
x
m^H
0
b^H
0
H
X
P^
B^T
0
1
z0
u0
80
K 0
k0
m^H
0
B^T
0
b^H
0
3777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
T
"
Qu 0
0 AQ
(nCE)
V j&(n )
#
2666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
1
z
u
8
K
k
m^H
B^T
b^H
h
x
m^H
0
b^H
0
H
X
P^
B^T
0
1
z0
u0
80
K 0
k0
m^H
0
B^T
0
b^H
0
3777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
,
(A.2.55)
subject to the laws of motion (2.4), (2.13), (A.2.52) and (2.27).
Next, we incorporate the constraints (2.4), (2.13), (A.2.52) and (2.27), into the right-
hand-side of (A.2.55). This is achieved through matrix @1, namely,
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@1 =
1
#
z
#
u
#
8
#
K
#
k
#
m^H
#
B^T
#
b^H
#
h
#
x
#
m^H
0
#
b^H
0
#
H
#
X
#
P^
#
B^T
0
#26666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
.
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 Bz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 Bu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 
(n )
cst:  
(n )
z  
(n )
u  
(n )
3  
(n )
K 0 0  
(n )
B^T
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1! ( 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1! ( 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
37777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
 1
 z
 u
 8
 K
 k
 m^H
 B^T
 b^H
 h
 x
 m^H 0
 b^H 0
 H
 X
 P^
 B^T 0
 1
 z0
 u0
 80
 K 0
 k0
 m^H 0
 B^T 0
 b^H 0
We deÖne a 174 17 matrix,
>
(nCE)
1 = @
T
1
2664 Qu 0
0 5Q
(nCE)
V j.(n )
3775@1 (A.2.56)
The RHS of (A.2.55) can we rewritten as an unconstrained maximization problem, incorpo-
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rating the constraints by using (A.2.56), namely,
max
h; x; m^H 0 ; b^H 0
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
2666666666666666666666666666664
1
z
u
8
K
k
m^H
B^T
b^H
h
x
m^H
0
b^H
0
H
X
P^
B^T
0
3777777777777777777777777777775
T
1
(nCE)
1
2666666666666666666666666666664
1
z
u
8
K
k
m^H
B^T
b^H
h
x
m^H
0
b^H
0
H
X
P^
B^T
0
3777777777777777777777777777775
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
(A.2.57)
The Örst-order conditions of (A.2.57) give,
1
(nCE)
1 [10:13;1:17]
2666666666666666666666666666664
1
z
u
8
K
k
m^H
B^T
b^H
h
x
m^H
0
b^H
0
H
X
P^
B^T
0
3777777777777777777777777777775
=
2664
0
0
0
0
3775 ; (A.2.58)
where the subscript ì[10:13; 1:17]î denotes the submatrix of >(nCE)1 comprised by the rows
from 10 to 13, and by the columns from 1 to 17. In order to impose the market-clearing
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conditions we construct a 174 10 matrix MCCE, given by,
1
#
z
#
u
#
8
#
K
#
B^T
#
H
#
X
#
P^
#
B^T
0
#
MCCE =
266666666666666666666666666664
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
!1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
!1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
377777777777777777777777777775
 1
 z
 u
 8
 K
 k
 m^H
 B^T
 b^H
 h
 x
 m^H 0
 b^H 0
 H
 X
 P^
 B^T 0
(A.2.59)
To impose market clearing combine (A.2.59) with (A.2.58) in the following way,
1
(nCE)
1 [10:13;1:17] MCCE
2666666666666664
1
z
u
8
K
B^T
H
X
P^
B^T
0
3777777777777775
=
2664
0
0
0
0
3775 , (A.2.60)
in order to ensure that individual decision rules comply with aggregate laws of motion.
SpeciÖcally, we impose the set of conditions concisely denoted by ìst = Stî and ìat = Atî
in equations (2.31) and (2.34) in the main body of the paper.
DeÖne a 44 10 matrix,
>
(nCE)
2 = >
(nCE)
1 [10:13;1:17] MCCE,
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such that we can derive from (A.2.60), the optimal law of motion for H, X, P^ and B^T
0
,
2664
H
X
P^
B^T
0
3775 = 1(nCE)3
26666664
1
z
u
8
K
B^T
37777775 . (A.2.61)
where the 44 6 matrix >(nCE)3 is given by,
>
(nCE)
3 = !
h
>
(nCE)
2 [1:4;7:10]
i!1
>
(nCE)
2 [1:4;1:6] .
Matrix >(nCE)3 summarizes the optimal decision rules of the aggregate action variables A =A
H;X; P^ ; B^T
0
B
. Given these decision rules, we reformulate (A.2.55), by initiating a matrix
which includes all household constraints (2.4), (2.13), (A.2.52) and (2.27), and all decision
rules given by >(nCE)3 through equation (A.2.61), namely,
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@2 =
1
#
z
#
u
#
8
#
K
#
k
#
m^H
#
B^T
#
b^H
#
h
#
x
#
m^H
0
#
b^H
0
#266666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1
(nCE)
3 [1;1] 1
(nCE)
3 [1;2] 1
(nCE)
3 [1;3] 1
(nCE)
3 [1;4] 1
(nCE)
3 [1;5] 0 0 1
(nCE)
3 [1;6] 0 0 0 0 0
1
(nCE)
3 [2;1] 1
(nCE)
3 [2;2] 1
(nCE)
3 [2;3] 1
(nCE)
3 [2;4] 1
(nCE)
3 [2;5] 0 0 1
(nCE)
3 [2;6] 0 0 0 0 0
1
(nCE)
3 [3;1] 1
(nCE)
3 [3;2] 1
(nCE)
3 [3;3] 1
(nCE)
3 [3;4] 1
(nCE)
3 [3;5] 0 0 1
(nCE)
3 [3;6] 0 0 0 0 0
1
(nCE)
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(nCE)
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(nCE)
3 [4;3] 1
(nCE)
3 [4;4] 1
(nCE)
3 [4;5] 0 0 1
(nCE)
3 [4;6] 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 Bz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 Bu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1
(nCE)
3 [4;1] 1
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(nCE)
3 [4;5] 0 0 1
(nCE)
3 [4;6] 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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 1
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 u0
 80
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Therefore, the 134 13 matrix,
>
(nCE)
4 = @
T
2
2664 Qu 0
0 5Q
(nCE)
V j.(n )
3775@2 , (A.2.62)
imposes all household constraints and all aggregate decision rules on the RHS of (A.2.55)
transforming (A.2.55) into an unconstrained optimization problem that respects market-
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clearing conditions. Therefore, maximizing,
max
h; x; m^H 0 ; b^H 0
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
266666666666666664
1
z
u
8
K
k
m^H
B^T
b^H
h
x
m^H
0
b^H
0
377777777777777775
T
>
(nCE)
4
266666666666666664
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K
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b^H
h
x
m^H
0
b^H
0
377777777777777775
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
, (A.2.63)
and after deriving the Örst-order conditions, we obtain the individual optimality conditions,
2666666664
h
x
m^H
0
b^H
0
3777777775
= >
(nCE)
5
2666666666666666666666666664
1
z
u
#
K
k
m^H
B^T
b^H
3777777777777777777777777775
(A.2.64)
where the 44 9 matrix >(nCE)5 , summarizing the optimality conditions, is given by,
>
(nCE)
5 = !
h
>
(nCE)
4 [10:13;10:13]
i!1
>
(nCE)
4 [10:13;1:9] .
We impose these conditions given by (A.2.64) on the RHS of the Bellman equation in order
to obtain an update of the quadratically approximated value function, Q(nCE)
V j.(n )
. SpeciÖcally,
we formulate the following 134 9 matrix,
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@3 =
1
#
z
#
u
#
8
#
K
#
k
#
m^H
#
B^T
#
b^H
#2666666666666666666666664
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1
(nCE)
5 [1;1] 1
(nCE)
5 [1;2] 1
(nCE)
5 [1;3] 1
(nCE)
5 [1;4] 1
(nCE)
5 [1;5] 1
(nCE)
5 [1;6] 1
(nCE)
5 [1;7] 1
(nCE)
5 [1;8] 1
(nCE)
5 [1;9]
1
(nCE)
5 [2;1] 1
(nCE)
5 [2;2] 1
(nCE)
5 [2;3] 1
(nCE)
5 [2;4] 1
(nCE)
5 [2;5] 1
(nCE)
5 [2;6] 1
(nCE)
5 [2;7] 1
(nCE)
5 [2;8] 1
(nCE)
5 [2;9]
1
(nCE)
5 [3;1] 1
(nCE)
5 [3;2] 1
(nCE)
5 [3;3] 1
(nCE)
5 [3;4] 1
(nCE)
5 [3;5] 1
(nCE)
5 [3;6] 1
(nCE)
5 [3;7] 1
(nCE)
5 [3;8] 1
(nCE)
5 [3;9]
1
(nCE)
5 [4;1] 1
(nCE)
5 [4;2] 1
(nCE)
5 [4;3] 1
(nCE)
5 [4;4] 1
(nCE)
5 [4;5] 1
(nCE)
5 [4;6] 1
(nCE)
5 [4;7] 1
(nCE)
5 [4;8] 1
(nCE)
5 [4;9]
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,
and we update the value functionís quadratic form through,
Q
(nCE+1)
V j.(n )
= )T3 & >(nCE)5 &)3 . (A.2.65)
If the distance between Q(nCE+1)
V j.(n )
and Q(nCE)
V j.(n )
is not arbitrarily small, we return to Step 3
and we continue until we have found the Öxed point, Q"
V j.(n )
, and the individual decision
rules, which are expressed by >"5.
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Step 4
In this step we compute the intermediate-equilibrium (ìIEî). We formulate the non-
Bellman equation of the household given by equation (2.37) in the main body of the paper,
leaving #0 free for one period ahead only, which is given by,
~V
A
z; u; #; #0; K; k; m^H ; B^T ; b^H j <(n )
B
=
max
h;x;m^H 0 ;b^H 0
n
u(z; u; #;K; k; m^H ; B^T ; b^H ; h; x; m^H
0
; b^H
0
; H;X; P^ ; B^T
0
)+
+5Et
h
V "
A
z0; u0; #0; K 0; k0; m^H
0
; B^T
0
; b^H
0 j <(n )
Bi)
, (A.2.66)
The value function V " used on the RHS of (A.2.66), is the Öxed point of the competitive-
equilibrium Bellman equation, given by (A.2.65) after the ìCE loopî has converged. The
expanded quadratic form of (A.2.66) is given by,
2666666666666664
1
z
u
8
80
K
k
m^H
B^T
b^H
3777777777777775
T
~Q
V j&(n )
2666666666666664
1
z
u
8
80
K
k
m^H
B^T
b^H
3777777777777775
= max
h;x;m^H 0 ;b^H 0
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
2666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
1
z
u
8
K
k
m^H
B^T
b^H
h
x
m^H
0
b^H
0
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B^T
0
1
z0
u0
80
K 0
k0
m^H
0
B^T
0
b^H
0
3777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
T
"
Qu 0
0 AQ$
V j&(n )
#
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1
z
u
8
K
k
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B^T
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h
x
m^H
0
b^H
0
H
X
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B^T
0
1
z0
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80
K 0
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m^H
0
B^T
0
b^H
0
3777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777775
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
.
(A.2.67)
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Since #0 is free for one period ahead only, we impose all constraints of the householdís
problem on the RHS of (A.2.67) except (A.2.52). SpeciÖcally, we impose constraints (2.4),
(2.13), and (2.27). This is achieved through the 264 18 matrix !1 given by,
!1 =
1
#
z
#
u
#
8
#
80
#
K
#
k
#
m^H
#
B^T
#
b^H
#
h
#
x
#
m^H
0
#
b^H
0
#
H
#
X
#
P^
#
B^T
0
#266666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 Bz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 Bu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1! ( 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1! ( 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
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Transforming the RHS of (A.2.67) as follows,
G
(nIE)
1 = !
T
1
2664 Qu 0
0 5Q"
V j.(n )
3775!1 (A.2.68)
leads to the following unconstrained-optimization version of the optimization problem of
(A.2.67):
max
h;x;m^H 0 ;b^H 0
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
266666666666666666666666666666664
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u
8
80
K
k
m^H
B^T
b^H
h
x
m^H
0
b^H
0
H
X
P^
B^T
0
377777777777777777777777777777775
T
E
(nIE)
1
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0
H
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377777777777777777777777777777775
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
. (A.2.69)
The Örst-order conditions are summarized by,
E
(nIE)
1 [11:14;1:18]
2666666666666666666666666666664
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0
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0
H
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0
3777777777777777777777777777775
=
2664
0
0
0
0
3775 : (A.2.70)
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Imposing the market-clearing conditions given by equations (2.31) and (2.34) in the main
body of the paper through matrix MCIE,
1
#
z
#
u
#
8
#
8
#
0 K
#
B^T
#
H
#
X
#
P^
#
B^T
0
#
MCIE =
26666666666666666666666666666664
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
!1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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(A.2.71)
applied on G(nIE)1 [11:14;1:18] as follows,
E
(nIE)
1 [11:14;1:18] MCIE
266666666666666664
1
z
u
8
80
K
B^T
H
X
P^
B^T
0
377777777777777775
=
2664
0
0
0
0
3775 ; (A.2.72)
we obtain a new matrix, G(nIE)2 , that contains this market-clearing information:
G
(nIE)
2 = G
(nIE)
1 [11:14;1:18] MCIE .
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Therefore, the aggregate decision rules for IE are given by,
2666666664
H
X
P^
B^T
0
3777777775
= G
(nIE)
3
26666666666666666664
1
z
u
#
#0
K
B^T
37777777777777777775
. (A.2.73)
where,
G
(nIE)
3 = !
h
G
(nIE)
2 [1:4;8:11]
i!1
G
(nIE)
2 [1:4;1:7] .
Notice that the di§erence between G(nIE)3 and >
(nCE)
3 in the CE loop is that G
(nIE)
3 also de-
pends on #0, which is a free policy variable, capturing the impact of any one-period deviation
of monetary policy on the state variables. In order to impose that ináuence of the aggregate
decision rules for IE on the RHS of (A.2.67) we use matrix !2, given by,
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!2 =
1
#
z
#
u
#
8
#
80
#
K
#
k
#
m^H
#
B^T
#
b^H
#
h
#
x
#
m^H
0
#
b^H
0
#26666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666664
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
E
(nIE)
3 [1;1] E
(nIE)
3 [1;2] E
(nIE)
3 [1;3] E
(nIE)
3 [1;4] E
(nIE)
3 [1;5] E
(nIE)
3 [1;6] 0 0 E
(nIE)
3 [1;7] 0 0 0 0 0
E
(nIE)
3 [2;1] E
(nIE)
3 [2;2] E
(nIE)
3 [2;3] E
(nIE)
3 [2;4] E
(nIE)
3 [2;5] E
(nIE)
3 [2;6] 0 0 E
(nIE)
3 [2;7] 0 0 0 0 0
E
(nIE)
3 [3;1] E
(nIE)
3 [3;2] E
(nIE)
3 [3;3] E
(nIE)
3 [3;4] E
(nIE)
3 [3;5] E
(nIE)
3 [3;6] 0 0 E
(nIE)
3 [3;7] 0 0 0 0 0
E
(nIE)
3 [4;1] E
(nIE)
3 [4;2] E
(nIE)
3 [4;3] E
(nIE)
3 [4;4] E
(nIE)
3 [4;5] E
(nIE)
3 [4;6] 0 0 E
(nIE)
3 [4;7] 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 Bz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 Bu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
E
(nIE)
3 [2;1] E
(nIE)
3 [2;2] E
(nIE)
3 [2;3] E
(nIE)
3 [2;4] E
(nIE)
3 [2;5] E
(nIE)
3 [2;6] + 1! ( 0 0 E(nIE)3 [2;7] 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1! ( 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
E
(nIE)
3 [4;1] E
(nIE)
3 [4;2] E
(nIE)
3 [4;3] E
(nIE)
3 [4;4] E
(nIE)
3 [4;5] E
(nIE)
3 [4;6] 0 0 E
(nIE)
3 [4;7] 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Using !2, deÖne a 14 4 14 matrix G(nIE)4 which summarizes the RHS of (A.2.66) as an
unconstrained problem that includes the information of market clearing conditions as follows
G
(nIE)
4 = !
T
2
2664 Qu 0
0 5Q"
V j.(n )
3775!2 , (A.2.74)
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perform optimization,
max
h; x; m^H 0 ; b^H 0
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
26666666666666666664
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h
x
m^H
0
b^H
0
37777777777777777775
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(nIE)
4
26666666666666666664
1
z
u
8
80
K
k
m^H
B^T
b^H
h
x
m^H
0
b^H
0
37777777777777777775
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
, (A.2.75)
and after taking Örst-order conditions obtain the individual optimality conditions given by,
2666666664
h
x
m^H
0
b^H
0
3777777775
= G
(nIE)
5
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1
z
u
#
#0
K
k
m^H
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3777777777777777777777777777775
, (A.2.76)
where G(nIE)5 is given by,
G
(nIE)
5 = !
h
G
(nIE)
4 [11:14;11:14]
i!1
G
(nIE)
4 [11:14;1:10] .
In order to derive the quadratically-approximated version of value function ~V , impose the
individual household optimal decisions on the RHS of (A.2.66), through transforming matrix
G
(nIE)
4 . SpeciÖcally, create the 144 10 matrix !3,
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!3 =
1
#
z
#
u
#
8
#
80
#
K
#
k
#
m^H
#
B^T
#
b^H
#266666666666666666666666664
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
E
(nIE)
5 [1;1] E
(nIE)
5 [1;2] E
(nIE)
5 [1;3] E
(nIE)
5 [1;4] E
(nIE)
5 [1;5] E
(nIE)
5 [1;6] E
(nIE)
5 [1;7] E
(nIE)
5 [1;8] E
(nIE)
5 [1;9] E
(nIE)
5 [1;10]
E
(nIE)
5 [2;1] E
(nIE)
5 [2;2] E
(nIE)
5 [2;3] E
(nIE)
5 [2;4] E
(nIE)
5 [2;5] E
(nIE)
5 [2;6] E
(nIE)
5 [2;7] E
(nIE)
5 [2;8] E
(nIE)
5 [2;9] E
(nIE)
5 [2;10]
E
(nIE)
5 [3;1] E
(nIE)
5 [3;2] E
(nIE)
5 [3;3] E
(nIE)
5 [3;4] E
(nIE)
5 [3;5] E
(nIE)
5 [3;6] E
(nIE)
5 [3;7] E
(nIE)
5 [3;8] E
(nIE)
5 [3;9] E
(nIE)
5 [3;10]
E
(nIE)
5 [4;1] E
(nIE)
5 [4;2] E
(nIE)
5 [4;3] E
(nIE)
5 [4;4] E
(nIE)
5 [4;5] E
(nIE)
5 [4;6] E
(nIE)
5 [4;7] E
(nIE)
5 [4;8] E
(nIE)
5 [4;9] E
(nIE)
5 [4;10]
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.
Obtain the quadratically approximated individual-utility function, ~V , through,
~Q
V j.(n )
= !T3 G
(nIE)
4 !3 .
In order to derive the quadratically approximated version of the welfare function ~W (S; #0 j <)
as deÖned by equation (2.38) in the main body of the paper, we construct the 104 7 matrix
MC)0 , given by,
1
#
z
#
u
#
8
#
K
#
B^T
#
80
#
MC30 =
2666666666666664
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
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(A.2.77)
that imposes the market-clearing conditions described by (2.31) in the main body of the pa-
per. Therefore, the quadratically approximated version of the welfare function ~W (S; #0 j <)
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is given by the 74 7 matrix,
~Q
W j.(n )
=MCT)0 ~Q
V j.(n )
MC)0 .
Therefore, to obtain optimal money supply #0, we solve the maximization problem,
max
)0
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
26666664
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z
u
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B^T
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37777775
T
~Q
W j.(n )
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u
8
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B^T
80
37777775
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
, (A.2.78)
with Örst order conditions given by,
~Q
W j.(n ) [7;1:7]
26666666666666666664
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z
u
#
K
B^T
#0
37777777777777777775
= 0 (A.2.79)
and optimal solution,
#0 = !
>
~Q
W j.(n ) [7;7]
?!1
~Q
W j.(n ) [7;1:6]
26666666666666664
1
z
u
#
K
B^T
37777777777777775
,
which provides the update of the optimal monetary-policy rule <,
&'(n +1) = !
>
~Q
W j.(n ) [7;7]
?!1
~Q
W j.(n ) [7;1:6]
.
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If the distance between &'(n +1)and &'(n ) is not arbitrarily small, we update < using an
overshooting convex-combination adjustment between &'(n +1)and &'(n ) that places more
weight on &'(n ), and we return to Step 2, continuing until we reach the Öxed point &'".
Step 5
Once the Öxed point &'" is reached, we introduce the steady-state value of #, the value
#ss used in the outer loop, to the equation,
#ss = &'"
26666666666666664
1
zss
uss
#ss
KssA
B^T
Bss
37777777777777775
, (A.2.80)
in order to see if the value #ss is the same on both sides. If equation (A.2.80) holds, then
we stop, as quadratic approximations in all loops are taken around a consistently accurate
steady state. Otherwise, we update our previous #ss value with that implied by the RHS
of equation (A.2.80), using again a convex-combination overshooting adjustment that places
more weight on the previous value, and we return to Step 1, continuing until convergence.
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3. CHAPTER
Jump Shocks, Endogenous Investment Leveraging and Asset
Prices: Analytical Results
3.1 Introduction
In todayís globalized world, the Önancial system may be too much leveraged. Financial
institutions invest using not only their own equity, but mostly borrowed money from other
sources, the so called ìinside moneyî. In a typical investment bank, the leverage ratio, which
is the ratio between inside money and own equity, varies between 20 to 30, meaning that
own equity can be as low as 3% of total assets. Such high leverage ratios mean that, in case
a rare disaster hits some investments of the bank causing damage beyond 3% of total assets,
the bank will become bankrupt.
Such bankruptcy concerns are especially alarming for countries with enormous banking
sectors, like Luxembourg. While EU agreements such as Basel II and III intend to regulate
leverage ratios, the crucial question is: are they enough? This paper intends to contribute
methods for answering such questions. The reason one needs to develop an analytical ap-
proach to Önancial stability is that asset prices and leveraging are both endogenous and
they co-determine each other. Simultaneously determining leverage ratios and the value of
productive assets held by Önancial institutions in a micro-founded framework consisting of
only preference-and-technology fundamentals is a challenging task. In this paper we under-
take this task in the presence of jump risks hitting (production) fundamentals. We focus
on these risks because we want to understand how market imperfections may lead to an
inadequacy of markets to respond to the presence of these jump risks. We therefore build
a Önancial-stability model with jump risks and incomplete capital markets. As the task of
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simultaneously endogenizing asset pricing and leveraging is cumbersome, the main goal and
scope of this paper is to deliver analytical results and methods that will facilitate future
work based on simulations.
The micro-founded model approach that we take goes beyond standard business-cycle
model analysis. We do so as the 2008 global Önancial crisis has shown that we need to
better understand the sources of Önancial instability. Existing dynamic stochastic general-
equilibrium models have failed in replicating the substantial and long-lasting contraction
in economic activity that followed the crisis. One reason for this failure is that most dy-
namic stochastic general-equilibriummodels focus only on the approximate-economy dynam-
ics around a prior measurement of a projected economic trend, viewed as ìthe steady stateî.
This strategy of measuring the economic trend is adequate for predicting usual business cycle
shock-propagation phenomena, but rather inadequate for studying the long-lasting impact
of credit-cycle shocks causing an economic crisis that leads to misallocation. A way to deal
with this inadequacy, is to endogenize the economic trend. A new generation of models
attempting to both endogenize economic growth and to deal with Önancial-crisis mechanics
is Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014, 2017).
The approach led by Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014, 2017) uses continuous-time
general-equilibrium stochastic models combining the macroeconomy with the banking sec-
tor. The techniques of Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014, 2017) follow several of the ideas in
He and Krishnamurthy (2012, 2013), with the crucial di§erence that they adapt the analysis
to an endogenous-growth framework. This class of models uses, as in the literature devel-
oped around the Black and Scholes (1973) option-pricing model, stochastic calculus for the
non-linear speciÖcations of economic dynamics. Since we know that credit-cycle shocks have
non-linear e§ects (see, for example, Bernanke et al., 1999, and Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997),
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these continuous-time techniques are appropriate.
The key contribution of this paper is that it focuses on how markets deal with the fact
that some Önancial-crisis (credit-cycle) shocks can be sizeable. The size of these shocks is
a feature that can contribute to their long-lasting e§ects. As credit cycles exhibit a shock-
propagation mechanism that involves vicious and virtuous circles of bank-leveraging and
asset-price movements, the size of a credit-cycle shock can give rise to a Önancial crisis.
Therefore, we focus on introducing jump shocks. The analysis of Brunnermeier and San-
nikov (2014, 2017) focuses only on di§usion shocks (normally-distributed shocks) to growth
rates of economic fundamentals. Jumps increase the kurtosis of growth rates to economic
fundamentals. Facing extreme shocks more frequently than those implied by the normal
distribution can lead to more frequent incidents where the equity of banks can be entirely
destroyed. The dramatically destroyed equity cannot be entirely rebuilt in the next period.
Only in the long run, through retained earnings, banks can restore their equity. In addition,
the bank shock can be ampliÖed through price movements.
The crucial feature of the class of models we study is the joint determination of asset prices
and leverage ratios of banks. For example, high stock prices can reinforce further demand
for stocks by banks, which further increases stock prices. Such reinforcing mechanisms
can amplify stock-market booms and can also make these booms persistent. The problem
is that the same mechanism can work on the downside: falling stock prices can lead to
a rapid reduction of demand by banks; banks deleverage too fast and become hit by the
further stock-price decline. Such dramatic downward paths can become much worse in the
presence of rare disasters. The reason is that rare disasters introduce more downside risk.
More interestingly, high leveraging during stock-market booms can make banks even more
exposed and vulnerable to this downside risk. Such scenarios necessitate the extension of
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the Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) framework to rare disasters in order to understand
Önancial stability and crisis prevention. More speciÖcally, we need to understand how banks
with rational expectations leverage up in an environment with jump shocks.19
Our prototype model is also an endogenous-growth model. We study how Önancial
(in)stability ináuences the amount of resources channeled from the Önancial sector to the
real economy. During a Önancial crisis, because of leveraging, a Önancial system may block
real-economy investments. Such a blockage lowers economic growth in the long run. In
order to eliminate the possibility of a disaster, leverage ratios may be rather conservative.
Nevertheless, taking medium-level risk (e.g. with regulation allowing for higher leverage
ratios), could stimulate higher economic growth in the long run. This trade-o§ deÖnes
an exciting agenda for future research: could it be desirable to allow an economy to be
moderately exposed to some rare-disaster risk? Is Önancial regulation welfare increasing?
Can we achieve a Pareto improvement? Although these questions are left unexplored in this
paper, establishing the technical features of this framework can help in building the platform
for answering these questions.
In our analysis, we Örst describe the structure of our model economy. As in Brunner-
meier and Sannikov (2014), our model is a variation of the Basak and Cuoco (1998) model.
This model allows to study endogenous stock prices and endogenous leverage ratios in an
endowment economy. We explain the roles of the two types of agents in our model and
we formulate their expected utility optimization problems and derive their optimal choices.
Using logarithmic preferences, we derive a closed form solution. In a next step, we analyt-
ically derive equilibrium conditions for agents with recursive Epstein-Zin preferences. We
19Documented by Reinhart and Rogo§ (2009), similar persistent declines and long-lasting changes in asset
prices, output or investment were observed following previous Önancial crises. The fact that ìwe have been
there beforeî, motivates the importance of understanding Önancial instability in order to make the Önancial
system more resilient. This is the best protection to limit the economic consequences of future disaster
shocks.
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explain the homotopy analysis method, which is appropriate for a numerical implementation
in Matlab. Then we extent our baseline model to a generalñequilibrium model by introduc-
ing production based on capital investments, with adjustment costs for investment changes.
We derive analytical solutions for agents with recursive Epstein-Zin preferences and a closed
form solution for agents with logarithmic preferences. We conclude with reáections on how
to proceed.
3.2 The baseline model
As in Basak and Cuoco (1998), we consider a continuous-time endowment economy on an
inÖnite time span. We assume two di§erent types of agents. Within each agent type we have
a large number of homogenous agents. Therefore, all agents are price-takers. Throughout,
we speak about a representative household and a so-called representative ìexpertî. The
household is subject to a non-convexity: it is restricted to investing only in bonds and not in
the stock market; on the contrary, only the expert has access to managing portfolios. This
non-convexity is the reason the resulting competitive allocation is not Pareto optimal. In
addition to that, a Önancial friction is assumed on the expertís behavior. The expert can
only Önance risky asset holdings through debt by issuing bonds, not by issuing new equity.
All goods are accounted for in real terms, i.e. in units of consumable goods. The
composition of the balance sheets of the expert and the household are summarized as follows:
Expert Household
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Pt = qtDt Bt Bt N
H
t
Nt
Table 3.1 - Balance sheet of the expert and the household in the baseline model.
The household has net wealth of NHt , with which it buys bonds, Bt, issued by the expert.
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The household lends money (deposits) to the expert at the bond rate, which is determined
endogenously. The expert invests the amount of the issued bonds, Bt, together with its net
wealth (equity), Nt, in the aggregate stock market, which is a simpliÖcation of the production
sector. Therefore, only experts hold risky assets, which they Önance mostly through debt
(short-selling of the bonds). The stock market can be seen as a stock index. The risky asset
pays a stochastic dividend, Dt, which is described by the following stochastic di§erential
equation,
dDt = gDtdt+ [(1! ')Dt !Dt] dnt , (3.1)
which can be simpliÖed to,
dDt
Dt
= gdt! 'dnt (3.2)
Equation (3.2) reveals thatDt is governed by a geometric Poisson process. In the endowment-
economy version of our model, dividends are the core exogenous random variable and jump
shocks are the only shocks to fundamentals (the dividends). The deterministic part of (3.1)
shows that Dt grows at a constant, positive and unbounded growth rate, g, over time (drift).
Parameter ' > 0, represents the jump size of the negative shock, while nt is the geometric
Poisson process with arrival rate *, of the shock.
dnt =
8><>: 1, with Pr. *dt0, with Pr. 1! *dt (3.3)
In a Poisson process the sequence of inter-arrival times (time between two shocks) is a
sequence of independent random variables. Each random variable has an exponential distri-
bution with parameter *. The past doesnít count in determining the probability of a new
shock innovation (no memory). This can be seen as a renewal assumption, which means that
the process probabilistically restarts at each arrival time and at each Öxed time. Therefore,
the shocks in this model occur continuously and independently (of the past), a key feature
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of a LÈvy process. The expected total number of arrivals, nt, within a given time-interval is
distributed proportionately to the time-interval, being equal to *t.
The dividend process, and thereby the risk for a negative shock in our case, is exogenous.
The expert, who is the only agent holding risky assets, has limited ability to absorb risk
through net wealth, Nt. In case a downturn in the stock market exceeds the expertís net
wealth, Nt, then the expert becomes unable to pay back its debt.
The macroeconomic environment is represented by two variables, qt and 7t, where qt is
the price-dividend ratio,
qt * Pt
Dt
(3.4)
with Pt being the stock market value (i.e. market capitalization),
Pt = qtDt (3.5)
and 7t is the fraction of the expertís net wealth divided by the value of total assets. Specif-
ically, fraction 7t is,
7t *
Nt
qtDt
2 [0; 1] . (3.6)
In our model, 7t is a state variable. Later on, we will use 7t in order to characterize how
decisions in our endowment economy evolve. State variable 7t is convenient, as it describes
the distribution of net wealth. Notably, 7t is also equal to the reciprocal of the leverage
ratio. Note that if 7t drops, leverage increases and the expert becomes more balance-sheet
constrained.
Both the price-dividend ratio and the leverage ratio (1=7t) are determined endogenously.
The corresponding debt-equity ratio is equal to,
qtDt !Nt
Nt
=
Bt
Nt
=
1
7t
! 1 (3.7)
Both types of agents have the same preferences.
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3.2.1 Representative householdís decision with logarithmic utility
The representative household maximizes its life-time utility under uncertainty. In a house-
hold problem the household decides on how much to consume and how much to invest
in bonds. The householdís preferences are represented by a time-additive von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function. Indeed, the household maximizes its expected utility facing a
stochastic bond rate rt, which depends on the macroeconomy.
max
(CHt ;Bt)t$0
E0
>Z 1
0
e!LtU
!
CHt
"
dt
?
(3.8)
s:t: dBt =
!
rtBt ! CHt
"
dt (3.9)
and subject to an initial bond endowment and a suitable transversality condition. In order
to obtain closed-form solutions, we assume a logarithmic utility function, i.e.,
U(CHt ) * ln(CHt ) .
Parameter : > 0 is the discount factor (rate of time preference). As we will see below, with
logarithmic utility, consumption will be a Öxed fraction, :, of net wealth.
The household takes a decision under uncertainty, because the bond rate, rt, is a function
of the random variable 7t, namely,
rt = R(7t) . (3.10)
The dynamics of 7t are governed by the recursion,
d7t = F (7t)dt+G(7t)dnt . (3.11)
At this stage, the functional forms of R(&); F (&) and G(&) are unknown.
The most suitable tool for optimization under uncertainty is the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equation. For the above stochastic dynamic optimization problem, we formulate the
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corresponding HJB equation denoted byHJBH , in which the state variables are two, (Bt; 7t):
:JH(Bt; 7t) = max
CHt >0
/
ln(Ct) + J
H
B (Bt; 7t) &
,
R(7t)Bt ! CHt
-
+ JH0 (Bt; 7t)F (7t)+
+ *
,
JH(Bt; 7t +G(7t))! JH(Bt; 7t)
-0
(3.12)
Consistent with the property of logarithmic utility, the householdís optimal consumption
rule is equal to:20
CHt = :Bt (3.13)
Equation (3.13) implies that the household consumes a Öxed fraction of his net wealth
regardless of the bond rate.
3.2.2 Representative expertís decision with logarithmic utility
Since the expert is allowed to invest in stocks, we are solving a Merton-type portfolio choice
model with risky assets (stocks). Before specifying the expertís optimization problem, we
deÖne Gt as the ratio of the expertís total assets over its net wealth,
Gt *
qtDt
Nt
=
1
7t
. (3.14)
Since all experts are the same, in equilibrium, Gt is the reciprocal of 7t and thereby the
economy-wide leverage ratio. Yet, in the formulation of an individual expertís problem, we
will disconnect Gt from 7t, i.e., we will not associate these two variables through equation
(3.14). As for the representative expertís optimization problem, the objective is to maximize
lifetime utility derived by shareholder consumption. The representative expertís shareholder
preferences are represented by a time-additive von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.
The expertís optimization di§ers from the householdís by its budget constraint.
20For details on the representative householdís optimization problem, and more speciÖcally on equation
(3.13), see the technical appendix, 3.6.A.1., equation (A.3.6)
106
As mentioned above, the expert invests only in the stock market, which gives him a
higher return 8rDt than the bond rate rt. The expert cannot keep the whole return on his
investment qtDt8rDt , but needs to reimburse the borrowed amount from the household with
its return rtBt. In his optimization problem, the expert takes into account the possibility
of an exogenous shock, which would have a negative e§ect on his net wealth. The expert
maximizes his shareholdersí expected utility. This is a standard Merton (1969) portfolio
choice problem with simultaneous decisions on how much to consume, by picking CEt , and
on how much to invest in the stock market, by picking Gt, under uncertainty. We postulate
that qt, the price-dividend ratio and 8rDt , the expected return of the investment in the stock
market, are both functions of 7t,
qt = Q(7t)
8rDt * E(rDt ) = RD(7t)
The functional forms Q(&) and RD(&) are unknown at this stage.
The expertís optimization problem is as follows,
max
(CEt ;Nt;/t)t$0
E0
>Z 1
0
e!LtU(CEt )dt
?
s:t: dNt =
/,
Gt(R
D(7t)!R(7t)) +R(7t)
-
Nt ! CEt
0
dt+
>
(1! ')Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
GtNtdnt| {z }
q
dNShockt =d(q
Shock
t D
Shock
t )
subject to given initial conditions on 7 and N and subject to an appropriate transversality
condition. Again,
U(CEt ) * ln(CEt ) .
In the expertís budget constraint, dNShockt is the shock term of dNt.
21 Indeed, dNt depends
on its trend and on the stochastic exogenous shock. Not only there is a direct e§ect on
21For details on how the shock term is derived, see the technical appendix, 3.6.A.2, equation (A.3.7).
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Dt when a shock appears (dnt = 1), but also an indirect e§ect to the price-dividend ratio,
Q(7t), which ampliÖes the initial shock and further reduces the expertís net wealth Nt. The
direct e§ect of an exogenous shock to Dt on Nt, can be seen as ìfundamental riskî. The
indirect e§ect, triggered by the initial shock to Dt on Nt, can be seen as an ìendogenous
riskî component. The presence of endogenous risk introduces an ampliÖcation mechanism
to shocks through price movements. Deleveraging of banks puts downward pressure on the
price-dividend ratio. Nt decreases beyond the size of the initial shock, !'Dt.
The expertís wealth share, 7t, decreases when a negative shock occurs, because the expert
needs to absorb the exogenous shock and additional stock market movements with his net
wealth Nt.
For the stochastic dynamic optimization problem, we formulate the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation of the expert, HJBE (two state variables (Nt; 7t)):
:JE(Nt; 7t) = max
CEt ;/t
(
ln(CEt ) + J
E
N (Nt; 7t)
/,
Gt(R
D(7t)!R(7t)) +R(7t)
-
Nt ! CEt
0
+JE0 (Nt; 7t)F (7t)+
+*
>
JE
9
Nt +
>
(1! ')Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
GtNt; 7t +G(7t)
:
! JE(Nt; 7t)
?)
The expertís optimal consumption rule is obtained by the Örst-order condition (F.O.C.)
with respect to CEt . Consistently with the usual property of logarithmic utility, optimal
consumption is a Öxed fraction of the expertís net wealth:22
CEt = :Nt (3.15)
The expertís optimal portfolio allocation rule (leveraging) is obtained by the F.O.C. with
22For details on the representative expertís optimization problem, and more speciÖcally on the optimal
consumption rule, (3.15), see the technical appendix, 3.6.A.2., equation (A.3.15).
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respect to Gt:
23
Gt = !
1h
(1! ')Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i ! *
RD(7t)!R(7t)
(3.16)
Equation (3.16) shows that the decision to leverage (Gt > 1) depends on the size of the
disaster shock and also on the price e§ect. In addition, equation (3.16) shows that an
increase in the risk premium, RD(7t)!R(7t), has a Örst-order e§ect on leverage, pushing it
upward.
3.2.3 Equilibrium conditions
An equilibrium is deÖned as a set of consumption choices of all agents,
/
CHt ; C
E
t
0
, and an
asset-holding decision of the expert, Gt, together with price processes,
/
qt; rt; 8r
D
t
0
, such that
(1:) all markets clear and (2:) all agents maximize their expected utility.
Given the balance sheet of the representative household, the following equation must
hold,
Bt = N
H
t . (3.17)
Similarly, the balance sheet of the representative expert implies,
qtDt = Bt +Nt . (3.18)
Using the householdís and expertís optimal consumption rule together with (3.18), we derive
aggregate consumption, Ct:
Ct = C
H
t + C
E
t = :(Bt +Nt) = :(qtDt) . (3.19)
In an endowment economy, market clearing implies that aggregate consumption must be
equal to aggregate output Yt, i.e.,
Ct = Yt . (3.20)
23For more details on the optimal portfolio allocation rule, (3.16), see the technical appendix, 3.6.A.2.,
equation (A.3.13).
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Yet, in a pure endowment economy aggregate output is equal to Dt, therefore,
Yt = Dt . (3.21)
Combining (3.19), (3.20) and (3.21) allows us to derive the equilibrium price-dividend ratio
(equilibrium price of the risky asset per unit áow of dividend),
qt =
1
:
= q , (3.22)
which is constant. This tells us, up front, that in an endowment economy where agents have
logarithmic preferences, there will be no endogenous risk, i.e., there is no ampliÖcation of
the disaster shock. The equilibrium price-dividend ratio is independent of 7t, it is constant
and equal to the inverse of :.
In a next step, we characterize asset prices. In order to derive the functional form of R(&)
for the equilibrium bond rate rt, one Örst needs to derive the equilibrium expected value of
rDt , R
D(7t). The dynamics of the risky asset return r
D
t are equal to:
drDt =
Dt
Pt
dt+
dPt
Pt
.
One can decompose the risky asset return into two parts: (1) the return from the dividend
process (the dividend yield 1=qt = Dt=Pt), and (2) the return from stock market price
movement (the capital gains rate, dPt=Pt). With qt = 1L one can show that the expected
value of rDt , is equal to:
24
RD(7t) =
Z 1
0
E(drDt )dt = :+ g ! *' = 8rD. (3.23)
With logarithmic preferences, we have a constant risky asset return in equilibrium. A change
in the risk premium can come only from a variation in the bond rate, rt. Using (3.16), the
24For more details on the derivation of the equilibrium expected value of risky asset return, (3.23), see the
technical appendix, 3.6.A.3., equation (A.3.18).
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optimal asset-allocation decision, Gt, of the expert with constant q and constant 8r
D, yields,
Gt =
1
'
! *
8rD !R(7t)
. (3.24)
From equation (3.24) one can deduce that leveraging, Gt, and the risk premium,
!
8rD !R(7t)
"
,
are positively related. Intuitively, this positive relationship tells us that whenever there is a
disaster shock, i.e., whenever Gt jumps up, R(7t) needs to decrease, given that 8r
D is constant.
We now re-arrange (3.24) using Gt = 1=7t in order to derive the equilibrium condition
for the bond rate, R(7t), in order to specify how R(7t) depends on 7t,
25
R(7t) = :+ g ! *' !
*
1
*
! 1
0t
. (3.25)
The risk premium
!
8rD !R(7t)
"
increases with smaller 7t. In order to complete the charac-
terization of all equilibrium conditions, we need to describe how jump shocks a§ect 7t, as all
equations are functions of the state variable 7t. The stochastic di§erential equation of d7t,
can be derived from,
d7t = d
9
Nt
qtDt
:
= :d
9
Nt
Dt
:
. (3.26)
More speciÖcally, in order to derive the law of motion of 7t, we must Örst derive the law of
motions of Nt and Dt. The stochastic di§erential equation governing the motion of Nt, is
given by,26
dNt =
(9
1
7t
! 1
:
*
1
*
! 1
0t
+ 8rD ! :
)
Nt| {z }
q
9N (Nt;Dt)
dt !'
:
Dt| {z }
q
bN (Nt;Dt)
dnt , (3.27)
while the stochastic di§erential equation driving the motion of Dt is,
dDt = gDt|{z}
q
9D(Nt;Dt)
dt+ (1! ')Dt !Dt| {z }
q
bD(Nt;Dt)
dnt . (3.28)
25For more details on the derivation of the equilibrium condition for the bond rate, (3.25), see the technical
appendix, 3.6.A.3., equation (A.3.19).
26For more details on the derivation of the law of motion of Nt, (3.27), see the technical appendix, 3.6.A.3.,
equation (A.3.20).
111
Using (3.27) and (3.28) and applying Ito^ís Lemma for Poisson processes, we can derive,
d (Nt=Dt), namely,27
d
9
Nt
Dt
:
=
Nt
Dt
"9
1
7t
! 1
:
*'
1! *
0t
! *'
#
dt+
"
Nt ! *LDt
Dt ! 'Dt !
Nt
Dt
#
dnt . (3.29)
By using (3.29) in (3.26), we can derive the law of motion of 7t,
28
d7t
7t
= !*'
9
1! 7t
' ! 7t
+ 1
:
dt!
 
1!
1! *
0t
1! '
!
dnt , (3.30)
with,
F (7t) = !*'
9
1! 7t
' ! 7t
+ 1
:
7t ,
and,
G(7t) =
 
1! *
0t
1! ' ! 1
!
7t .
In a nutshell, in the case of logarithmic preferences, we were able to derive a closed-form
solution for Q (&), R (&), RD (&), F (&) and G (&).
3.3 Recursive Epstein-Zin preferences
We extend our model by generalizing the preferences of both agents, the representative
household and the representative expert, to recursive Epstein-Zin (Du¢e-Epstein, 1992a,b)
preferences. The goal is to separate risk and time preferences, as there is no fundamental
economic reason behind assuming that they are the same. We would like to remark that, in
the case of logarithmic utility, if economic agents are averse to variation of consumption over
time, then it is implied that they are also averse to consumption variation across di§erent
states at a particular point of time. By assuming that the agents have recursive Epstein-
Zin preferences over consumption, we allow for independent speciÖcation of the elasticity of
27For more details on the derivation of d
A
Nt
Dt
B
, (3.29), see the technical appendix, 3.6.A.3., equation (A.3.22).
28For more details on how to derive the law of motion of Ht, (3.30), see the technical appendix, 3.6.A.3.,
equation (A.3.24).
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intertemporal substitution and the coe¢cient of risk aversion. From the Önance literature
we know, that recursive Epstein-Zin preferences help to better examine the role of risk in
determining price-dividend ratios.
The continuous-time version of recursive Epstein-Zin preferences is provided by Du¢e
and Epstein (1992a,b). SpeciÖcally, expected utility is deÖned as,29
Jt = Et
>Z 1
t
f(C(R); J(R))dR
?
,
in which f(C; J) is a normalized aggregator function of continuation utility, J , and current
consumption, C, that takes the form,
f(C; J) * :(1! 9)J
<
C
[(1!()J ]
1
1!$
=1! 1
*
! 1
1! 1
+
,
where : is the rate of time preference, 9 is the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion and A is
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. It is interesting to mention that if A = 1=9, the
normalized aggregator f(C; J) reduces to the additive power, constant relative-risk-aversion
(CRRA) utility function, from which the logarithmic utility function can be obtained by
taking the limit (as 9 ! 1). All utility parameters :, 9 and A are strictly positive, i.e.,
:; 9; A > 0.
3.3.1 Homotopy approach for a numerical solution with Epstein-
Zin preferences
In the technical appendix, section 3.6.A.4 - 3.6.A.6 , we derive the representative householdís
and the representative expertís optimal decisions with recursive Epstein-Zin preferences.
We determine market-clearing conditions and derive analytically all equilibrium conditions
needed to proceed to the formulation of an algorithm for the numerical solution. We use
29The utility is recursive, because the current utility Jt depends on expected values of future utility Js;s>t.
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a homotopy approach to numerically solve for the functional forms of Q(7t), F (7t), G(7t),
R(7t), R
D(7t),  
H(7t) and  
E(7t), as explained in the following steps:
1. Take the analytically derived equilibrium solutions from the time-separable-logarithmic-
utility setup of the model as a Örst guess for Q(7t), F (7t), G(7t) and R(7t), and match
them by exponential projection method.
Q(7t) =
1
:
& Q(7t) ' e
P;
i=0 C
Q
i [ln(0t)]
i
F (7t) = !*'7t
9
1! 7t
' ! 7t
+ 1
:
& F (7t) ' e
P;
i=0 C
F
i [ln(0t)]
i
G(7t) = 7t
 
1! *
0t
1! ' ! 1
!
& G(7t) ' e
P;
i=0 C
G
i [ln(0t)]
i
R(7t) = :+ g ! *' !
*
1
*
! 1
0t
& R(7t) ' e
P;
i=0 C
R
i [ln(0t)]
i
2. Then use these in
RD(7t) * E(rDt ) =
1
Q(7t)
+ g +
Q0t(7t)
Q(7t)
F (7t) + *
>
(1! ')Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
to obtain RD(7t).
3. Use RD(7t) and the derived simpliÖcation of the HJB
E,
0 =
:
a
h
:
A(1!$)
1!A(1!$) E(7t)
A
A(1!$)!1 ! 1
i
 E(7t)
+(1! 9) E(7t)
>
1
7t
,
RD(7t)!R(7t)
-
+R(7t)! :
1
1!A(1!$) E(7t)
A
A(1!$)!1
?
+
!
 E
"0
(7t)F (7t)
+*
(
 E(7t +G(7t))
<
1 +
>
(1! ')Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
1
7t
=1!(
!  E(7t)
)
(3.31)
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and the derived FOC w.r.t. Gt, which, in general equilibrium complies with Gt = 1=7t,
Gt =
<
!Q
h
(1!*)Q(#t+G(#t))
Q(#t)
!1
i
 E(0t+G(0t))
 E(0t)[R
D(0t)!R(0t)]
= 1
$
! 1h
(1! ')Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i (3.32)
jointly with  E(7t) and
!
 E
"0
(7t), by using the exponential projection method to ap-
proximate  E(7t),
 E(7t) ' e
P;
i=0 C
E
i [ln(0t)]
i
and
!
 E
"0
(7t), !
 E
"0
(7t) '
 E(7t)
7t
e
P;
i=0 iC
E
i [ln(0t)]
i!1 ,
in order to obtain an update for R(n)(7t),  
E;(n)(7t) and C
E;(n)(Nt; 7t).
4. Use the updated R(n)(7t) and the derived simpliÖcation of the HJB
H ,
0 =
:
a
h
:
A(1!$)
1!A(1!$) H(7t)
A
A(1!$)!1 ! 1
i
 H(7t)
+(1! 9) H(7t)
h
R(7t)! :
1
1!A(1!$) H(7t)
A
A(1!$)!1
i
+( H)0(7t) & F (7t) + *[ H(7t +G(7t))!  H(7t)] (3.33)
jointly with  H(7t) and
!
 H
"0
(7t), by using the exponential projection method to
approximate  H(7t),
 H(7t) ' e
P;
i=0 C
H
i [ln(0t)]
i
and
!
 H
"0
(7t), !
 H
"0
(7t) '
 H(7t)
7t
e
P;
i=0 iC
H
i [ln(0t)]
i!1
in order to obtain an update for  H;(n)(7t) and C
H;(n)(Nt; 7t).
5. Use  E;(n)(7t) and  
H;(n)(7t) in order to update <
(n)
E (7t) and <
(n)
H (7t),
<
(n)
E (7t) = :
1
1!A(1!$) 
A
A(1!$)!1
E
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<
(n)
H (7t) = :
1
1!A(1!$) 
A
A(1!$)!1
H
which are used to update Q(n+1)(7t),
Q(n+1)(7t) =
h
<
(n)
H (7t) & (1! 7t) + <(n)E (7t) & 7t
i!1
(3.34)
6. Use from d7t, F (7t) andG(7t) in order to obtain an update for F
(n+1)(7t) andG
(n+1)(7t).
F (n+1)(7t) = 7t
266664 17t (RD(n)(7t)!R(n)(7t)) +R(n)(7t)! C
E(Nt; 7t)
Nt| {z }!g!
.
(n)
E (0t)
Q0(n)(7t)
Q(n)(7t)
F (n)(7t)! g
377775
(3.35)
G(n+1)(7t) = 7t
24 0t!10t + 10t (1! ') Q(n)(0t+G(0t))Q(n)(0t)
(1! ')Q(n)(0t+G(0t))
Q(n)(0t)
! 1
35 (3.36)
7. If
k Q(n+1) !Q(n) k + k F (n+1) ! F (n) k + k G(n+1) !G(n) k< "
stop;
otherwise, go to step 2.
The above seven-step procedure is the way to extend the analysis to Epstein-Zin recursive
preferences using numerical methods. Crucial in this procedure is the Örst guess suggested by
the logarithmic-utility case. Using outer loops to the seven-step procedure described above,
both preference parameters, 9 and A are gradually changed. Initially, both 9 and A are set to
values close to 1 and the formulas derived for the logarithmic case are used as the Örst guess.
These outer loops, gradually, using small steps, change the values of 9 and A away from 1,
while using the Öxed-point outcomes for functions Q, F , and G from the previous step of the
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outer-loop iterations referring to values of 9 and A. For this homotopy procedure to work, the
Örst guess is crucial. The contribution of this paper is to recommend this Örst guess and to
deliver the above seven-step algorithm that implements the homotopy approach. Numerical
simulations for data applications using the endowment-economy exercise are beyond the
scope of this paper. Yet, we recommend an extension to a production economy in the next
section.
3.4 General-equilibrium model with production
We extend the baseline model by introducing an ìAKî production function, Yt = AKt,
where A > 0 is the level of technology. We have a production economy with endogenous
growth. The representative expert is, as before, the shareholder of the banks. As the banks
own (invest in) the equity of the Örms, the expert indirectly also becomes the shareholder of
the Örms. This implies that the expert not only decides on optimal consumption and asset
allocation, but also on optimal investment. As can be seen in the balance sheet below, we
now have the aggregate amount of capital, Kt, which is entirely hold by the expert at price
qt on its assetsí side (qt is similar to Tobinís Q).
Expert Household
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Pt = qtKt Bt Bt N
H
t
Nt
Table 3.2 - Balance sheet of the expert and the household in the general equilibrium model.
The valuation of Örmsí productive capital takes place in the stock market. The capital
stock, Kt, are the units of capital entering production, while qt is the price of one unit of
capital. The law of motion of the aggregate amount of capital is described by the following
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stochastic di§erential equation,
dKt = (>(kt)! /)Ktdt+ [(1! ')Kt !Kt] dnt
where kt is the reinvestment rate per unit of capital, kt = It=Kt,
=) dKt
Kt
= (>(kt)! /)dt! 'dnt
which is driven by a geometric Poisson process nt,
dnt =
8><>: 1, with Pr. *dt0, with Pr. 1! *dt .
The aggregate amount of capital, Kt, is subject to negative exogenous shocks of size 'Kt with
arrival rate *. The deterministic growth rate of aggregate capital is determined by investment
in capital and its depreciation rate /, which is constant over time. The growth-rate e§ect of
investment on capital depends on the investment function >(kt). As in Bernanke et al. (1999)
we introduce nonlinear costs in adjustment of capital, in order to have an ampliÖcation e§ect
of the exogenous shock. >(kt) is an investment function with convex costs in adjustments to
the amount of capital and the investment function is such that >(0) = 0, >0 > 0 (increasing)
and >00 / 0 (concave). The concavity of >(kt) creates technological illiquidity.
The investment function, > (kt), can be seen as a Önancial friction. Technological liquid-
ity is the same as reversibility of an investment, with limited price impact. Technological
illiquidity refers to the di¢culty to undo investment or to increase investment. Technological
illiquidity leads to variations in Tobinís Q, which is equal to qt, as will be shown later. In
the setup of our model, as in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), the price impact is driven
by shifts in the state variable 7t, which describes the distribution of wealth and is deÖned
as,
7t =
Nt
qtKt
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with 7t 2 [0; 1], and with,
qt = Q (7t) .
Figure 3.1 - Investment function >(kt) with & > 1 and & = 1.
We assume the following functional form for the investment function:
>(kt) =
1
K
(1 + Kkt)
1!& ! 1
1! & , & 7 0 (3.37)
with K being an adjustment cost parameter and with &; a parameter to increase the curvature
and thereby technological illiquidity. For the special case, where & = 1, we have,
>(kt) =
ln (1 + Kkt)
K
(3.38)
>(kt) is depicted in Figure 3.1 with & > 1 and & = 1. One can see that by increasing &,
the curvature of the investment function increases, which means that the adjustment costs
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for investment increase. In the numerical example depicted by Figure 3.1, K = 10 and the
employed value for & > 1 is & = 1:10.
3.4.1 Representative householdís utility maximization
The householdís expected utility maximization in the production economy does not di§er
from the one in the endowment economy. The change in the householdís net wealth depends
on the return the household receives from lending to the expert and on howmuch it consumes,
i.e.,
dBt = (rtBt ! CHt )dt .
The optimal consumption rule of the household with recursive Epstein-Zin preferences, is
given by a consumption rate depending on the state variable 7t times its net wealth Bt,
30
CHt = <
H (7t)Bt , (3.39)
while in the special case of logarithmic preferences, the optimal consumption rule of the
household has a consumption rate equal to the discount factor, :, i.e.,31
CHt = :Bt . (3.40)
3.4.2 Representative expertís utility maximization
The representative expert has to solve two maximization problems in the production econ-
omy, one as the shareholder of the Örms and one as the shareholder of the banks. From the
optimization problem of the expert as the shareholder of the Örms, we derive the optimal
investment rate rule,
>0(kt) =
1
Q (7t)
, (3.41)
30For the intermediate steps, we refer to the representative householdís decision with recursive Epstein-Zin
preferences in the endowment economy in the technical appendix, section 3.6.A.4., equation (A.3.26).
31For the intermediate steps, we refer to the representative householdís decision with logarithmic utility in
the endowment economy in the technical appendix, section 3.6.A.1., equation (A.3.6).
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with (3.41) being the same in all cases, the general recursive Epstein-Zin preferences case
and the special case with logarithmic preferences.32
The function Q (7t) is can be interpreted as Tobinís Q. From the functional form of >(kt),
we can derive >0(kt), and solve for the optimal investment rate kt,
Q (7t) = (1 + Kkt)
&
kt =
[Q (7t)]
1
; ! 1
K
(3.42)
For the special case where & = 1,
Q (7t) = (1 + Kkt)
kt =
Q (7t)! 1
K
(3.43)
As in the endowment economy, the expert maximizes the banksí shareholdersí expected
utility from consumption, by selecting the leveraging rate, Gt, and consumption, C
E
t . The
law of motion of the representative expertís net wealth Nt is given by,
dNt =
/,
Gt(8r
K
t !R(7t)) +R(7t)
-
Nt ! CEt
0
dt+
>
(1! ') Q (7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
GtNtdnt
where 8rKt is the expected return of the aggregate amount of capital and it is postulated to
be a function of 7t,
8rKt * E(rKt ) ,
expressed as a function of 7t,
8rKt = R
K(7t) . (3.44)
32For details on the optimization problem of the expert as the shareholder of the Örms with logarithmic
preferences and with recursive Epstein-Zin preferences, see the technical appendix, section 3.6.B.1., equations
(A.3.37) and (A.3.38).
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The optimal consumption rule for the expert with recursive Epstein-Zin preferences, is given
by a consumption rate depending on the state variable 7t times its net wealth Nt,
33
CEt = <
E (7t)Nt , (3.45)
while with logarithmic utility, the consumption rate is equal to the discount factor :,34
CEt = :Nt . (3.46)
The optimal portfolio allocation rule for the expert with recursive Epstein-Zin preferences,
is equal to,35
Gt =
<
!Q
h
(1!*)Q(#t+G(#t))
Q(#t)
!1
i
 E(0t+G(0t))
 E(0t)[R
K(0t)!R(0t)]
= 1
$
! 1h
(1! ')Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i (3.47)
while with logarithmic utility,36
Gt = !
1A
(1! ') Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
B ! *
RK (7t)!R (7t)
. (3.48)
3.4.3 Equilibrium conditions in the production economy
The way we deÖned an equilibrium in the endowment economy, also holds for the production
economy. The balance sheets of both agents always need to be balanced at all times. This
balance-sheet balancing condition means that the representative household has,
Bt = N
H
t , (3.49)
33For the intermediate steps, we refer to the representative expertís decision with recursive Epstein-Zin
preferences in the endowment economy in the technical appendix, section 3.6.A.5., equation (A.3.28).
34For the intermediate steps, we refer to the representative expertís decision with logarithmic utility in the
endowment economy in the technical appendix, section 3.6.A.2., equation (??).
35For the intermediate steps, we refer to the representative expertís decision with recursive Epstein-Zin
preferences in the endowment economy in the technical appendix, section 3.6.A.5., equation (A.3.29).
36For the intermediate steps, we refer to the representative expertís decision with logarithmic utility in the
endowment economy in the technical appendix, section 3.6.A.2., equation (A.3.13).
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while the representative expert has,
qtKt = Bt +Nt . (3.50)
For the market-clearing condition to hold in a closed economy with no government purchases,
the sum of aggregate consumption, Ct = CHt + C
E
t , and investment, It must be equal to
aggregate output, Yt, which is obtained by the AK production function, such that,
Ct + It = AKt (3.51)
CHt + C
E
t = AKt ! It = (A! kt)Kt
with It = ktKt. With recursive Epstein-Zin preferences, aggregate consumption, Ct, is equal
to,
Ct = <
H (7t)Bt +<
E (7t)Nt (3.52)
while with logarithmic preferences, Ct, is equal to,
Ct = : (Bt +Nt) ,
or, equivalently,
Ct = :Q (7t)Kt . (3.53)
Under market-clearing conditions, given optimal consumption choices from both agents and
given the optimal reinvestment rate, the equilibrium condition for the price of capital, Q(7t)
for recursive Epstein-Zin preferences is equal to,37
Q(7t) =
A!
9
Q(0t)
1
; !1
S
:
7t<
E(7t) + (1! 7t)<H(7t)
, (3.54)
37For the intermediate steps, on the derivation of the equilibrium condition for the price of capital, see the
technical appendix, section 3.6.B.2., equation (A.3.39).
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where the optimal reinvestment rate per unit of capital is equal to,
kt =
1
K
h
Q(7t)
1
; ! 1
i
. (3.55)
For the special case where & = 1, the equilibrium condition for the price of capital is equal
to,38
Q (7t) =
A+ 1
S
<H (7t) (1! 7t) + <E (7t) 7t + 1S
(3.56)
and the equilibrium condition for the reinvestment rate per unit of capital is equal to,39
kt =
A!<H (7t) (1! 7t)!<E (7t) 7t
K [<H (7t) (1! 7t) + <E (7t) 7t] + 1
(3.57)
With logarithmic utility, the equilibrium price of capital is a constant, computed as an
implicit function of,40
q =
A!
A
q
1
; !1
S
B
:
(3.58)
The equilibrium price in the production economy for agents with logarithmic utility is a
constant. Moreover, in the production economy with logarithmic preferences, the equilibrium
reinvestment rate per unit of capital k is also constant. If & 6= 1, k can be calculated by
combining equations (3.58) and (3.55). For the special case where & = 1, the equilibrium
price of capital is given by a closed-form,41
q =
AK+ 1
:K+ 1
(3.59)
and the equilibrium reinvestment rate per unit of capital is equal to,42
k =
A! :
:K+ 1
(3.60)
38For the intermediate steps, on the derivation of the equilibrium condition for the price of capital in the
special case where J = 1, see the technical appendix, section 3.6.B.2., equation (A.3.41).
39For the intermediate steps, on the derivation of the equilibrium reinvestment rate in the special case where
J = 1, see the technical appendix, section 3.6.B.2., equation (A.3.42).
40For the intermediate steps, on the derivation of the equilibrium condition for the price of capital, see the
technical appendix, section 3.6.B.2., equation (A.3.44).
41For the intermediate steps, on the derivation of the equilibrium condition for the price of capital in the
special case where J = 1, see the technical appendix, section 3.6.B.2., equation (A.3.45).
42For the intermediate steps, on the derivation of the equilibrium reinvestment rate in the special case where
J = 1, see the technical appendix, section 3.6.B.2., equation (A.3.46).
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In Figure 3.2 we depict the equilibrium price of capital and equilibrium reinvestment rate per
unit of capital with logarithmic utility for two curvature levels of the investment function,
representing higher and lower investment adjustment costs & = 1:1 > 1 and & = 1. Both
capital prices, Q (7), and investment, k, do not depend on * and '. This holds because,
in the case of logarithmic utility <H (7t) = <
E (7t) = :. With higher adjustment cost of
investment, driven by parameter &, the reinvestment rate per unit of capital goes down
(investment is discouraged) and the price for capital goes up.
Figure 3.2 - Equilibrium price of capital and reinvestment rate per unit of capital
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The rate of return that the expert earns from holding capital has the following law of
motion,
drKt =
(A! kt)Kt
Q (7t)Kt
dt| {z }
q
div idend yield
+
d (Q (7t)Kt)
Q (7t)Kt| {z }
q
Capita l gains rate
(3.61)
The equilibrium condition for RK (7t) for agents with recursive Epstein-Zin preferences, is
given by,43
RK (7t) =
1
K
"
AK+ 1
Q (7t)
+
&Q (7t)
1!;
; ! 1
1! &
#
! / + (3.62)
+
Q0t (7t)F (7t)
Q (7t)
+ *
>
Q (7t +G (7t))
Q (7t)
(1! ')! 1
?
In the special case, where & = 1, the equilibrium condition for the expected rate of return
on capital, RK (7t) ; for agents with recursive Epstein-Zin preferences, is given by,
44
RK (7t) =
1
K
>
AK+ 1
Q (7t)
+ ln (Q (7t))
?
! / + (3.63)
+
Q0t (7t)F (7t)
Q (7t)
+ *
>
Q (7t +G (7t))
Q (7t)
(1! ')! 1
?
The expected equilibrium rate of return on capital, for agents with logarithmic prefer-
ences, is given by,45
E
!
rKt
"
=
1
K
 
AK+ 1
q
+
&q
1!;
; ! 1
1! &
!
! / ! *' = 8rKt (3.64)
8rKt is, as in the endowment economy, constant for agents with logarithmic preferences. In
the special case, where & = 1, the expected equilibrium rate of return on capital, for agents
43For the intermediate steps, on the derivation of the equilibrium condition for RK (Ht) for agents with
recursive Epstein-Zin preferences, see the technical appendix, section 3.6.B.2., equation (A.3.57).
44For the intermediate steps, on the derivation of the equilibrium condition for RK (Ht) for agents with
recursive Epstein-Zin preferences for the special case where J = 1, see the technical appendix, section
3.6.B.2., equation (A.3.58).
45For the intermediate steps, on the derivation of the expected equilibrium rate of return on capital for
agents with logarithmic preferences, see the technical appendix, section 3.6.B.2., equation (A.3.61).
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with logarithmic preferences, is given by,46
E
!
rKt
"
=
1
K
(:K+ 1 + ln (AK+ 1)! ln (:K+ 1))! / ! *' = 8rKt (3.65)
In a next step, we use the optimal portfolio allocation Gt, derived from the expertís
expected utility maximization problem, in order to derive the equilibrium condition of the
bond rate R(7t) for agents with recursive Epstein-Zin preferences,
47
R(7t) = R
K(7t) +
*
h
(1! ')Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i
 E(7t +G(7t))
 E(7t)
h
1
0t
h
(1! ')Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i
+ 1
i( (3.66)
where RK(7t) is given by (3.62) and in the special case, where &t = 1, R
K(7t) is given by
(3.63).
For agents with logarithmic preferences, the equilibrium condition of the bond rate R(7t)
is given by,48
R (7t) = 8r
K
t +
*
1
0t
! 1
*
(3.67)
where 8rKt is given by (3.64) and in the special case, where & = 1, 8r
K
t is given by (3.65).
In Figure 3.3, RK(7t), R(7t) and the risk premium (denoted by ìR-P(7)î) are depicted for
the special case of logarithmic preferences. The three panels comprising the Örst row of
Figure 3.3 depict RK(7t), R(7t) and the risk premium for the benchmark parameter values,
K = 10, : = 2%, A = 11%, / = 3%, * = 3%, and ' = 5%. The blue line depicts the
case of logarithmic investment adjustment costs (& = 1), while the red line depicts higher
adjustment costs setting & = 1:1. The pure message is that higher adjustment costs make
46For the intermediate steps, on the derivation of the expected equilibrium rate of return on capital for
agents with logarithmic preferences for the special case where J = 1, see the technical appendix, section
3.6.B.2., equation (A.3.64).
47For the intermediate steps, on the derivation of the equilibrium condition for R (Ht) for agents with recursive
Epstein-Zin preferences, see the technical appendix, section 3.6.B.2., equation (A.3.65).
48For the intermediate steps, on the derivation of the equilibrium condition for R (Ht) for agents with loga-
rithmic preferences, see the technical appendix, section 3.6.B.2., equation (A.3.67).
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both expected stock returns, RK(7t), and the bond rate, R(7t) to drop. Yet, as implied by
(3.67), the risk premium, RK(7t)!R(7t) is not a§ected by changes in the value of &.
Figure 3.3 - Expected equilibrium rate of return on capital, equilibrium bond rate and
the risk premium (denoted by ìR-P(7)î) for agents with logarithmic preferences.
The three panels comprising the second row of Figure 3.3 depict RK(7t), R(7t) and the
risk premium for all the benchmark parameter values except for setting & = 1:1 and except
for varying the values of * and '. Introducing higher disaster risk, *, ceteris paribus (the
green line) decreases both RK(7t) and R(7t) but increases the risk premium (as this is also
implied by (3.67)). These are reasonable e§ects, as stock returns become less attractive
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and investors ask for a higher risk premium for the higher partial-default risk (risk spread).
Unsurprisingly, the direction of changes is qualitatively the same for introducing higher
disaster impact, ', ceteris paribus (the black line). The three panels comprising the second
row of Figure 3.3 depict RK(7t), R(7t) and the risk premium for & = 1, with the same
qualitative conclusions. Quantitatively, in the case of & = 1, RK(7t) and R(7t) are at higher
levels compared to the case of & = 1:1, while the risk premium comparisons are the same for
& = 1 and & = 1:1, as implied by (3.67).
As a Önal step, we derive the equilibrium condition for the law of motion of the state
variable 7t, for agents with recursive Epstein-Zin preferences,
49
d7t
7t
=
>>
1
7t
(RK (7t)!R (7t)) +R (7t)
?
!<E (7t)! >"(kt) + / !
Q0t (7t)F (7t)
Q (7t)
?
| {z }
q
1
#t
F (#t)
dt+
+
A
1
0t
! 1
B h
(1! ') Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i
Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
(1! ')| {z }
q
1
#t
G(#t)
dnt
(3.68)
where >"(kt) corresponds to >(kt) with its optimal reinvestment rate. For agents with
logarithmic preferences, the equilibrium law of motion is equal to,50
d7t
7t
=
>>
1
7t
(8rKt !R (7t)) +R (7t)
?
! :! >"(kt) + /
?
| {z }
q
1
#t
F (#t)
dt+
A
1
0t
! 1
B
(!')
1! '| {z }
q
1
#t
G(#t)
dnt
(3.69)
49For the intermediate steps, on the derivation of the equilibrium condition for the law of motion of Ht for
agents with recursive Epstein-Zin preferences, see the technical appendix, section 3.6.B.2., equation (A.3.70).
50For the intermediate steps, on the derivation of the equilibrium condition for the law of motion of Ht for
agents with logarithmic preferences, see the technical appendix, section 3.6.B.2., equation (A.3.72).
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Figure 3.4 - Law of motion of 7 for di§erent values of * and ', logarithmic investment
costs (& = 1), vs. higher adjustment costs (& > 1).
In Figure 3.4, F (7t) and G(7t) for logarithmic preferences are depicted. For Önancial stabil-
ity, it is crucial to have a region of negative values for function F (7). The main messages
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from Figure 3.4 are that increasing & produces such a negative region, while increasing
disaster risk, *, and the negative disaster impact, ', increase the negative slope of F (7).
Further research focusing on numerical simulations can investigate the role of such parame-
ters, especially in the presence of regulating constraints on leveraging policies of Önancial
intermediaries. This extension requires numerical techniques that handle corner solutions
for such sharp constraints, such as viscosity-solution approaches.
3.5 Conclusion
We provided analytical results on introducing jump/disaster risk to a new class of models
of Önancial stability. This class of models is micro-founded, relying only on preference-and-
technology fundamentals in order to co-determine the leveraging of Önancial institutions
and asset prices. As excess leveraging may boost asset prices and leveraging may expose
the system to a sudden drop in asset-prices, the core feature to investigate is the extent
to which markets internalize these features. As the framework we study has incomplete
markets, facing a certain degree of market failure is inevitable. In our view, introducing
disaster shocks to such markets is at the heart of the broader research question of Önancial
stability.51 The place at which markets fail to internalize the risk of such disaster shock is
the place where the need for Önancial-stability regulation starts.
We have not attempted a policy analysis in this paper. The task of introducing disaster
risk to this class of Önancial stability models is cumbersome and it requires the develop-
ment of robust numerical techniques. The contribution of this paper is to deliver analyti-
cal results that can serve as guides for developing homotopy approaches in order to study
such economies. We made this contribution for two versions of the model. The Örst is a
51This model complements other ìworkhorseî models such as the Bernanke et al. (1999) model, in which
the possibility of disasters is not studied.
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Basak and Cuoco (1998) version of the model, an endowment economy. The second, is a
production-economy version with endogenous growth. In the endogenous-growth version,
the economy-wide growth rate depends on the level of endogenous risk in the economy. En-
dogenous risk is a model feature that stems from the level of exposure to external shocks
due to leveraging.
In our model, the inverse of the leverage ratio, 7t, will not be stationary for most pa-
rameter values. This feature allows us to study the role and urgency of regulation in the
form of Basel II and Basel III requirements in future research. Further research is needed
to see which parameters and policies make 7t stationary. A provisional idea is to introduce
regulation in the form of imposing a minimum leverage ratio (lower bound) that implies a
penalty if violated. SpeciÖcally, one needs to investigate the case in which experts will have
to pay a penalty to the households. By taking this punishment mechanism into account
while solving their utility-maximization problem, experts may decrease their leverage ratio
even more than the imposed minimum-leverage ratio. Whether this policy may lead to more
stock-price stability is an additional extension for future research.
Our model opens the potential of studying the role that monetary policy can play for
preventing bank runs. Borrowed money by banks is inside money in the balance sheets of
banks. Money injections to the balance sheets of banks is outside money. Understanding
the mechanism driving the dynamics of inside money and also the ways banks perceive
monetary-policy rules, or surprising monetary-policy announcements, gives the chance to
answer speciÖc questions such as: ìhow does quantitative easing work?î
A key challenge of these models is the matching of real-world asset-price features. Specif-
ically, one goal is to match price-dividend ratios of the Önancial sector, bond-prices and
aggregate-stock-index returns simultaneously. Once this goal is achieved, then, by varying
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model parameters, one can study whether the Önancial system tends to be unstable. In fu-
ture work, we plan to introduce outside money to our model (central bank money), allowing
for the central bank to rescue banks. Furthermore, we plan to introduce model uncertainty.
Model uncertainty implies that there are ìblind spotsî in disaster anticipations that may al-
low for even higher leveraging. Such high leverage may exacerbate the potential for Önancial
crises.
3.6 Technical appendix
3.6.A Endowment economy
3.6.A.1 Representative householdís decision with logarithmic utility
max
(CHt ;Bt)t$0
E0
>Z 1
0
e!LtU(CHt )dt
?
s:t: dBt = (rtBt ! CHt )dt
where U(CHt ) * ln(CHt ). The bond rate rt is a function of 7t,
rt = R(7t)
and the dynamics of 7t are in the form of,
d7t = F (7t)dt+G(7t)dnt
At this stage, the functional forms of R(&); F (&) and G(&) are unknown.
We solve the stochastic dynamic optimization problem through the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJBH) equation,
:JH(Bt; 7t) = max
CHt >0
/
ln(CHt ) + J
H
B (Bt; 7t) &
,
R(7t)Bt ! CHt
-
+ JH0 (Bt; 7t)F (7t)+
+ *
,
JH(Bt; 7t +G(7t))! JH(Bt; 7t)
-0
(A.3.1)
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in which JHB (Bt; 7t) denotes the partial derivative with respect to variable Bt and J
H
0 (Bt; 7t)
denotes the partial derivative with respect to variable 7t.
We take a guess on the functional form for the householdís value function JH(Bt; 7t),
JH(Bt; 7t) = H(7t) + b ln(Bt)
FOC w.r.t. CHt : !
CHt
"!1
= JHB (Bt; 7t)
CHt = b
!1Bt (A.3.2)
Now plugging this equation into (A.3.1) and using the function form of the value function
gives,
:H(7t) + :b ln(Bt) = ln(b
!1) + ln(Bt) + bR(7t)! 1
+H 0(7t)F (7t) + * [H(7t +G(7t))!H(7t)] (A.3.3)
In order to make the equation hold, the following conditions have to be secured,
:b ln(Bt) = ln(Bt)
b =
1
:
(A.3.4)
and
:H(7t) = ln(b
!1) + bR(7t)! 1 +H 0(7t)F (7t) + * [H(7t +G(7t))!H(7t)] (A.3.5)
We can further simplify the (A.3.1), using both conditions, (A.3.4) and (A.3.5) in one an-
other,
:H(7t) = ln(:) +
1
:
R(7t)! 1 +H 0(7t)F (7t) + * [H(7t +G(7t))!H(7t)]
0 = :H(7t)! ln(:)!
1
:
R(7t) + 1!H 0(7t)F (7t)! * [H(7t +G(7t))!H(7t)] .
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H(7t) can be solved once we know the functional forms of R(&); F (&) and G(&).
(A.3.4) in (A.3.2) gives us the householdís optimal consumption rule as a Öxed fraction,
:, of his net wealth Bt,
CHt = :Bt (A.3.6)
3.6.A.2 Representative expertís decision with logarithmic utility
max
(CEt ;Nt;/t)t$0
E0
>Z 1
0
e!LtU(CEt )dt
?
s:t: dNt =
/,
Gt(8r
D
t ! rt) + rt
-
Nt ! CEt
0
dt+
>
(1! ') Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
GtNtdnt
where U(CEt ) * ln(CEt ) and Gt = 10t .
The shock term of dNt,
dNShockt = d(q
Shock
t D
Shock
t ) =
>
(1! ') Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
GtNtdnt (A.3.7)
can be derived applying Ito^ís Lemma for Poisson processes. We recall the stochastic di§er-
ential equation for Dt, dDt,
dDt = gDtdt+ [(1! ')Dt !Dt] dnt
and postulate that qt depends on the state variable 7t,
qt = Q(7t)
with the law of motion equal to,
d7t = F (7t)dt+G(7t)d7t
Applying Ito^ís Lemma, we derive the stochastic di§erential equation of Q(7t),
dQ(7t) = Q0t(7t)F (7t)dt+ [Q(7t +G(7t))!Q(7t)] dnt (A.3.8)
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in which Q0t(7t) is the derivative with respect to 7t.
Next we derive the stochastic di§erential equation of f(Q(7t); Dt) = Q(7t)Dt,
df(Q(7t); Dt) =
,
fQ(0t)Q0tF (7t) + fDtgDt
-
dt
+ [f(Q(7t) +Q(7t +G(7t))!Q(7t); Dt + (1! ')Dt !Dt)! f(Q(7t); Dt)] dnt
df(Q(7t); Dt) =
,
DtQ0tF (7t) +Q(7t)gDt
-
dt+ [f(Q(7t +G(7t)); (1! ')Dt)! f(Q(7t); Dt)] dnt
df(Q(7t); Dt) =
,
DtQ0tF (7t) +Q(7t)gDt
-
dt+ [Q(7t +G(7t))(1! ')Dt !Q(7t)Dt] dnt
(A.3.9)
d(Q(7t)
ShockDShockt ) = [Q(7t +G(7t))(1! ')Dt !Q(7t)Dt] dnt
=
>
Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
(1! ')! 1
?
Q(7t)Dtdnt
=
>
Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
(1! ')! 1
?
GtNtdnt (A.3.10)
8rDt is the expected return from the stock market and it is postulated to be a function of 7t:
8rDt * E(rDt ) = RD(7t)
For the expertís stochastic dynamic optimization problem, we formulate the corresponding
HJBE:
:JE(Nt; 7t) = max
CEt ;/t
/
ln(CEt ) + J
E
N (Nt; 7t)
/,
Gt(R
D(7t)!R(7t)) +R(7t)
-
Nt ! CEt
0
+
JE0 (Nt; 7t)F (7t) + +*
>
JE
9
Nt +
>
(1! ') Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
GtNt; 7t +G(7t)
:
! JE(Nt; 7t)
?=
(A.3.11)
We take a guess on the functional form for the expertís value function JE(Nt; 7t),
JE(Nt; 7t) = L(7t) + K ln(Nt)
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FOC w.r.t. Ct: !
CEt
"!1
= JEN (Nt; 7t)
CEt =
1
K
Nt (A.3.12)
FOC w.r.t. Gt:
JEN (Nt; 7t) (R
D(7t)!R(7t))Nt = !*
>
(1! ') Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
Nt
JEN
9
Nt +
>
(1! ') Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
GtNt; 7t +G(7t)
:
K(RD(7t)!R(7t)) =
!*
h
(1! ') Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i
K
1 +
h
(1! ') Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i
Gt>
(1! ') Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
Gt = !1!
*
h
(1! ') Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i
(RD(7t)!R(7t))
Gt = !
1h
(1! ') Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i ! *
(RD(7t)!R(7t))
(A.3.13)
Simplify (A.3.11) by using the functional form of the value function JE(Nt; 7t), its partial
derivatives, (A.3.12) and (A.3.13),
:L(7t) + :K ln(Nt) = ln(
1
K
) + ln(Nt) +
+K
1
Nt
<,
Gt(8r
D
t ! rt) + rt
-
Nt ! 1
K
Nt
=
+ L0(7t)F (7t) + * [L(7t +G(7t))
+K ln
9
Nt +
>
(1! ') Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
GtNt
:
! L(7t)! K ln(Nt)
?
:L(7t) + :K ln(Nt) = ln(
1
K
) + ln(Nt) + L
0(7t)F (7t)+
+
240@! 1h
(1! ') Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i ! *
(RD(7t)!R(7t))
1A (RD(7t)!R(7t)) +R(7t)
35K! 1+
+*
24L(7t +G(7t)) + K ln(Nt) + K ln
0@!*
h
(1! ') Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i
(RD(7t)!R(7t))
1A! L(7t)! K ln(Nt)
35
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:L(7t) + :K ln(Nt) = ln(
1
K
) + ln(Nt) + L
0(7t)F (7t)+
+
240@! (RD(7t)!R(7t))h
(1! ') Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i ! *
1A+R(7t)
35K! 1+
+*
24L(7t +G(7t)) + K ln
0@!*
h
(1! ') Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i
(RD(7t)!R(7t))
1A! L(7t)
35
To make the equation hold, we need to secure that,
:K ln(Nt) = ln(Nt)
K =
1
:
(A.3.14)
and
:L(7t) = ln(
1
K
) + L0(7t)F (7t) +
240@! (RD(7t)!R(7t))h
(1! ') Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i ! *
1A+R(7t)
35K! 1 +
+*
24L(7t +G(7t)) + K ln
0@!*
h
(1! ') Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i
(RD(7t)!R(7t))
1A! L(7t)
35
(A.3.14) in (A.3.12) gives us the expertís optimal consumption rule as a Öxed fraction, :, of
his net wealth Nt:
CEt = :Nt (A.3.15)
3.6.A.3 Equilibrium conditions
In order to derive the equilibrium expected value of the risky asset return, RD(7t), we need
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to determine the dynamics of the risky asset return rDt ,
drDt =
Dt
Pt
dt+
d(Pt)
Pt
drDt =
Dt
Pt
dt+
d(qDt)
qDt
drDt = :dt+
d(1
L
Dt)
1
L
Dt
drDt = (:+ g)dt! 'dnt (A.3.16)
The expected value of drDt , E
!
drDt
"
in equilibrium is equal to,
E(drDt ) = (:+ g ! *')dt (A.3.17)
and the expected value of rDt , R
D(7t) in equilibrium is equal to,
RD(7t) =
1Z
0
E(drDt )dt = :+ g ! *' = 8rDt (A.3.18)
To derive the equilibrium bond return R(7t), we use (A.3.13) and constant q, in
Gt =
1
7t
! 1h
(1! ') Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i ! *
(8rDt !R(7t))
=
1
7t
1
'
! *
(:+ g ! *' !R(7t))
=
1
7t
1
'
! 1
7t
=
*
(:+ g ! *' !R(7t))
(:+ g ! *' !R(7t)) =
*
1
*
! 1
0t
R(7t) = :+ g ! *' !
*
1
*
! 1
0t
(A.3.19)
In order to derive the law of motion of 7t, rewrite 7t as,
7t *
Nt
qtDt
= :
Nt
Dt
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so that the stochastic di§erential equation of 7t, d7t, reduces to,
d7t = :d
9
Nt
Dt
:
First we derive the stochastic di§erential equation of Nt, dNt, with Gt =
1
0t
and (A.3.15),
(3.22), (A.3.18) and (A.1.4):
dNt =
/,
Gt(8r
D
t ! rt) + rt
-
Nt ! CEt
0
dt+
>
(1! ') Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
GtNtdnt
dNt =
<>
1
7t
(8rDt !R(7t)) +R(7t)! :
?
Nt
=
dt! 'Nt
7t
dnt
dNt =
("9
1! 1
7t
: 
:+ g ! *' ! *1
*
! 1
0t
!
+
1
7t
(:+ g ! *')! :
#
Nt
)
dt! '
:
Dtdnt
dNt =
"9
1
7t
! 1
:
*
1
*
! 1
0t
+ :+ g ! *' ! :
#
Ntdt! '
:
Dtdnt
dNt =
"9
1
7t
! 1
:
*
1
*
! 1
0t
+ 8rDt ! :
#
Nt| {z }
q
9N (Nt;Dt)
dt !'
:
Dt| {z }
q
bN (Nt;Dt)
dnt (A.3.20)
dNt = #
N(Nt; Dt)dt+ b
N(Nt; Dt)dnt
Then we recall the stochastic di§erential equation of Dt, dDt:
dDt = gDt|{z}
q
9D(Nt;Dt)
dt+ [(1! ')Dt !Dt]| {z }
q
bD(Nt;Dt)
dnt
dDt = #
D(Nt; Dt)dt+ b
D(Nt; Dt)dnt (A.3.21)
We deÖne the function f(Nt; Dt),
f(Nt; Dt) * Nt
Dt
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and apply Ito^ís Lemma for Poisson processes, in order to derive d
A
Nt
Dt
B
,
df(Nt; Dt) =
,
fD(Nt; Dt) & #D(Nt; Dt) + fN(Nt; Dt) & #N(Nt; Dt)
-
dt+,
f(Nt + b
N(Nt; Dt); Dt + b
D(Nt; Dt))! f(Nt; Dt)
-
dnt
df(Nt; Dt) =
(
!Nt
D2t
gDt +
1
Dt
"9
1
7t
! 1
:
*
1
*
! 1
0t
+ 8rDt ! :
#
Nt
)
dt+
+
(
Nt ! *LDt
Dt + [(1! ')Dt !Dt] !
Nt
Dt
)
dnt
df(Nt; Dt) =
Nt
Dt
(9
1
7t
! 1
:
*
1
*
! 1
0t
+ 8rDt ! (:+ g)
)
dt+
"
Nt ! *LDt
Dt ! 'Dt !
Nt
Dt
#
dnt
df(Nt; Dt) =
Nt
Dt
"9
1
7t
! 1
:
*'
1! *
0t
! *'
#
dt+
"
Nt ! *LDt
Dt ! 'Dt !
Nt
Dt
#
dnt (A.3.22)
Now we can derive the law of motion of 7t:
d7t = :dH(Nt; Dt)
d7t =
:Nt
Dt
&
(9
1
7t
! 1
:
*'
1! *
0t
! *'
)
dt+
"
LNt
Dt
! '
1! ' !
:Nt
Dt
#
dnt
d7t = 7t
"9
1
7t
! 1
:
*'
1! *
0t
! *'
#
dt+
9
7t ! '
1! ' ! 7t
:
dnt
d7t = !*'7t
9
1! 7t
' ! 7t
+ 1
:
| {z }
q
F (#t)
dt+ 7t
 
1! *
0t
1! ' ! 1
!
| {z }
q
G(#t)
dnt (A.3.23)
The dynamics of 7t:
d7t
7t
= !*'
9
1! 7t
' ! 7t
+ 1
:
dt!
 
1!
1! *
0t
1! '
!
dnt (A.3.24)
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3.6.A.4 Representative householdís decision with recursive Epstein-Zin prefer-
ences
Expected utility is deÖned as,
JHt = Et
241Z
t
f
!
CH (R) ; JH (R)
"
dR
35
in which f
!
CH ; JH
"
is a normalized aggregator of continuation utility, JH , and current
consumption CH ,
f(CHt ; J
H
t ) * :(1! 9)JHt
(
CHt
[(1!()JHt ]
1
1!$
)1! 1
*
! 1
1! 1
+
Derivative of f(CHt ; J
H
t ) w.r.t. C
H
t :
fc(C
H
t ; J
H
t ) = :
,
(1! 9)JHt
-1! 1! 1*
1!$
!
CHt
"! 1
*
We deÖne,
a * 1!
1
+
1! 9
1! 1
A
= a(1! 9)
We postulate that the bond rate rt is a function of 7t,
rt = R(7t)
and the dynamics of 7t are of the form,
d7t = F (7t)dt+G(7t)dnt .
The expert maximizes his expected utility subject to,
dBt =
!
R(7t)Bt ! CHt
"
dt
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At this stage, the functional forms of R(&); F (&) and G(&) are unknown.
For the householdís stochastic dynamic optimization problem with recursive Epstein-Zin
preferences, we formulate the corresponding HJBH :
0 = max
CHt
/
f(CHt ; J
H
t ) + J
H
B (Bt; 7t) &
,
R(7t)Bt ! CHt
-
+ JH0 (Bt; 7t)F (7t)+
+ *
,
JH(Bt; 7t +G(7t))! JH(Bt; 7t)
-0
(A.3.25)
We take a guess on the functional form of JH(Bt; 7t),
JH(Bt; 7t) =  
H(7t)
B1!(t
1! 9
FOC w.r.t. CHt :
fc(C
H
t ; J
H
t ) = J
H
B (Bt; 7t)
:[(1! 9)JHt ]1!U
!
CHt
"U(1!()!1
=  H(7t)B
!(
t
:(1! 9)1!U H(7)1!UB
(1!()(1!U)
t
(1! 9)1!U
!
CHt
"U(1!()!1
=  H (7)B!(t
: H (7)!U CU(1!()!1t = B
!(1!()+U(1!()!(
t
We obtain the optimal consumption rule for the representative household:
CHt = :
1
1!A(1!$) H(7t)
A
A(1!$)!1| {z }
q
/H (#t)
Bt
CHt = <H(7t)Bt (A.3.26)
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Rewrite f(CHt ; J
H
t ) for the simpliÖcation of (A.3.25),
f(CHt ; J
H
t ) * :(1! 9)JHt
(
CHt
[(1!()JHt ]
1
1!$
)1! 1
*
! 1
1! 1
+
f(CHt ; J
H
t ) = !
:
a
JHt +
:
a
(1! 9)!U !JHt "1!U !CHt "U(1!()
f(CHt ; J
H
t ) =
:
a
>
! H(7)B
1!(
t
1! 9 + (1! 9)
!U H(7)1!U
B(1!()(1!U)
(1! 9)1!U :
A(1!$)
1!A(1!$) H(7)
A2(1!$)
A(1!$)!1B
U(1!()
t
?
f(CHt ; J
H
t ) =
:
a
 H(7)
B1!(t
1! 9
>
!1 + : A(1!$)1!A(1!$) H(7) A
2(1!$)!A2(1!$)+A
A(1!$)!1
?
f(CHt ; J
H
t ) =
:
a
[:
A(1!$)
1!A(1!$) H(7t)
A
A(1!$)!1 ! 1] H(7t)
B1!(t
1! 9
and replace it in (A.3.25),
0 =
:
a
h
:
A(1!$)
1!A(1!$) H(7t)
A
A(1!$)!1 ! 1
i
 H(7t)
+(1! 9) H(7t)
h
R(7t)! :
1
1!A(1!$) H(7t)
A
A(1!$)!1
i
+( H)0(7t) & F (7t) + *[ H(7t +G(7t))!  H(7t)] (A.3.27)
(A.3.27) will be used in the numerical solution to derive  H(7t) and C
H
t (Nt; 7t).
3.6.A.5 Representative expertís decision with recursive Epstein-Zin preferences
The expert maximizes his expected utility subject to,
dNt =
/,
Gt(8r
D
t ! rt) + rt
-
Nt ! CEt
0
dt+
>
(1! ') Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
GtNtdnt
dNShockt is derived as in (A.3.7) and we postulate that the price-dividend ratio is a function
of 7t,
qt = Q(7t)
8rDt is the expected return of the investment in the stock market and it is a function of 7t,
8rDt * E(rDt ) = RD(7t)
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For the expertís stochastic dynamic optimization problem with recursive Epstein-Zin pref-
erences, we formulate the corresponding HJBE:
0 = max
CEt ;/t
/
f(CEt ; J
E
t ) + J
E
N (Nt; 7t)
/,
Gt(R
D(7t)!R(7t)) +R(7t)
-
Nt ! CEt
0
+ JE0 (Nt; 7t)F (7t)
+*
>
JE
9<
1 +
>
(1! ')Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
Gt
=
Nt; 7t +G(7t)
:
! JE(Nt; 7t)
?=
We take a guess for the functional form of JE(Nt; 7t):
JE(Nt; 7t) =  
E(7t)
N1!(t
1! 9
FOC w.r.t. Ct:
fc(C
E
t ; J
E
t ) = J
E
N (Nt; 7t)
CEt = :
1
1!A(1!$) E(7t)
A
A(1!$)!1| {z }
q
/E(#t)
Nt
CEt = <E(7t)Nt (A.3.28)
FOC w.r.t. Gt:
JEN (Nt; 7t)Nt(R
D(7t)!R(7t)) = !*Nt
>
(1! ')Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
JEN
9<
1 +
>
(1! ')Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
Gt
=
Nt; 7t +G(7t)
:
 E(7)N!(t
,
RD(7t)!R(7t)
-
= !*
>
(1! ')Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
 E(7t +G(7t))<
1 +
>
(1! ')Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
Gt
=!(
N!(t
1 +
>
(1! ')Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
Gt =
8<:!*
h
(1! ')Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i
 E(7t +G(7t))
 E(7t) [R
D(7t)!R(7t)]
9=;
1
$
Gt =
<
!Q
h
(1!*)Q(#t+G(#t))
Q(#t)
!1
i
 E(0t+G(0t))
 E(0t)[R
D(0t)!R(0t)]
= 1
$
! 1h
(1! ')Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i (A.3.29)
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SimpliÖcation of the HJBE,
0 =
:
a
h
:
A(1!$)
1!A(1!$) E(7t)
A
A(1!$)!1 ! 1
i
 E(7t)
+(1! 9) E(7t)
>
1
7
,
RD(7t)!R(7t)
-
+R(7t)! :
1
1!A(1!$) E(7t)
A
A(1!$)!1
?
+
!
 E
"0
(7t)F (7t)
+*
(
 E(7t +G(7t))
<
1 +
>
(1! ')Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
1
7t
=1!(
!  E(7t)
)
(A.3.30)
Both (A.3.29) and (A.3.30) are used in the numerical solution to derive R(7t) and  
E(7t).
3.6.A.6 Numerical solution with recursive Epstein-Zin preferences
A numerical solution has to be applied in order to solve the model with recursive Epstein-Zin
preferences. As we do not know the exact solution of the dynamic system, the Örst idea is
to start from the equilibrium conditions. In equilibrium, aggregated consumption must be
equal to output, namely, the dividend realized at a speciÖc time.
CEt (Nt; 7t) +C
H
t (Bt; 7t) = Dt
By deÖnition:
7t =
Nt
Q(7t)Dt
and
1! 7t =
Q(7t)Dt
Q(7t)Dt
! Nt
Q(7t)Dt
=
Bt
Q(7t)Dt
Solving for Nt and Bt,
Nt = 7tQ(7t)Dt
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Bt = (1! 7t)Q(7t)Dt
Thereby we transform the two state variables Nt and Bt into functions of 7t. The equilibrium
condition equation can be rewritten as,
CEt (7tQ(7t)Dt; 7t) + C
H
t ((1! 7t)Q(7t)Dt; 7t) = Dt
From (A.3.26) and (A.3.28), we know that,
CHt = <H(7t)Bt and C
E
t = <E(7t)Nt
We further simplify the equilibrium condition equation, in order to obtain equilibrium Q(7t),
<H(7t) (1! 7t)Q(7t)Dt +<E(7t)7tQ(7t)Dt = Dt
<H(7t) (1! 7t)Q(7t) + <E(7t)7tQ(7t) = 1
Q(7t) =
1
<H(7t) (1! 7t) + <E(7t)7t
(A.3.31)
We recall the dynamics of 7t,
d7t = F (7t)dt+G(7t)dnt
Applying Ito^ís lemma for Poisson processes to derive the stochastic di§erential equation of
Q(7t), dQ(7t),
dQ(7t) = Q0t(7t)F (7t)dt+ [Q(7t +G(7t))!Q(7t)] dnt
dQ(7t) = Q0t(7t)F (7t)dt+
+([ H(7t +G(7t)) (1! (7t +G(7t))) +  E(7t +G(7t)) (7t +G(7t))]!1
! [<H(7t) (1! 7t) + <E(7t)7t]!1)dnt
The dynamics of returns from investing in the stock market, are given by,
drDt =
Dt
Pt
dt+
d(Q(7t)Dt)
Q(7t)Dt
(A.3.32)
drDt =
1
Q(7t)
dt+
d(Q(7t)Dt)
Q(7t)Dt
147
with (A.3.9),
drDt =
1
Q(7t)
dt+
,
Q0t(7t)F (7t) +Q(7t)g
-
Q(7t)
dt+
[Q(7t +G(7t))(1! ')!Q(7t)]
Q(7t)
dnt
drDt =
>
1
Q(7t)
+ g +
Q0t(7t)
Q(7t)
F (7t)
?
dt+
>
(1! ')Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
dnt (A.3.33)
The expected value of drDt is equal to:
E(drDt ) =
<
1
Q(7t)
+ g +
Q0(7t)
Q(7t)
F (7t) + *
>
(1! ')Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?=
dt (A.3.34)
and the expected value of rDt is equal to:
8rDt * E(rDt ) =
1
Q(7t)
+ g +
Q0(7t)
Q(7t)
F (7t) + *
>
(1! ')Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
(A.3.35)
To derive the law of motion of 7t, d7t, recall the di§erentials of Q(7t)Dt, d (Q(7t)Dt),
d(Q(7t)Dt) =
,
Q0t(7t)F (7t) +Q(7t)g
-
Dt| {z }
)y
dt+ [Q(7t +G(7t))(1! ')!Q(7t)]Dt| {z }
by
dnt
and Nt, dNt,
dNt =
<>
1
7t
(RDt (7t)!Rt(7t)) +Rt(7t)
?
Nt ! CEt (Nt; 7t)
=
| {z }
)X
dt+
>
(1! ') Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
Nt
7t| {z }
bx
dnt
By Ito^ís Lemma for Poisson processes xt and yt, we have:
d
9
xt
yt
:
=
9
1
yt
#x ! xt
y2t
#y
:
dt+
9
xt + b
x
yt + by
! xt
yt
:
dnt
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Applied to d7t = d
A
Nt
Q(0t)Dt
B
, gives us the law of motion of 7t,
d7t =
>
1
Q(7t)Dt
<>
1
7t
(RDt (7t)!Rt(7t)) +Rt(7t)
?
Nt ! CEt (Nt; 7t)
=
!
! Nt
(Q(7t)Dt)
2
,
Q0t(7t)F (7t) +Q(7t)g
-
Dt
?
dt+
+
24 Nt +
h
(1! ') Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i
Nt
0t
Q(7t)Dt + [Q(7t +G(7t))(1! ')!Q(7t)]Dt
! Nt
Q(7t)Dt
35 dnt
d7t = 7t
><>
1
7t
(RDt (7t)!Rt(7t)) +Rt(7t)
?
! C
E
t (Nt; 7t)
Nt
=
!
9
Q0t(7t)F (7t)
Q(7t)
+ g
:?
dt+
+7t
24
A
1 +
h
(1! ') Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i
1
0t
B
h
1 + [Q(0t+G(0t))(1!*)!Q(0t)]
Q(0t)
i ! 1
35 dnt
d7t = 7t
>
1
7t
(RDt (7t)!Rt(7t)) +Rt(7t)!
CEt (Nt; 7t)
Nt
! Q0t(7t)F (7t)
Q(7t)
! g
?
| {z }
q
F (#t)
dt+
+7t
24
A
0t!1
0t
+ 1
0t
(1! ') Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
B
(1! ')Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
35
| {z }
q
G(#t)
dnt (A.3.36)
3.6.B Production economy (general-equilibrium model)
3.6.B.1 Representative expertís utility maximization
The expert has to solve two maximization problems in the production economy, one as the
shareholder of the Örms and one as the shareholder of the banks.
Optimization problem of the expert as the shareholder of the Örms:
The expert maximizes his expected utility, subject to,
CEt + C
H
t + It = AKt
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given the law of motions of the state variables Kt; 7t and Bt:
dKt = (> (kt)Kt ! /Kt) dt+ ((1! ')Kt !Kt) dnt
d7t = F (7t) dt+G (7t) dnt
dBt =
!
R (7t)Bt ! CHt
"
dt
For the expertís stochastic dynamic optimization problem with logarithmic utility, U
!
CEt
"
=
ln
!
CEt
"
, we formulate the corresponding HJBE:
:JE (Kt; 7t; Bt) = max
Wt
/
U
!
AKt ! CHt ! ktKt
"
+JEKt (Kt; 7t; Bt) (> (kt)Kt ! /Kt) + JE0t (Kt; 7t; Bt)F (7t)
+JEBt (Kt; 7t; Bt)
!
R (7t)Bt ! CHt
"
+*
,
JE (Kt + (1! ')Kt !Kt; 7t +G (7t) ; Bt)! JE (Kt; 7t; Bt)
-0
For our purpose to formally derive the optimal investment rate, we only need the FOC w.r.t.
kt:
U 0
!
CEt
"
Kt = J
E
Kt (Kt; 7t; Bt) >
0 (kt)Kt
>0 (kt) =
U 0
!
CEt
"
JEKt (Kt; 7t; Bt)
=
1
Q (7t)
>0 (kt) =
1
Q (7t)
(A.3.37)
For consistency, we also formulate the HJBE for the expertís stochastic dynamic optimiza-
tion problem with recursive Epstein-Zin preferences:
0 = max
Wt
/
f
!
AKt ! CHt ! ktKt; JE (Kt; 7t; Bt)
"
+JEKt (Kt; 7t; Bt) (> (kt)Kt ! /Kt) + JE0t (Kt; 7t; Bt)F (7t)
+JEBt (Kt; 7t; Bt)
!
R (7t)Bt ! CHt
"
+*
,
JE (Kt + (1! ')Kt !Kt; 7t +G (7t) ; Bt)! JE (Kt; 7t; Bt)
-0
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FOC w.r.t. kt:
fCEt
!
CEt ; J
E
"
Kt = J
E
Kt (Kt; 7t; Bt) >
0 (kt)Kt
>0 (kt) =
fCEt
!
CEt ; J
E
"
JEKt (Kt; 7t; Bt)
=
1
Q (7t)
>0 (kt) =
1
Q (7t)
(A.3.38)
3.6.B.2 Equilibrium conditions in the production economy
Derivation of the equilibrium condition for the price of capital Q (7t) and the optimal in-
vestment rate kt with recursive Epstein-Zin preferences:
From the market clearing condition (3.51), using (3.52), we derive the equilibrium con-
dition for the price of capital Q (7t),
Ct + It = AKt
CHt + C
E
t = (A! kt)Kt
<H (7t)Bt +<
E (7t)Nt = (A! kt)Kt
<H (7t) (1! 7t) + <E (7t) 7t =
A! kt
Q (7t)
Q (7t) =
A! kt
<H (7t) (1! 7t) + <E (7t) 7t
. (A.3.39)
Using the optimal reinvestment rate per unit of capital,
kt =
[Q (7t)]
1
; ! 1
K
in (A.3.39), we have,
Q (7t) =
A!
9
Q(0t)
1
; !1
S
:
<H (7t) (1! 7t) + <E (7t) 7t
(A.3.40)
In the special case where & = 1, (A.3.40) is equal to,
Q (7t) =
A!
A
Q(0t)!1
S
B
<H (7t) (1! 7t) + <E (7t) 7t
A = Q (7t)
!
<H (7t) (1! 7t) + <E (7t) 7t
"
+
9
Q (7t)! 1
K
:
Q (7t) =
A+ 1
S
<H (7t) (1! 7t) + <E (7t) 7t + 1S
. (A.3.41)
and the optimal reinvestment rate per unit of capital, (3.43) is equal to,
kt =
Q (7t)! 1
K
kt =
A+ 1
F
.H(0t)(1!0t)+.E(0t)0t+ 1F
K
! 1
K
kt =
A+ 1
S
!<H (7t) (1! 7t)!<E (7t) 7t ! 1S
K [<H (7t) (1! 7t) + <E (7t) 7t] + 1
kt =
A!<H (7t) (1! 7t)!<E (7t) 7t
K [<H (7t) (1! 7t) + <E (7t) 7t] + 1
(A.3.42)
Derivation of the equilibrium condition for the price of capital Q (7t) and the optimal rein-
vestment rate per unit of capital kt with logarithmic preferences:
From the market clearing condition (3.51), using (3.53), we derive the equilibrium con-
dition for the price of capital Q (7t),
Ct + It = AKt
: (Bt +Nt) = AKt ! It
:Q (7t)Kt = (A! kt)Kt
Q (7t) =
(A! kt)
:
(A.3.43)
and with the optimal reinvestment rate per unit of capital (3.42) in (A.3.43),
q =
A!
A
q
1
; !1
S
B
:
(A.3.44)
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implies that the equilibrium price of capital q is constant.
In the special case where & = 1, (A.3.44) is equal to,
q =
A! ! q!1
S
"
:
q =
A
:
! q
:K
+
1
:K
q =
AK+ 1
:K+ 1
(A.3.45)
and the optimal reinvestment rate per unit of capital, (3.43) is equal to,
k =
q ! 1
K
k =
AS+1
LS+1
! 1
K
k =
A! :
:K+ 1
(A.3.46)
Derivation of the equilibrium condition for the expected return of the aggre-
gate amount of capital:
The dynamics of capital return, are given by the following law of motion,
drKt =
Dt
Q (7t)Kt
dt+
d (Q (7t)Kt)
Q (7t)Kt
(A.3.47)
with Dt * (A! kt)Kt being the dividend. In order to derive the equilibrium equation of
RK (7t), we Örst derive the stochastic di§erential equation of Q (7t),
dQ (7t) = Q0t (7t)F (7t) dt+ [Q (7t +G (7t))!Q (7t)] dnt (A.3.48)
and we recall the stochastic di§erential equation of Kt,
dKt = (>(kt)! /)Ktdt+ ((1! ')Kt !Kt) dnt (A.3.49)
in order to use both, dQ (7t) and dKt, to derive d (Q (7t)Kt), by applying Ito^ís Lemma for
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Poisson processes,
d (Q (7t)Kt) =
,
KtQ0t (7t)F (7t) +Qt (>(kt)! /)Kt
-
dt+
+ [(Q (7t) + [Q (7t +G (7t))!Q (7t)]) (K + ((1! ')Kt !Kt))
!Q (7t)Kt] dnt
d (Q (7t)Kt) =
>
Q0t (7t)F (7t)
Q (7t)
+ >(kt)! /
?
Q (7t)Ktdt+
+ [Q (7t +G (7t)) (1! ')Kt !Q (7t)Kt] dnt
d (Q (7t)Kt)
Q (7t)Kt
=
>
Q0t (7t)F (7t)
Q (7t)
+ >(kt)! /
?
dt+
>
Q (7t +G (7t))
Q (7t)
(1! ')! 1
?
dnt
(A.3.50)
Used in (A.3.47), gives us,
drKt =
>
(A! kt)
Q (7t)
+ >(kt)! / + Q0t (7t)F (7t)
Q (7t)
?
dt+
+
>
Q (7t +G (7t))
Q (7t)
(1! ')! 1
?
dnt (A.3.51)
We rewrite the optimal reinvestment rate per unit of capital kt,
kt =
Q (7t)
1
; ! 1
K
1 + Kkt = Q (7t)
1
;
and use it in the investment function (3.37),
>(kt) =
1
K
Q (7t)
1!;
; ! 1
1! & . (A.3.52)
Using this in (A.3.51),
drKt =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
A
Q (7t)
! Q (7t)
1
; ! 1
KQ (7t)
+
1
K
Q (7t)
1!;
; ! 1
1! &| {z }
q
0(#t)
! / + Q0t (7t)F (7t)
Q (7t)
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
dt+
+
<
Q (7t +G (7t))
Q (7t)
(1! ')! 1
=
dnt (A.3.53)
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Reformulate @ (7t) in order to simplify (A.3.53),
@ (7t) =
A
Q (7t)
! Q (7t)
1
; ! 1
KQ (7t)
+
1
K
Q (7t)
1!;
; ! 1
1! &
=
AK+ 1
KQ (7t)
+
1
K
Q (7t)
1!;
;
9
1
1! & ! 1
:
! 1
K (1! &)
=
AK+ 1
KQ (7t)
+
1
K
>
Q (7t)
1!;
;
9
1
1! & ! 1
:
! 1
(1! &)
?
=
1
K
AK+ 1
Q (7t)
+
1
K
24Q (7t) 1!;; !
A
Q (7t)
1!;
; ! &Q (7t)
1!;
;
B
! 1
1! &
35
=
1
K
"
AK+ 1
Q (7t)
+
&Q (7t)
1!;
; ! 1
1! &
#
(A.3.54)
Substituting (A.3.54) in (A.3.53), gives us,
drKt =
(
1
K
"
AK+ 1
Q (7t)
+
&Q (7t)
1!;
; ! 1
1! &
#
! / + Q0t (7t)F (7t)
Q (7t)
)
dt+
+
<
Q (7t +G (7t))
Q (7t)
(1! ')! 1
=
dnt (A.3.55)
RK (7t) =
1Z
0
E
!
drKt
"
dt = E
!
rKt
"
(A.3.56)
The equilibrium condition for the expected return of the aggregate amount of capital, RK (7t)
for agents with recursive Epstein-Zin preferences, is derived using (A.3.55) and (A.3.56),
RK (7t) =
1
K
"
AK+ 1
Q (7t)
+
&Q (7t)
1!;
; ! 1
1! &
#
! / +
+
Q0t (7t)F (7t)
Q (7t)
+ *
>
Q (7t +G (7t))
Q (7t)
(1! ')! 1
?
(A.3.57)
In (A.3.57) we consider the special case of & = 1, so that
lim
&!1
&Q (7t)
1!;
; ! 1
1! & = ln (Q (7t)) ,
155
which gives us the equilibrium equation of RK (7t),
RK (7t) =
1
K
>
AK+ 1
Q (7t)
+ ln (Q (7t))
?
! / +
+
Q0t (7t)F (7t)
Q (7t)
+ *
>
Q (7t +G (7t))
Q (7t)
(1! ')! 1
?
(A.3.58)
The dynamics of the capital return, with logarithmic utility are derived using (3.42) in
(A.3.47) and taking into account that q is constant,
drKt =
Dt
qKt
dt+
d (qKt)
qKt
drKt =
(A! kt)
q
dt+
dKt
Kt
drKt =
>
(A! kt)
q
+ >(kt)! /
?
dt! 'dnt
drKt =
264
h
A!
A
q
1
; !1
S
Bi
q
+
1
K
q
1!;
; ! 1
1! & ! /
375 dt! 'dnt
drKt =
"
A
q
! q
1!;
;
K
+
1
qK
+
1
K
q
1!;
; ! 1
1! & ! /
#
dt! 'dnt
drKt =
"
AK+ 1
qK
+
1
K
 
q
1!;
; ! 1! q 1!;; + &q 1!;;
1! &
!
! /
#
dt! 'dnt
drKt =
"
1
K
 
AK+ 1
q
+
&q
1!;
; ! 1
1! &
!
! /
#
dt! 'dnt (A.3.59)
The expected value of drKt is equal to,
E
!
drKt
"
=
"
1
K
 
AK+ 1
q
+
&q
1!;
; ! 1
1! &
!
! / ! *'
#
dt (A.3.60)
and the expected value of rKt is equal to,
E
!
rKt
"
=
1
K
 
AK+ 1
q
+
&q
1!;
; ! 1
1! &
!
! / ! *' (A.3.61)
with
q =
A
A!
A
q
1
; !1
S
BB
:
. (A.3.62)
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In (A.3.61), we consider the special case, where & = 1,
lim
&!1
&q
1!;
; ! 1
1! & = ln (q) ,
which gives us,
E
!
rKt
"
=
1
K
>
AK+ 1
q
+ ln (q)
?
! / ! *' (A.3.63)
In (A.3.63) use the equilibrium price q, derived for logarithmic preferences, (A.3.45), in order
to obtain the equilibrium expected rate of return on capital,
E
!
rKt
"
=
1
K
9
:K+ 1 + ln
9
AK+ 1
:K+ 1
::
! / ! *'
E
!
rKt
"
=
1
K
(:K+ 1 + ln (AK+ 1)! ln (:K+ 1))! / ! *' (A.3.64)
Derivation of the equilibrium condition for the bond return:
We rewrite the optimal portfolio allocation rule, (3.47) for an expert with recursive
Epstein-Zin preferences,
Gt =
<
!Q
h
(1!*)Q(#t+G(#t))
Q(#t)
!1
i
 E(0t+G(0t))
 E(0t)[R
K(0t)!R(0t)]
= 1
$
! 1h
(1! ')Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i
Gt
>
(1! ')Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
+ 1 =
8<:!*
h
(1! ')Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i
 E(7t +G(7t))
 E(7t) [R
K(7t)!R(7t)]
9=;
1
$
/
 E(7t)
,
RK(7t)!R(7t)
-0 1
$ =
n
!*
h
(1! ')Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i
 E(7t +G(7t))
o 1
$
Gt
h
(1! ')Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i
+ 1
 E(7t)
,
RK(7t)!R(7t)
-
=
!*
h
(1! ')Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i
 E(7t +G(7t))h
Gt
h
(1! ')Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i
+ 1
i(
such that,
R(7t) = R
K(7t) +
*
h
(1! ')Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i
 E(7t +G(7t))
 E(7t)
h
1
0t
h
(1! ')Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i
+ 1
i( (A.3.65)
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with optimal RK (7t) given by (A.3.57) and for the special case where & = 1, with optimal
RK (7t) given by (A.3.58).
For an expert with logarithmic preferences, we rewrite the optimal portfolio allocation
rule, (3.48) in order to derive R(7t),
Gt = !
1A
(1! ') Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
B ! *
RK (7t)!R (7t)
*
RK (7t)!R (7t)
= ! 1A
(1! ') Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
B ! Gt
RK (7t)!R (7t) = !
*
1!
(1!*)Q(#t+G(#t))
Q(#t)
!1
" + Gt
R (7t) = R
K (7t) +
*
1!
(1!*)Q(#t+G(#t))
Q(#t)
!1
" + Gt (A.3.66)
We know that with logarithmic utility, q is constant, so that the equation of (A.3.66) is equal
to,
R (7t) = R
K (7t) +
*
1
0t
! 1
*
(A.3.67)
with optimal RK (7t) given by (A.3.61) and (A.3.62) and for the special case where & = 1,
with optimal RK (7t) given by (A.3.64).
Derivation of the law of motion of 7t:
To derive the law of motion of 7t, recall that
d7t
7t
=
d
A
Nt
Q(0t)Kt
B
Nt
Q(0t)Kt
and recall from (A.3.50) the stochastic di§erential equations of Q (7t)Kt,
d (Q (7t)Kt) =
<
>(kt)! / + Q0t (7t)F (7t)
Q (7t)
=
Q (7t)Ktdt+
+
<
Q (7t +G (7t))
Q (7t)
(1! ')! 1
=
Q (7t)Ktdnt (A.3.68)
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and Nt,
dNt =
/,
Gt(R
K (7t)!R (7t)) +R (7t)
-
Nt ! CEt
0
dt+
>
(1! ') Q(7t +G(7t))
Q(7t)
! 1
?
GtNtdnt
(A.3.69)
Using both, (A.3.68) and (A.3.69), we can derive the law of motion of 7t for recursive
Epstein-Zin preferences, with (A.3.52),
d7t
7t
=
><>
1
7t
(RK (7t)!R (7t)) +R (7t)
?
!<E (7t)
=
!
<
>(kt)! / + Q0t (7t)F (7t)
Q (7t)
=?
dt+
+
h
(1! ') Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i
1
0t
!
n
Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
(1! ')! 1
o
1 +
n
Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
(1! ')! 1
o dnt
d7t
7t
=
">
1
7t
(RK (7t)!R (7t)) +R (7t)
?
!<E (7t)!
1
K
Q (7t)
1!;
; ! 1
1! & + / !
Q0t (7t)F (7t)
Q (7t)
#
| {z }
q
1
#t
F (#t)
dt+
+
A
1
0t
! 1
B h
(1! ') Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
! 1
i
Q(0t+G(0t))
Q(0t)
(1! ')| {z }
q
1
#t
G(#t)
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(A.3.70)
using (A.3.57) for RK (7t) and (A.3.65) for R (7t).
For the special case where & = 1, we use the optimal kt from (3.43), in order to rewrite
the investment function as,
>(kt) =
ln (Q (7t))
K
(A.3.71)
which is then used in the law of motion of 7t together with (A.3.58) for R
K (7t) and (A.3.65)
for R (7t).
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The law of motion of 7t for logarithmic utility, with (A.3.52), is given by,
d7t
7t
=
>>
1
7t
(8rKt !R (7t)) +R (7t)
?
! :! (>(kt)! /)
?
dt+
A
1
0t
! 1
B
(!')
1! ' dnt
d7t
7t
=
">
1
7t
(8rKt !R (7t)) +R (7t)
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! :! 1
K
q
1!;
; ! 1
1! & + /
#
| {z }
q
1
#t
F (#t)
dt+
A
1
0t
! 1
B
(!')
1! '| {z }
q
1
#t
G(#t)
dnt
(A.3.72)
together with (A.3.61) for 8rKt and (A.3.67) for R (7t). For the special case where & = 1,
we use the law of motion of 7t, (A.3.72), together with (A.3.71) for >(kt), (A.3.64) for 8r
K
t
and (A.3.67) for R (7t).
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